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Abstract 
 
The thesis investigates how governments could use a progressive tax system to raise 
more revenues from the mining industry. Making mineral taxes more progressive can 
raise high magnitude of revenues, reduce time-dependent inequality, resolve fiscal 
instability and restore confidence in tax planning to execute social development goals. 
However, no study has been conducted to investigate how progressivity distributes 
burdens and the degree to which revenues are collected and redistributed to a society. 
Given the gap, this study investigates the revenue collecting potentials of Papua New 
Guinea’s (PNG) progressive mineral taxation regime. 
 
The study methodology differs from stylized models used for building of taxation theory 
and descriptive analysis of policy issues. The study uses the Lorenz curve, which 
structurally measures the tax burden distribution and the time-dependent behaviour of tax 
instruments through computing progression coefficients using the Stroup index model. 
These techniques use time series financial and tax revenue data to measure the theoretical 
and actual performance of individual tax instruments. Further, to enhance the reliability 
of the results, uncertainty of input variables such as price and costs are reduced using real 
option (RO) solution techniques. The estimated and historical data are then used to 
compute tax progressivity index (TPI), marginal effective tax rate (METR), net effective 
tax rate (NETR) and other variables to assess the performance of royalty, basic tax 
instruments and hybrid resource rent tax. The combination of TPI, METR, NETR and 
wealth transfer rates and the Lorenz curve make the study a more comprehensive analysis 
of PNG’s mineral taxation regime.          
 
Corporate income tax (CIT), dividend withholding tax (DWT) and ad valorem royalty 
stand out as the mainstays of PNG’s mineral taxation regime compared with equity 
participation and additional profit tax (APT). The equity participation and the APT 
generate small amount of revenues and increase the social cost of rent-seeking. Further, 
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indirect and non-tax benefits when added to the direct taxes transfer substantial share of 
the mineral wealth to PNG. This thesis finds that PNG’s progressive mineral taxation 
framework has the ability to capture high magnitude of revenues from the resources 
sector. However, there are requirements for calibrating the policy tools such as 
depreciation techniques, loss carry forward provision, thin capitalisation rules and others 
to protect the tax base to make the tax instruments more progressive. 
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Chapter 1 : Introduction 
 
Raising revenues from the mining industry is one of the main objectives for devising 
policies that encourage extraction of mineral resources found within a mineral endowed 
nation. Recent research indicates that mineral taxation has become more topical in 
relation to governments seeking innovative ways to capture a high magnitude of tax 
revenues from mining activities. The objective is achieved through designing suitable tax 
instruments, including royalties and hybrid rent levies imposed at different taxing points 
(pre-tax and post-tax bases) so that total revenue collection can be maximised (Conrad 
2014). However, designing a balanced tax system that fits into the complex technical, 
economic and financial structure of the mining industry is a major challenge facing 
mineral taxation policies. The aim of this study is to analyse how a progressive tax 
schedule could balance the profit maximisation and revenue raising objectives of the 
stakeholders. 
 
Recent studies such as Clausing and Durst (2015) and Laporte and Quatrebarbes (2015) 
suggest that mineral taxation is a primary tool used for raising revenues to meet social 
development goals. Since governments often play leading roles in minerals supply, tax 
designates a political risk, which affects both industry returns and social welfare. As a 
result, mining companies perceive that taxes eliminate rents and thus, they could collude 
to reduce tax liabilities. On the other hand, governments respond to the perceived revenue 
losses by adopting corrective strategies to capture more of the resource revenues to 
support development budgets (Daley and Wood 2016). However, theory states that social 
return rate cannot rise further than the required return on a mining project that 
compensates investors for risk-taking investments (Garnaut and Clunnies Ross 1983). 
These diverging objectives complicate designing a balanced taxation policy. 
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This dissertation examines the taxation regime of PNG, using it as a case study to 
investigate the revenue generating capacity of progressive tax instruments, and how they 
affect investment decision-making. The chapter is organised as follows. Sections 1.1 and 
1.2 briefly discuss the background and the research problem. Sections 1.3 and 1.4 discuss 
the research design and purpose of the study. Sections 1.5 and 1.6 present the 
significance and scope of the study. Sections 1.7, 1.8 and 1.9 briefly mention ethical 
considerations, types of rents and provide a summary. 
 
 
1.1 Study background 
 
Mineral taxation studies are theory-orientated and focus more on optimal tax design 
structures for broadening the tax base (enlarging the industry through tax 
competitiveness) and rectifying other policy issues (Boadway and Keen 2014). However, 
past studies do not cogently explain the distributional characteristics of a neutral tax 
system and merely use it as a criterion for attaining extraction optimality (Smith and GL 
2007). The neutrality principle facilitates the distributions of rents pertaining to risks 
faced by capital and input factor providers that in turn ensures taxing the resource rents 
do not distort investment decision-making processes (Daniel, Keen and McPherson 
2010). It protects the capital allocation from being distorted by allowing a mining project 
to attain a normal rate of return (ROR) over a shortest period of time before a government 
can have access to tax revenues (Hogan 2012).  
  
 In order for a neutral tax system to function efficiently, investors expect tax designs that 
engage governments in sharing risks such as loss carry forward provision and crediting 
royalty payments against the taxable income (Boadway and Keen 2010). The early work 
of Brown (1948), which was revised by Garnaut and Clunies-Ross (1979) became the 
foundation for cash flow tax systems that are commonly employed in most mining 
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jurisdictions (McLaren 2012). The difference between the two cash flow taxes is that the 
Brownian tax attains neutrality by fully engaging a government into sharing the risks 
such as market price, exchange rate, operating and capital costs. 
 
Concerning the Brownian tax, subsidising a mining project’s cash flow losses using 
development funds delays a government having access to revenues. On the other hand, 
the Garnaut and Clunies-Ross tax system creates flexibility for a mining project to offset 
cash flow losses through the loss carry forward (LCF) provision (McLaren 2012). The 
LCF provision ensures the opportunity cost of irreversible capital invested must be 
recouped before taxes can be imposed (Mitchell 2009). This mechanism is facilitated by 
allowing a mining project itself to offset the losses, which takes the burden away from 
nations that have limited public finance for achieving social development goals.  
 
The common hybrid taxes devised to capture excess rents are: Resource Rent Tax (RRT), 
Resource Supper Profit Tax (RSPT) and Mineral Resources Rent Tax (MRRT) (Murray 
2015). Recent evidence suggests that none of these hybrid systems have fulfilled 
Australian federal government’s revenue raising projections (Valle de Souza, Dollery and 
Kortt 2016). The same scenario has been revealed for PNG from which the RRT 
originated. Furthermore, allowance for corporate capital (ACC) technique and a modified 
Boadway-Bruce tax system (Boadway and Bruce 1984) are also hybrid systems that are 
not practically applied at the policy level. Contrastingly, most mining jurisdictions rely 
more on royalties and basic taxes such as CIT than the hybrid tax systems. 
 
The basic tax instruments are CIT, dividend withholding tax (DWT) and royalties that 
generate stable and consistent revenues from the mining sector. Protecting the tax base of 
a cash flow tax system at the policy level is a major challenge because CIT generates 
greater revenues than the hybrid systems. Further, many countries are adopting the ad 
valorem royalty because it is a value-based levy, which responds to changes in the market 
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price, deposit quality and production rate (Otto et al. 2006). This has encouraged the 
resilience of value-based royalties globally despite their distorting behaviours. A recent 
study by Ergas, Harris and Pincus (2014) shows that royalties can fulfil a government’s 
revenue raising objective with minimum distortion (e.g., Freebairn 2015) compared to the 
RRT and state equity participation. 
 
Equity participation is a quasi-tax policy in which host governments own interests in 
mining operations and other extraction activities (oil and gas projects) (McPherson 2010). 
Equity participation strengthens a partnership between an investor and a government, and 
is driven by the optimism for financial asset accumulation and skill transfers to the 
community. However, heavy political involvement complicates measuring its 
performance, especially the social cost of equity participation that could exceed the 
expected dividend gains (Mendes 2015). Compared with equity participation and RRT, a 
few progressive basic taxes, including the ad valorem royalty can raise significant 
revenues. 
 
Progressivity has a strong connection with rent-based taxes, yet remains largely 
unstudied, although few scholars do mention it half-heartedly (Kamin 2008a). This could 
be due to the fear that more progressive taxes increase the marginal tax rate, thereby 
exposing investors to a high tax burden. Since marginal tax rate measures the burdens 
placed on values added to capital invested (Chen and Mintz 2013), it eliminates tax 
competitiveness and discourages risk-taking investment behaviour (Conrad and Hool 
1984). However, the incremental tax rate on every dollar increase in net value could be a 
reflexive behaviour that responds to an increase in the tax base, and therefore, 
progressivity may not increase the tax burden. Land (2008, 4) contends that an “adaptable 
and progressive” system is equitable and collects more tax revenues from profitable 
mines than do fixed systems  (also Daniel and Sunley 2008; Duncan and Peter 2016). 
 
  5  
  
  
The underlying principle of progressivity is that an increase in the marginal effective tax 
rate (METR) is a response to increases in the incremental rents generated by a profitable 
mining project (Gatzia and Woods 2014). This behaviour encourages tax instruments to 
respond positively to changes in the pre-tax base. This being the case, strongly 
progressive taxes capture the marginal incremental rents thereby transferring substantial 
mineral wealth to the society (Rousseau, 2014). Moreover, progressivity reduces the 
time-consistency problem by enhancing flexibility that in turn maintains an equilibrium 
position during both high and low rent periods (Land 2008). This could be the main 
reason why governments are encouraged to adopt progressive rent-based taxes compared 
to regressive levies and royalties (Clausing and Durst 2015a).  
 
Regressive levies not only generate lower revenues, but also distort capital allocation and 
production efficiencies. Hogan (2012) finds that relying on regressive taxes has resulted 
in losses of resource revenues in Australia. She affirms the findings of earlier studies 
(Freebairn and Quiggin 2010; Mayo 1979) to argue that profit-based royalties provide a 
safe option for governments to meet their revenue collection objectives. Additionally, 
consistent flows of revenues depend on the profit generating ability of the mining 
industry in the long run. Thus, securing the long-term sustainability of the industry 
requires a stable and competitive taxation regime. Although these ideas have been widely 
accepted (Hogan and Goldsworthy 2010), no performance-based studies have been 
conducted to investigate the revenue collecting capacity of  profit-based tax instruments. 
 
 
1.2 Research problem 
 
With easy access to information, communities in mineral producing countries have 
become more proactive in determining the benefits they expect to receive from mining 
activities through more direct involvement in the investment decision-making processes 
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(Solomon 2012; Ulriksen 2017). The mining boom that was observed from 2003 to 2008 
has spurred what appears to be global mining tax inquisitions into the dissipation of tax 
revenues (Conde 2017). Governments’ perception of fiscal imbalance has triggered 
widespread corrective tax policies that resulted in breaching of existing stability 
agreements. Additionally, there has been increasing tax rates, partial nationalisation and 
expropriation occurred in the period from 2009 to 2014 (Heidrich and Loaiza 2016). 
These trends could arise from governments reacting to the perception that tax instruments 
are not performing as expected and communities opposing mining activities in view of 
protecting traditional endowments and physical environment (Williams 2016). 
 
Australia has tested various hybrid RRT models in an attempt to maximise revenues by 
taxing rents from the mining sector (Daley and Wood 2016). Recently, Western Australia 
and Victoria drafted proposals to increase the unit-based royalty rates on iron ore and 
coal respectively (Bowie and Ellison 2016). In other regions, PNG proposes to increase 
equity participation by 30 to 50 percent, royalty to 4 percent; and reintroduce the APT, 
which was abolished in 2002 (DMPGM 2014). Further, CIT rates in South American 
countries have increased by 20 percent between 2009 and 2014. For instance, the 
Dominican Republic increased the CIT rate from 12 to 36 percent with a prolonged 
capital recovery period of 15 years (Heidrich and Loaiza 2016). These trends suggest that 
mining companies who balance economic and social objectives may overcome the 
protectionist policies (barrier to entry), especially in resource-rich developing countries. 
 
Although the market may play a part in causing the fiscal instability, the first place to 
search for evidence is in the prevailing tax system and tax instruments, as well as the 
methodology used for measuring their performances. First, the taxation literature is 
congested with propositions on how taxes affect extraction decisions using optimal tax 
models (Smith 2013). The optimal models focus mainly on investigating different risk 
levels that affect the underlying economic variables required for assessing 
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competitiveness and resolving policy issues. However, those decisions are often biased 
from the perspective that an investor’s risk premium exceeds the social discount rate 
(Mankiw, Weinzierl and Yagan 2009). This ignores the fact that an investor’s risk 
premium is facilitated in the tax designs where governments are willing to delay their 
revenue collections until investors realise their RORs on the invested capital. Hence, 
extreme forms of both complicated and hybrid tax systems that attempt to attain pure 
neutrality (tax optimality) can cause issues for tax authorities who may not have the skills 
required for auditing tax compliance. 
 
Second, the main purpose of advocating tax optimality is to reduce the tax burden. This 
has diverted the attention away from analysis of the revenue collecting potential of 
various tax instruments, with more efforts placed on diagnosing inefficiencies in the 
design criteria. Additionally, emphasising the extraction optimality causes an oversight of 
the social needs when tax revenues are eroded, which partly increases fiscal inequality 
(Mankiw, Weinzierl and Yagan 2009). This could be the main reason for governments 
changing their behaviours when the industry enters a boom period or when a quality 
deposit is found. The fear that an existing tax system may not sufficiently capture the 
profits encourages corrective tax policies (Guj et al. 2017). Therefore, studying the risk 
and rent distributions, and revenue raising potential of the tax instruments could explain 
why there has been an increase in protectionist policies (Humphreys 2013).  
 
Given the problem statement, a suitable method is required to establish a cogent 
understanding of the distributions of risks, rents and tax transfers to the society. The 
nature of the problem requires time series data and techniques that deal with uncertainty 
so that design factors that influence tax performance can be correctly distinguished and 
quantified. 
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1.3 Research design 
 
A suitable technique is required for analysing the progressive taxation regime of PNG, 
especially deriving variables that measure the tax burden distribution and mineral wealth 
transfer to a society. The Stroup index model (Stroup and Hubbard 2013) is identified to 
be a suitable technique. It derives the progression coefficients of tax instruments that can 
be used along with the marginal effective tax rates (METR) and other variables for 
measuring the overall distribution of tax burdens, rents and revenues (Kamin 2008b). 
Further, the Lorenz concentration curve (Lorenz 1905) is identified as a suitable 
technique to structurally measure the degree of progressivity. The progressivity curves 
plotted against the Lorenz concentration curve will assist in distinguishing the behaviour 
of tax instruments in terms of burden distribution and the degree of resource revenue 
transfers to society. The revenue generating potential of various tax instruments are 
measured by positioning the respective progressivity curves against the Lorenz curve 
(Stroup 2005).  
 
The quantitative study involves performing a theoretical and a historical tax analysis 
using time series financial and tax revenue data to compute the functional (decision) 
variables. Data required are collected from the undeveloped Frieda deposit, the now 
closed Bougainville mine, and the existing Ok Tedi copper and Porgera gold mines in 
PNG. These data will be used to statistically generalise mining industry’s tax 
performance between 1972 and 2013. The theoretical data comprise of prices, costs and 
production estimates that are highly uncertain. Since the conceptual data are imperfect, 
some real option (RO) solution techniques are used to reduce the time-dependent data 
uncertainty. The variations in price and costs are adjusted to make cash flows more 
stochastic to improve the validity of the findings (Samis, Davis and Laughton 2007). 
Integrating the theoretical and historical results will broaden the knowledge on the 
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distribution of tax burden, rents and wealth transfers, as well as provide a more balanced 
analysis. 
 
 
1.4 Purpose of the study 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to identify whether a progressive tax system, when applied to 
the mining industry, collects revenue in a manner that does not distort investment 
decision making (Sunley and Baunsgaard 2001). It is hypothesised that governments can 
collect more tax revenues through devising a more progressive tax system that includes 
indirect taxes and non-tax benefits.  
  
The following issues collectively guide the main research question, which is: What 
mining taxation system is suitable to fulfil the tax revenue collecting objective of the 
government without conflicting with the established principles of tax design such as 
neutrality, equity and stability?       
 
Research issues: 
 
(1) Can the progressive tax system augment the capacities of individual tax instruments 
to capture a higher magnitude of tax revenues for the government? 
 
(2) What are the theoretical and practical aspects of the progressive tax schedule that 
makes it a suitable tax system for balancing the fiscal needs of investors and 
governments? 
 
(3) How do the methodology and techniques impact upon the reliability of the results of 
the thesis? 
  10  
  
  
  
1.5 Significance 
 
This study will demonstrate how risks and rents are distributed within a taxation 
framework, which allows a government to accept some forms of risk-sharing and revenue 
trade-offs arising from uncertain prices, costs and mine operational circumstances. 
Further, disagreements between investors and governments over tax compliance do arise 
and can turn into costly litigations (Davidson 2012). Such issues can be resolved by 
reliably measuring how tax instruments perform when responding to changes under 
cyclic market and other risk conditions. It will also encourage the GoPNG to have faith in 
the ability of the existing progressive tax system to fulfil its revenue-collecting objective. 
The findings of this study, along with the methods used in the analyses will benefit 
investors, government and communities in different ways. 
 
This study uses techniques for analysing the progressive cash flow tax system, which can 
be simple to adopt, especially the cash flow tax models. The numerical-based decision 
variables like the METR and progression indices can clearly explain the tax burden and 
rent distributions. This study approach can assist the GoPNG to distinguish high 
performing tax instruments from those that are inefficient.  The findings of the study will 
help the GoPNG to rationalise its policy by retaining and strengthening the progressive 
tax instruments that will ensure efficient tax planning (Wilson 2016). Additionally, the 
study may help reduce the tendency of governments to change tax policies during periods 
of high profits, which often lead to fiscal instability, erosion of investor confidence and 
derailment of long-term existence of the mining industry (Robson 2015). 
 
The use of a progressive tax system could benefit investors in two areas. First, a 
progressive tax system is a concession where it’s flexibly responds to low and high rent 
periods, possibly reducing fiscal instability. During periods of high profits, a tax system 
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is in equilibrium position, the marginal tax rate increases slowly relative to increase in 
profits. Alternatively, the accumulation of tax credits through a full loss-offset provision 
benefits the investors during periods of low profits. This in turn causes the marginal tax 
rate to decrease in response to a declining trend in profits accessed. Second, a progressive 
tax system can discourage the use of equity participation and RRT as they are responsible 
for causing deadweight losses and wasteful extraction of mineral resources (Mankiw, 
Weinzierl and Yagan 2009). 
  
 
1.6 Scope of study 
 
This study is an analysis of tax instruments applied to the mining sector in PNG. It does 
not include other tax instruments that could be used as alternatives for broadening a tax 
policy. For example, a sliding scale royalty could provide an alternative to the ad valorem 
royalty currently in use in PNG. This study does not fully investigate alternative royalty 
types and hybrid instruments such as the RSPT and profit-to-cost types that are not 
commonly applied (Otto 2017). It only focuses on the internal rate of return (IRR) to 
threshold rate type of the RRT and ignores other systems that may be suitable for PNG.      
 
This study is confined to mining taxes, although the taxation policy applied to the mining 
industry overlaps with the petroleum and gas sectors. For example, equity participation 
policy is extended to the oil and gas sectors in PNG (Blake and Roberts 2006). Hence, 
modeling equity participation in the entire extractive industry could broaden the 
knowledge on implications of community owning equity interests. Additionally, since 
PNG’s petroleum and gas sectors have a higher CIT rate, comparing them with that of the 
mining industry could provide some important insights into how CIT performs under 
different fiscal conditions in terms of burden distributions. However, such a comparative 
analysis could not be completed due to cost and time constraints of the study. 
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1.7 Ethical considerations 
 
This research follows the ethical guidelines provided by Curtin University and the 
National Health and Medical Council (NHMRC). The guidelines were observed at all 
stages of the research process including fieldwork, data aggregation and analysis of 
results. This study deals with three significant stakeholder groups: the industry; the 
GoPNG; and the community. Hence, the data dispersion, processing and analysis have 
been conducted in a manner that avoids biased views of stakeholders, community and the 
researcher. 
 
 
1.8 Definitions of rents 
 
The taxation framework in some ways attains neutrality to protect different types of rents 
and allocates those rents to respective stakeholders. A tax design must allow capital (e.g., 
equity and debt capital) owners and input factor providers to receive different types of 
rents before governments can have access to tax revenues (Passant 2012). Further, the 
existence of rents is one of the main reasons for providing special tax treatment to the 
minerals sector (Dasgupta, Heal and Stiglitz 1980). Because of these significances, 
different types of rents identified below will be used in this study. 
 
 
Rent: 
• Rent is defined as “excess payment above that required for keeping a factor in 
production” (Wessel 1967,  1223). Rent is a neoclassical concept with reference to 
payments made to landholders for possessing collateral rights to agricultural lands, 
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which include mineral property rights. However, classical economists argue that in-
situ mineral has no value without a sacrifice (Tilton 2004).  
 
Ricardian rent: 
• These rents are available to different mining operations and mineral types as a 
result of differences in costs, prices and deposit qualities (Tilton 2004). A 
government setting different tax rules for different types of mineral extraction may 
target the Ricardian rents. For instance, Guj (2012) finds that the Australian 
government devised the RSPT for capturing the Ricardian rents from iron ore 
(high profit). However, it caused fiscal imbalance amongst the marginal and low 
profit coal mines. 
 
User cost: 
• User cost is a type of rent payment made to a resource owner by the user (miner) 
for depleting the in situ reserve and transferring the cost to future users. Royalty is 
recognised as a user cost or explicit tax because extracting today deprives future a 
generation’s opportunity to benefit from the same mineral deposit (Boadway and 
Keen 2010; Minnitt 2007). 
 
Paretian rent: 
• Paretian rent is defined as “excess payment above that required to keep a factor in 
production”  (Worcester 1946, 258). The tax literature integrates Paretian rent with 
the definition of economic rent, which is derived from the difference between cash 
inflows (revenue) and outflows (costs) (Hogan and Goldsworthy 2010). It exists 
within a single mining operation and is determined by prices and costs of the 
factors employed in production. Profit-based tax instruments can be imposed on 
the Paretian rent similar to economic rent. 
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Economic rent: 
• Economic rent is defined as “the excess of the return to a factor of production 
above the amount that is required to sustain the current use of the factor (or to 
entice the use of the factor” (Ergas, Harrison and Pincus 2010, 171). The tax 
literature often uses economic rent interchangeably with pure profit, pure rent or 
excess profit. Identifying the existence of economic rents in mining projects is 
significant for correctly assessing profit-based taxes such as the RRT, which is 
based on rents above those considered to be normal (Garnaut 2010b). 
 
   
Normal rent: 
• Normal rent is defined as the “minimum rate of return required to hold capital for 
the activity” (Hogan and Goldsworthy 2010, 135). The return on the pre-tax cash 
flow is measured by investor’s discount rate, while the excess rent is measured by 
internal rate of return (IRR) based on the post-tax cash flow (Torries 1998). The 
main principle in mineral taxation is that the normal and quasi-rents should not be 
taxed.  
 
Quasi-rents: 
• These are sunk costs incurred over prolonged periods of exploration, as well as 
capital and operating costs that should be considered before taxes can be imposed 
(Boadway and Keen 2014). Garnaut and Clunies Ross (1983, 35-6) caution that 
quasi-rents are not a market-driven values and are often treated as marginal costs 
on a producer's supply curve. Therefore, quasi-rents should not be taxed, which is 
why the LCF provision is required when designing a mineral taxation framework. 
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1.9 Summary 
 
This chapter has introduced the focus of this thesis, which is to investigate the 
progressive taxation regime applied to the mining sector in PNG. Understanding and 
measuring the tax performance is significant for supporting economic and social 
development goals. The research interest is inspired by the increasing tendency of 
governments to devise tax systems that capture a maximum share of resource revenues 
from mineral extraction, especially in developing countries.  
 
The thesis is structured in the following order. Chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature to 
synthesize the complex interface between taxation theory and tax systems that link the 
objectives of investors and the government. It presents the theoretical perspectives on the 
principles of progressivity and functional variables for measuring the performance of 
various tax instruments. The chapter briefly presents the techniques commonly used for 
taxation studies, as well as techniques required for correcting imperfect data before 
providing a summary. Chapter 3 explains the research methodology. It presents a 
conceptual outline of the procedures used for collecting data and identifying the decision 
variables. It also provides a discussion of the limitations of the analyses undertaken in 
this thesis. 
   
Chapters 4 and 5 present the results of the theoretical and historical tax analysis 
respectively, by tabulating the progression coefficients and graphically represent the 
performance of the tax instruments against the Lorenz concentration curve. Chapter 6 
aligns the theoretical and historical results and reconciles the findings to make some 
policy recommendations for PNG’s mineral taxation regime. The conclusions of the 
thesis are presented in Chapter 7.  
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Chapter 2 : Literature Review 
 
Tax policies have become more significant in recent years as communities and host 
governments broadly expect to retain an equitable share of the minerals extracted. 
Likewise, investors anticipate fair returns for sacrificing capital, resources and time in 
risk-taking exploration and mine development. In an attempt to balance these fiscal 
expectations, the taxation theory developed between 1940 and 1990 has been broadly 
revised and extended into devising various hybrid systems to provide economically and 
socially equitable tax systems. This chapter reviews some of these theoretical 
developments along with the tax instruments, analytical techniques and models, and 
variables that will be used in this study. 
 
Section 2.1 explains how the theoretical framework tries to balance the extraction 
efficiency based on time-dependent distributions of risk, while Section 2.1.1 briefly 
examines some policy issues affecting mineral taxation. Section 2.2 discusses the 
principles of progressivity from a new perspective, while Section 2.3 presents the 
functional variables that will be used to measure the performance of various tax 
instruments. Section 2.4 examines the individual tax instruments and Section 2.5 
discusses indirect and non-tax benefits. Section 2.6 examines the techniques used for tax 
modelling and Section 2.7 examines the techniques used for forecasting the input 
variables. Section 2.8 provides a summary of the chapter. 
 
 
2.1 Theoretical Framework 
 
Balancing mineral extraction efficiency with the social dimension of taxation is a major 
challenge due to recognition that minerals found within a jurisdiction are exhaustible and 
owned by the state and the community as a whole (Laporte and De Quatrebarbes 2015). 
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Furthermore, tax policies regulate mining activities so that they occur orderly in 
accordance with national development goals. Many commentators perceive that resource 
taxes exist as an exchange for ownership transfers to private owners, depletion of 
reserves and environmental protection (Ramatji 2013). Given these objectives, some tax 
policy design criteria such as neutrality, equity and stability are argued as prerequisites 
for a balanced tax system (Baunsgaard 2001). Amongst those tax design criteria, 
neutrality principle is a significant one because it regulates the effects of imposing tax on 
economic, financial and technical aspects of a mining operation. The principle of 
neutrality states that investment decisions would be unaffected if taxes are not imposed 
on the quasi-rents by adopting some optimal tax systems (Fane 1987).  
 
Optimal tax theory recognises lump sum and Brownian taxes meet the neutral conditions 
as they allow the capital allocation process to occur unabated (Fane 1987). In relation to 
that, investors argue that some forms of neutrality must be maintained to recover the 
irreversible capital committed towards exploration and mine development before paying 
taxes. However, conforming to an absolute neutral policy is socially suboptimal as these 
tax systems may not raise sufficient revenues to compensate the community (Alvarez and 
Koskela 2007). Sorensen (2007, 383) argues that “optimal tax theory has produced very 
few robust results that can serve as the basis for useful, concrete policy advice”. Placing 
more emphasis on the effects of taxes on extraction path tends to ignore the redistributive 
abilities of the tax instruments. Further, a principle underlying the balanced tax system is 
one that sustains the sources (mines) from which rents and tax revenues are derived to 
meet the investor and government’s objectives.  
 
The Brownian system, or R-based system (Brown 1948) invites a government to directly 
share the risks of a mining project by subsidising losses so that revenues become 
accessible when the tax base turns positive (Guj 2011; Hogan 2012). In reality, 
governments seldom subsidise corporate losses to induce the capital reallocation 
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processes to occur rapidly (Boadway and Keen 2014). A government could be reluctant 
to subsidise the corporate losses because there is uncertainty surrounding when a tax base 
would turn positive so that the cost of loss subsidy can be recovered. Moreover, the 
Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE) is a modified version of the Brownian tax that 
permits thin capitalisation and allows a government to refund unallocated capital at the 
risk-free interest rate (Boadway and Keen 2014). However, the ACE is complex, which 
makes it unsuitable for immature jurisdictions that have low financial and tax 
administration capacities.  
 
Designing a pure neutral tax system is politically difficult at the policy level (Garnaut 
2010a). A government may not recover the risk payments (using public funds) made to 
an investor if the subsidy, including interests exceed the future tax revenues. Since mine 
operators control costs and make decisions (Fessehaie and Morris 2013), they could 
influence the occurrence of losses so that a loss subsidy can be claimed from a 
government. This behaviour of investors under a Brownian tax system could be socially 
unappealing. A government committing scarce development funds towards offsetting 
corporate losses could reduce social welfare, which is critical for developing countries. 
Hence, the Brownian tax and its hybird types could exert fiscal burdens on a low-income 
mineral endowed country (Garnaut 2010a).  
 
Nevertheless, during low mineral prices, the application of Brownian tax system can be 
useful for subsidising exploration activities to sustain the mining industry. For instance, a 
government can recapture the cost of subsidy through amortising past exploration 
expenditures against positive cash flows from a successful mining project (Garnaut 
2010a). However, this is also risky because the success rate for a mineral property to 
advance from exploration to extraction phase is highly uncertain. This could be the 
reason why Canada has abandoned the exploration subsidy policy (Mintz and Chen 
2012a). 
  19  
  
  
 
In observing these problems, Garnaut and Clunies-Ross (1979) develop the second-best 
neutral system, which allows a mining project to carry forward its cash flow losses. The 
losses are uplifted at a risk-free interest rate and the cumulative amount is offset against 
positive cash flows rather than a government immediately subsidising them. This shifts 
the financial risks to the mining project, which relieves a low-income developing nation 
from bearing the financial burden of subsidising corporate losses under the Brownian tax 
system (Passant 2014). This is the main advantage of the second-best neutral system, 
which creates flexibility for a mining project to recover its capital cost by delaying the 
payment of tax revenues. It restricts attaining pure neutrality and is a risk sharing system 
that is suitable meeting the welfare needs of non-diversified developing countries 
(Garnaut 2010b). 
 
In summary, the second-best neutrality operates to distribute the quasi-rents according to 
the risks faced by capital and input factor providers. This manner of risk sharing permits 
an investor to recover the capital costs rapidly before a government accesses revenues at 
latter stages of a mine life (Mintz and Chen 2012b). Both the investor and the 
government capture Ricardian rents on the pre-tax base arising from the interface 
amongst market price, extraction costs and deposit quality. However, the second-best 
neutrality is not as well understood as a tax system that can distribute different types of 
rents to capital owners, input factor providers and investors. Hence, understanding how 
neutrality works is significant for designing a balanced mineral taxation policy. 
 
 
2.1.1 Some issues facing taxation policy 
 
According to Otto (2017), a balanced mineral taxation policy is one that facilitates 
investors’ quests for earning excess rents above the normal profit without compromising 
the opportunities for communities to retain an equitable share of the mineral wealth. This 
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can be done by sustaining the tax base through continued exploration and mine 
developments in the long-run (Kogel 2015). However, this policy statement is complex 
and thus difficult to achieve due to the diverging economic and socio-political objectives 
of investors and governments respectively. A balanced tax policy can be achieved by 
integrating financial, economic and technical aspects of a mining operation into the 
theoretical framework, which does not compromise the social needs of host communities 
(Magno 2015). Aside from these aspects, a tax base is influenced by some uncertainties 
(risks).  
 
Uncertainties associated with exploration, mine development and extraction activities 
influence taxation policies (Boadway and Flatters 1993). Since price is a driving force 
behind mineral exploration, the probability of finding an economic ore body is highly 
uncertain. Further, costs and deposit quality are also uncetain at the extraction stage. 
These risks make the opportunity costs of both irreversible capital invested and tax base 
more uncertain (Evatt et al. 2014). Furthermore, the uncertainty associated with a 
government’s behaviour during profitable periods has historically been responsible for 
causing fiscal instability (Humphreys 2013). 
 
Investors prefer fiscal stability over neutrality and equity when committing capital for 
exploration and mine development, which in turn determines the long-term stability of 
tax policies (Daniel and Sunley 2010). Stability agreement clauses are often devised to 
provide a guarantee that a government will not change existing tax laws and rates 
spanning different price cycles and political regimes (Sunley and Baunsgaard 2001). 
Fiscal stability clauses can be exemplified in bilateral and mine development agreements 
(MDA) for specific mining projects (Daniel and Sunley 2010). Further, attaining long-
term stability can encourage investors to adapt to a nation’s tax system, which makes it 
more ‘predictable’ in the long run. Amongst these issues, inconsistency in tax revenue 
collection gives a wrong perception that a tax system is inefficient. This often leads to 
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unpredictable and lengthy reforms, which is a major cause of fiscal instability amongst 
most mineral endowed nations (Mendes 2015; Sunley et al. 2012).  
 
Taxation policy discourses placed more emphasis on international competitiveness 
between 1980 and 2000 (Otto 2000). Tax reforms often follow low commodity prices as 
jurisdictions try to be competitive with other mineral endowed nations, as the mean 
profitability is higher for low-cost firms in low-tax jurisdictions (Tomasic 2015). This is 
because attracting foreign direct investment enhances dynamic and static gains: skill 
replication and physical capital accumulation, as well as non-tax benefits such as inflows 
of technology. Many countries have experienced positive growths as a result of policy 
reforms such as the ease of entry of foreign investors leading to increased investments 
(Sunley et al. 2012). Moreover, taxation regimes are often deregulated to attract the flows 
of foreign investment capital to low-tax destinations. However, the reforms can also 
introduce problems during non-boom periods can cause fiscal imbalance during boom 
periods (Chen and Mintz 2013). 
 
Between 2003 and 2014, the supply cycle inconsistency problem enticed governments to 
behave indifferently towards the industry making profits, resulting in widespread fiscal 
instability (Solomon 2012). For instance, South Africa’s move towards resource 
nationalisation based on black economic empowerment is most surprising for a country 
that was once known for being one of the highly competitive fiscal regimes in the world 
(Cawood and Oshokoya 2013). The fiscal disparity gap between investors (high profits) 
and governments (low tax revenues) could be due to the absence of suitable tax systems 
that respond to changes in the tax base. 
 
In summary, the debate has reached a consensus that an equitable tax system is one that 
reduces the average burden, is administratively simple, has less use of regressive levies 
and more use of progressive rent-based taxes (Heidrich 2013, 6). Progressive taxes are 
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flexible and respond to market and production uncertainties (Baunsgaard 2001; Land 
2009). However, little research has been done to encourage a policy-push in this 
direction. A tax policy shift towards adopting a self-adjusting progressive tax system 
could resolve the cyclic issues, which could enhance an equitable distribution of risks, 
rents and revenues. 
 
 
2.2 Tax Progressivity 
 
The self-adjusting ability of a progressive tax system could resolve the inflexibility 
associated with a non-progressive tax system, which does not respond to boom and bust 
cycles (Land 2010). Unfortunately, limited studies have been done to analyse the 
progressivity of individual tax instruments. Kamin (2008, 241) argues that “policy 
makers and analysts often rely on progressivity as a guidepost in constructing and 
analysing tax policy, but do little to justify the progressivity method they employ”. Only 
few scholars such as Keen et al. (2014) use some progressivity curves from the 
Internatonal Monetray Fund (IMF) to demonstrate how different combinations of 
progressive royalty (e,g., deductible and creditible royalty) that can be considered as 
upfront payments of rent taxes. However, they do not fully explain the tax burden and 
rent distributions, although a creditable royalty could capture a high magnitude of 
revenues.  
 
Boadway and Keen (2010, 14) define progressivity as “an average tax rate that rises with 
the realised profitability of the underlying project”. However, this definition is shallow 
because the terms ‘average’ and ‘marginal’ have discretely different meanings. Average 
tax rate is the actual tax revenues paid divided by the corresponding tax base, which is a 
static measurement of tax liability. Contrastingly, the marginal tax rate is a continuous 
measurement of tax liability placed on an incremental income, which fits well with the 
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progressivity concept. Progressivity measures the changes in marginal tax rate in 
response to values added to an invested capital (Stroup and Hubbard 2013). To author’s 
knowledge, there has been no study undertaken to investigate the distributive capacity of 
cyclical progressivity under certain conditions such as price and tax rate increases. The 
non-mineral taxation literature suggests that increasing profitability may not induce the 
marginal tax rate to rise (Kremer and Stähler 2016). 
 
Non-mining taxation uses progressivity to assess the distribution of tax burdens that 
affect skill development and redistribution of gains in social welfare. A major fear is that 
strong progressivity causes the marginal tax rate to increase (Conrad and Hool 1984), 
which distorts labour productivity through discouraging skills development and 
innovation, and can impede national productivity (Holter, Krueger and Stepanchuk 
2014). As a result, less progressive and flat tax systems are favoured over more 
progressive systems (Guner, Lopez-Daneri and Ventura 2016). Less progressive tax 
systems such as payroll taxes maintain labour productivity through horizontal 
distributions of tax burdens. 
 
The horizontal distribution system having the same rate is a flat system, but face different 
tax liabilities according to skill levels (Mirrlees 1971). Most labour incomes are taxed at 
a fixed rate, but experience horizontal distributions of burdens due to different income 
distributions that correspond to skill levels. On the other hand, Mirrlees’ (1971) identifies 
a vertical equity system that differentiates labour income levels and investors’ ability to 
pay (Guj 2012; Kiprotich 2016). The inequality between a tax payer and a recipient of tax 
revenues is reduced when the tax concentration is closer to a linearly progressive curve. 
 
In support of Mirrlees’ findings, Daniel, Keen and McPherson (2010, 215) note that “[a] 
more progressive regime gives some relief to investors for projects with low ROR while 
allowing the government to increase its share of the revenue when an investment is 
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highly profitable”. In other words, progressivity equalises the distribution of tax burdens 
under these dynamic conditions (Duncan and Sabirianova Peter 2008),  and resolves the 
time inconsistency problem and increases fairness (Daniel and Sunley 2010). Progressive 
taxes can transfer a greater magnitude of wealth to the community if price and deposit 
quality are high, and the mine operating costs are low (Fraser 1993; Tilton 2004). 
However, the literature on mineral taxation has not kept up with research to conceptualise 
these relationships despite a considerable number of studies reluctantly mention 
progressivity as an ideal tax system (Daniel and Sunley 2010; Land 2008, 2010). Others 
argue that more progressive taxes discourage risk-taking behaviour of investors (Conrad 
and Hool 1984). This has slowed the conceptual development of progressivity as 
demonstrated in Figure 2.1. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1:  Tax curves often used to define progressive taxes and regressive royalties 
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Figure 2.1 is a graphical representation that is often used to show how progressivity 
increases as the tax base increases, with the opposite holding for regressive levies. 
However, Figure 2.1 does not structurally show the effects of cyclical progressivity and 
regressivity during periods of low and high rent. Regressivity favours investors during 
high price periods by relaxing the tax liability and favours governments during low price 
periods. This could cause inequality in terms of governments collecting less revenues 
from unit-based levies when compared to the value-based levies (Clausing and Durst 
2015b). An extreme regressivity with a substantially high level of royalty rates, or with 
no royalty credits tend to prolong the time for realising a pre-tax rate of return (ROR) 
(Dowell 1979). These features can be cogently traced within a structural progressivity 
model featured by the Lorenz concentration curve (Fig. 2.2). 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Conceptual progressivity chart based on the Lorenz concentration curve 
(Govori 2015; Roach 2010a) 
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Figure 2.2 is a Lorenz concentration curve that plots the cumulative taxes paid on the y-
axis and cumulative pre-tax cash flows along the x-axis (Lorenz 1905). Lorenz developed 
the 45-degree concentration curve, which is a linear line that reflects a perfect 
equilibrium (Roach 2010b) and tracks the performance of individual tax instruments over 
time. Unfortunately, the taxation literature does not distinguish various progressivity 
types and simply categorises progressive taxes as those that capture revenues 
proportional to increases in profits (incomes), which is not correct. The cyclical 
progressivity being subject to tax design factors, market conditions and operational 
parameters can cause variations in the abilities of profit-based taxes to capture the 
incremental rents. Varing degrees of progressivity/regressivity (broken red lines) are 
represented on the Lorenz curve as shown in Figure 2.2 (Roach 2003). Those that lie 
below the Lorenz curve are progressive and those that are above it are regresssive. 
 
In Figure 2.2, tax curves closer to the Lorenz curve within the light green coloured 
boundary are known as strongly progressive because those taxes have stronger aptitudes 
to capture more of the incremental rents compared to those that are below the boundary. 
Duncan and Sabirianova Peter (2008) find that inequality is reduced as tax instruments 
approach linearity (Lorenz curve). Likewise, tax instruments lose their strength in 
capturing the marginal increases in profits as demonstrated by the concave (weak) 
progressivity curve in Figure 2.2. Tax instruments collect few revenues as progressivity 
curves bow downwards away from the Lorenz curve (Heathcote, Storesletten and 
Violante 2014). These behaviours of tax instruments could be due to factors such as the 
nature of tax designs, mine operational risks, over-investment or profit and cost shifting. 
 
Similarly, regressive levies, excises and duties lie above the Lorenz curve in Figure 2.2. 
As mentioned earlier, inequality caused by regressive royalties and levies affects both 
investors and government. Although some royalties may be progressive, Boadway and 
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Keen (2014) find that royalties cause time inconsistency problems as they do not respond 
to changes in the tax base. Further, regressive royalties and levies raise small amount of 
revenues as income increases. Some tax curves that skip above and below the Lorenz 
curve are identified by Govori (2015) as having regressive progression behviour under 
certain conditions (see Section 6.1). Such a manner of defining the domains of tax 
performance using the Lorenz concentration curve is referred to as structural 
progressivity analysis (Roach 2010a), and can also be assessed using progression 
coefficients (indices) (Stroup and Hubbard 2013). 
 
The Kakwani index is a progression coefficient derived by measuring the area under the 
Lorenz curve against the size of the area defined by a tax curve (Kakwani 1977). It 
measures the degree of concavity from the Lorenz concentration curve for various tax 
instruments. Further, the Suits index model (Suits 1977) follows the Kakwani index 
model. However, it is slightly different as identified by Stroup and Hubbard (2013, 20). 
They identify the difference as “whereas the Kakwani index sums the difference in 
convexity between these two curves equally across the entire tax base, the Suits index 
weights the difference in the upper-income end of the spectrum more heavily than the 
lower income end”. Likewise, the Stroup index, named after Michael D. Stroup (2005), is 
computed by dividing the ratio of cumulative tax (tax curve area) by the total area below 
or above the Lorenz curve (or cumulative pre-tax cash flow). The equation for computing 
the tax progressivity index (TPI) using the Stroup index model is as follows: 
 
𝑇𝑃𝐼𝑡  = (1 − (𝐶𝑇𝑅𝑡/𝐶𝑇𝐵𝑡))                                                 (2.1) 
   
Where TPIt  = tax progressivity index (or progression coefficient) at time t  
            𝐶𝑇𝑅𝑡 = cumulative percentage change in tax revenues at time t  
 𝐶𝑇𝐵𝑡 = cumulative percentage change in the tax base at time t  
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In summary, the progressivity technique using the Stroup model can reliably measure the 
burden distribution and performance of tax instruments by a means of observing the 
changes in the progression coefficients over time (Stroup and Hubbard 2013). The claim 
in literature that progressive taxes increase the tax burden ignores the decline in the real 
marginal effective tax rate because investors do not precisely pay taxes at the theoretical 
effective tax rate (Keightley and Sherlock 2014). Further, progressive tax systems not 
only collect higher tax revenues, but also harmonise a neutral tax system to function 
efficiently through a fair distribution of risks and rents amongst the participating 
stakeholders. Moreover, progressivity resolves the problem of cyclicality by regulating 
tax burden distribution during periods of low and high rents so that the balance can be 
maintained. 
 
 
2.3 Functional variables for measuring tax performance 
 
The economic and tax analysis require reliable functional variables because these have to 
be interpreted into policy information. Functional variables such as net present value 
(NPV), internal rate of return (IRR), payback period, average effective tax rate (AETR) 
and marginal effective tax rate (METR) are derived from techno-economic models 
(Hogan and Goldsworthy 2010). The NPV, IRR and payback period are often used for 
assessing the economic effects of tax systems on economics of mining projects (Otto 
2009). However, these variables are biased towards optimising the extraction efficiency 
and do not measure the investor and government’s behavioural responses with regard to 
redistributive capacity of a tax system. The financial variables can be effectively 
integrated with the METR, AETR and other decision-making variables for a balanced tax 
analysis. Equation (2.2) is often used to derive the AETR:   
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𝐴𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑡     = 𝑇𝜏/𝐶𝐹𝑝𝑟𝑒−𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒                    (2.2) 
 
Where AETRt  = average effective tax rate at time t  
  𝑇𝜏 = actual taxes paid (undiscounted)  
 𝐶𝐹𝑝𝑟𝑒−𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 = pre-tax cash flow or the tax base at time t  
 
Given the fact that most tax rates are constant, changes in pre-tax cash flows against post-
tax cash flows can cause the AETR to vary. In other words, time-lag effects can cause the 
AETR to increase (or decrease). This could erroneously reflect a tax regime to be 
unattractive or vice versa (Gordon, Kalambokidis and Slemrod 2003, 4). The authors 
argue that the AETR is ineffective in measuring the distribution of tax burdens, especially 
the neutrality aspects of taxation before and after a tax reform. This is because the AETR 
has no economic merits when compared to the marginal effective tax rate (METR) 
(Daniel, Keen and McPherson 2010). According to Fullerton (1999), the METR measures 
changes in the pre-tax IRR against the post-tax IRR as given in equation (2.3). 
 
𝑀𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑡     = (𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑟𝑒−𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 − 𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒)/(𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑟𝑒−𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒) (2.3) 
 
  Where METRt     = marginal effective tax rate at time t  
𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑟𝑒−𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒  = cumulative percentage change in the tax revenues at time t  
  𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 = cumulative percentage change in the tax base at time t  
 
 
METR measures the effect of an entire tax system on productive capacity of the capital 
employed (Gillen and Gados 2007), and is widely used for measuring the performance of 
taxes in the mining industry (Boadway 1987; Chen and Mintz 2015b). A concise 
definition of METR is given in Fullerton (1999, 270). It measures the effects of taxes on 
capital invested and is derived by dividing the post-tax IRR by the pre-tax IRR given in 
equation (2.3). Chen and Perry (2015) analyse the efficiencies of royalty and CIT in 
Columbia using the METR as a performance measurement criteria. They found that 
royalty reduces the productive capacity of the capital invested more than that of the CIT 
because royalties ignore the neutrality requirement for capital allocation. For example, a 
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zero METR reflects a neutral system in which there is no distortion (McKenzie, Mansour 
and Brûlé 1998). 
 
The METR can be identical to a distortion rate although the techniques used to compute 
these variables are entirely different. Blake and Robert (2006) use the NPV approach to 
calculate the distortion index for some mineral and petroleum fiscal regimes, including 
that of PNG. They show that distortion and METR rates for individual taxes and royalties 
can be easily computed and tracked over time. With contrast, the AETR provides a static 
reflection of the overall tax liability without defining the tax burden distributions relative 
to the capital invested and value of the firm (Kanniainen and Panteghini 2013). 
Moreover, Chen and Perry (2015) show that a distortion rate can be derived as a ratio of 
post-tax NPV to pre-tax NPV. Further, aside from the commonly used functional 
variables, additional variables are required to adequately measure the aggregate wealth 
transfer to a host nation. 
 
First, the theoretical measurement of the METR may correctly show the effects of taxes 
on the incremental value in capital employed (Gillen and Gados 2007). However, 
overinvestment and profit shifting could influence the actual pre-tax IRR (or NPV) and 
the post-tax IRR (NPV) to change. As a result, the METR may not clearly capture the 
actual tax revenue flows over time (Keightley and Sherlock 2014). Further, 
disagreements over actual taxes being paid by mining industry do arise frequently due to 
misapplications of the functional variables (Marsh, Lewis and Chesters 2014; McPhail 
2017). The disagreements could be attributed to tax scholars using different models and 
techniques resulting in variations in the effective tax rates (Davidson 2012; Swan 2012). 
Therefore, a risk-weighted net effective tax rate (NETR) can be derived by combining the 
TPI and METR to account for resource revenue leakages (Guj et al. 2017), (see Section 
3.5). 
 
  31  
  
  
Second, a major limitation of the METR, TPI and AETR is that these variables are only 
compatible for assessing the distributive capacities of direct and indirect tax instruments. 
These variables exclude the non-tax benefits such as human and physical capitals (e.g., 
transport, education, health and social infrastructures) that add to the aggregate wealth 
transfers to the community (Jackson 2015). The mainstream theoretical models often do 
not capture the provisons of goods and services, including technical assistances offered 
voluntarily that are beyond the regulatory requirements. The non-tax benefits are not only 
for social licence to operate (Owen 2016), but also improve the living standards of the 
community (Loayza and Rigolini 2016). Because of these significances, a variable is 
required to designate the proportional distributions of rents and aggregate tax and non-tax 
benefit transfers associated with a mining operation (see Section 3.5). 
 
In summary, the interpretation of analytical results can be weak unless a suitable 
combination of decision variables is used. Combining the economic variables (NPV, IRR 
and payback period) with the TPI and the METR will strengthen the interpretation of tax 
performance. 
 
 
2.4 Direct taxes 
2.4.1 Royalties 
 
Boadway and Keen (2014) find royalties to be distortionary and time-inconsistent as they 
do not respond to changes in the tax base. This argument relates to the notion that 
royalties generally reduce mineral reserves by raising the cutoff grade that in turn reduce 
the known resource and shorten a mine life (Hogan 2012). Additionally, royalties do not 
give credence to time preferences for capital and input factors employed for production 
due to levies on gross revenues occur before distributions of the quasi-rents (Freebairn 
and Quiggin 2010). However, there are disagreements on the practical aspects of the 
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distortion concept due to royalties being recognised as a user fee or explicit tax (Boadway 
and Keen 2010; Minnitt 2007). It symbolises a form of rent payment for collateral 
ownership of land where minerals are found (Duncan and Duncan 1997). 
  
According to Minnitt (2007), royalties are payments for transferring the ownership of 
exhaustible minerals, since extracting them now diminishes the returns that could be 
enjoyed by a future user. The existence of royalties originated from Hoteling’s (1931) 
scarcity rent concept, where a rent is paid for exploiting a non-renewable resource in the 
present time. Community has to be compensated for having the collateral rights to 
mineral deposits and exhaustion of the finite minerals (Minnitt 2007, 542). However, 
economic sacrifices such as the commitment of captial and factors of production do 
require tax policies to rationalise the balance between economic and social dimensions of 
extracting the minerals. 
 
The literature perceives royalties as regressive and have distortionary effects on the cutoff 
grade (Freebairn and Quiggin 2010; Helliwell 1978). However, royalties are not the only 
variables in Lane's (1988) minimum cutoff grade model that is often used in mine design 
and extraction planning. The interface amongst mining, milling and selling costs, and 
market price and mill recovery rate determine the minimum cutoff grade (Asad and Topal 
2011). Further, Ergas and Pincus (2014) find that royalties do not cause a major distortion 
that could lead to a mine closure. Additionally, Conrad, Hool and Nekipelov (2015) find 
that the effects of distortion are minimum. Helliwell (1978, 44) notes that “ if there is 
little scope for cutting costs by raising the cut-off grade, the distorting effects of the gross 
royalty will be even less”. These studies indicate that the argument regarding distortion is 
less critical for low cost and quality deposits because a positive tax base could enhance 
the timely allocation of the invested capital (Fraser 1993). 
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Distortion could remain a conceptual argument in the taxation literature because the 
measurement of distortion on capital allocation and extraction efficiency is practically 
complex due to information asymmetry. Further, cost-cutting strategies such as reduction 
in labour costs through mechanised operations (Fessehaie and Morris 2013), reduced 
energy costs through a switch to hydro or hydrothermal energy (Patsa et al. 2015), and a 
fly-in fly-out mode of mine operation (Storey 2010) can offset the effects of distortion. 
However, time inconsistency problem associated with royalty proceeds being paid before 
reaching a payback period is the major concern. Aside from these conceptual issues, 
different royalty types could suit different types of minerals (i.e. base, precious and 
industrial minerals) attributed to some advantages and disadvantages at the policy level. 
 
Value-based royalties are applied to high value minerals in most jurisdictions (Keen et al. 
2014; Western Australian Government 2015). The main reason is that the ability of an ad 
valorem royalty to respond to changes in the gross revenue is more attractive to 
governments than regressive royalties. Other factors that favour the value-based royalties 
are: require low skill levels for auditing purposes; limit the chance of evading payments; 
and captures the values of by-products (Collier 2010; Guj 2012). On the other hand, unit-
based and value-based royalties can have detrimental effects on the profitability of a 
high-cost mine as they reduce the post-tax profits (Lund 2009). Unit-based royalties are 
less useful for high value minerals and are more suitable for bulk commodities such as 
iron ore and bauxite (Bowie and Ellison 2016). 
 
A unit-based, or specific royalty applied at a fixed rate is levied on a physical unit of 
output, either in dollars per tonne or volume. In most cases, unit-based royalties are 
suitable for bulky commodities  due to their high extraction and transportation costs (Otto 
2006, 268). A weight-based charge on a low-value commodity is more favourable than a 
volume-based charge as it eliminates impurities and captures the values of by-product 
minerals. However, unit-based royalties are not receptive to market dynamics and only 
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respond to changes in production rate, which can be manipulated to reduce its liability 
(Guj 2012). This can result in governments receiving less royalty revenues than expected 
when compared to the value-based royalties. Alternatively, high-cost and high-risk mines 
favour profit-based royalty arrangements as they provide incentives for attracting 
investors (Osmundsen 1998).  
 
Behaviour of firms and magnitude of revenues collected from royalties could  explain 
why royalties are resiliently applied (Kemp 2009). Firms tend to respond more 
aggressively towards profit-based taxes as these may reduce economic rents compared to 
the effects of royalties. For instance, Australia’s mineral resource rent tax (MRRT) 
attracted ferocious political and academic debates that influenced the introduction of the 
RSPT (Passant 2014). Mining firms could react more aggressively to the introduction of 
rent-based taxes that tend to reduce the value of the firm more than the royalties. 
 
In summary, there is consensus among investors acknowledging the societal rationales 
for applying royalties. Investors are well aware that translating capital losses into welfare 
gains is socially more important than defending their extraction optimality. This is 
because the social and economic obligations often fall on a mine operator if fiscal 
redistributions are inefficiently executed, as often is the case in PNG (Hilson and 
Garforth 2013). In reality, community protests can temporarily or permanently shut down 
a mine, whereas royalty charges often do not have this ability (Kirsch 2014; Regan 2014). 
Recent studies argue that value-based royalties can collect significant revenues when 
compared to those collected through the RRT and its hybrid types of rent taxes (Freebairn 
2015, 2; Ergas and Pincus 2014). 
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2.4.2 Resource rent tax (RRT) 
 
Garnaut (2010) explains the significance of neutrality, stability and raising revenues 
using a RRT at the exploration, mine construction and extraction stages. He explains that 
an exploration subsidy could eliminate the need for rapid amortisation, which would 
shorten the time for attaining a normal ROR on capital invested. He also argue the there 
is a high potential for economic gains from resource taxation using a RRT where 
revenues would become accessible at the early production stage (Garnaut 2010b). 
However, collecting revenues using a RRT is uncertain due to the risk variables such as 
price, deposit quality and costs (Smith 1999). 
 
The ability of a RRT to raise revenues from excess profits depend on the profitability of a 
mine and a threshold rate set by a government. Smith (1999), and Ergas, Harrison and 
Pincus (2010) argue that uncertainty associated with price and deposit quality controls the 
time for IRR to reach the threshold rate, which signals a mine has generated the excess 
profits. Depending on the IRR and the threshold rate settings, a RRT may capture the 
excess profits during boom periods only (Fraser 1993), and may not perform well for low 
quality and high cost deposits during non-boom periods. Moreover, a mine operator 
reluctant to reveal private information concerning the size and deposit quality, costs and 
financial data could complicate measuring when a threshold rate could be triggered.  
 
Garnaut (2010) argues that an investor’s discount rate is the ideal threshold rate under the 
second-best neutral tax system. A mine is said to generate excess profits above the 
expected normal ROR when the IRR exceeds investor’s discount rate. However, setting 
the ideal threshold rate is complex due to asymmetry of information associated with 
deposit quality, price and cost uncertainties. Setting a threshold rate below investor’s risk 
premium causes a distortion since the RRT could tax the quasi-rents (Ergas, Harrison and 
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Pincus 2010). To avoid distortion, the full loss-offset policy is required to ensure profit 
tax instruments do not fall on capital and factor allocations (quasi-rents). 
 
Lund (2011) explains that RSPT has features of the threshold rate and IRR-based RRT as 
well as the Brownian tax. The RSPT was designed to follow the second-best neutrality 
principle for successful mines. However, a government would make a settling payment 
equivalent to the unused deductions that are carried forward. This procedure resembles a 
Brownian tax if a mine ceases production (Land 2010). In that respect, the RSPT is 
unsuitable for financially constrained developing countries like PNG although the RSPT 
is neutral and encourages investment decision-making. Further, Australian government 
replaced the RSPT with the MRRT, which is determined by a profitability ceiling 
(Passant 2014). Hence, a shift from the RSPT to the MRRT in Australia is an indication 
of the complexity that could be encountered in maintaining neutrality while at the same 
time expecting to generate revenues. 
 
In summary, the overwhelming perception that a RRT promises to generate more 
revenues from profitable mines compared to royalties could have misled tax policies. The 
APT failed to capture tax revenues from excess profits from mines that existed between 
1972 and 2002 in PNG (McLaren 2012). The APT remained a lay-by tax awaiting the 
existing mines in PNG to generate the excess profits, which never eventuated. Recent 
evidence from studies of McLaren and Passant (2015) and Murray (2015) strongly 
suggest that both developed and immature nations may not successfully use either a RRT 
or its hybrid types to collect revenues from excess profits. The complexity associated 
with measuring the timing when a threshold rate is triggered under information 
asymmetry makes the RRT or APT less attractive to developing countries compared to 
basic taxes such as the CIT. 
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2.4.3 Corporate income tax 
 
CIT is the most stable, neutral and non-distorting tax instrument since quasi-rents are 
allocated before imposing it (Sarma and Naresh 2001). As well, CIT generates 
considerable revenues when compared to royalties, levies and the hybrid RRTs due to its 
high rate relative to rates of other tax instruments (Thomason 2011). Additionally, CIT 
becomes payable immediately when a tax base becomes positive, but delays in accessing 
the CIT revenues can be expected due to unfavourable market prices, low deposit quality 
and high operating costs. Further, CIT liability is measured as a function of gross 
revenues minus expenses (royalties, operating costs, depreciation allowances, interest 
deductions, tax credits) multiplied by the CIT rate (Keightley and Sherlock 2014).  
 
Setting an ideal CIT rate is a significant aspect of its design because higher CIT rates can 
distort the value of the underlying asset more than all other tax instruments, including 
royalties. CIT rates for the mining sector are often set at around 30 percent, which the 
industry accepts as reasonable (Kumar 1991). An increase in the CIT rate can reduce 
investment competitiveness, as well as the value of a firm operating within a jurisdiction 
(Lund 2014a). Therefore, keeping the CIT rate constant throughout a mine’s life is 
significant for maintaining its neutrality status (Atkinson and Sandmo 1980, 174). That 
being said, the real marginal CIT rate can be lower than the statutory rate due to some 
factors within and external to the tax system affecting the CIT base. A CIT base refers to 
the pre-tax cash flows derived after expensing depreciation, amortisation, interest and 
operating costs against the gross revenues (Wilson 2016). 
 
The main factors affecting the CIT base within the tax system are tax depreciation, 
amortisation and thin capitalisation rules, and investors manipulating it through 
overcapitalisation and overinvestment (Kawano and Slemrod 2012). First, depreciation 
techniques such as accelerated declining balance (ADB) and straight-line are components 
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of a fiscal policy and the choice of these techniques is important. The ADB technique 
shortens the timing for attaining the required ROR on the invested capital (Kulp and 
Hartman 2011). Although the ADB technique reduces the CIT revenues in the early 
stages of a mine life, it increases revenue collections by reducing the depreciation 
deductions at the mature stages of a mine life (Hlouskova and Tsigaris 2012). With 
contrast, a straight-line depreciation technique prolongs the timing for attaining a normal 
ROR. However, it improves the post-tax value of the firm due to constant whole of mine 
life tax deductions and accumulate tax credits under unlimited LCF provision and reduces 
CIT revenues at the mature production stages (Dwenger and Walch 2011). 
 
Second, thin capitalisation rules can affect the CIT base as well as an investor’s decision 
for financing of a mining project (Auerbach et al. 2017). Thin capitalisation rules limit an 
investor’s ability to make a decision on debt and equity capital financing strategies. On 
the other hand, it ensures the magnitude of allowable interest deductions do not 
excessively reduce the CIT base through restricting firms from highly leveraging the 
capital costs (Christian and Henry 2015). A highly leveraged or thinly capitalised firm 
gets high interest deductions and reduces the tax base that in turn erodes the CIT 
revenues. The PNG Taxation Review Committee has recommended reducing the thin 
capitalisation ceiling to 2:1 from the present ceiling of 3:1 to reduce the existence of tax 
shields (Mullins and Burns 2016). This ceiling represents a 50 percent debt-equity ratio, 
which is beneficial for companies in the extraction phase. Hence, excessive regulation of 
debt financing may erode the CIT base through an increase in interest deductions 
(Boadway and Tremblay 2016). 
 
Third, overinvestment refers to overstating fixed and operating costs that erodes the CIT 
base (Kanniainen and Panteghini 2013, 12). Tax evasion tactics such as operating a low 
IRR mine with inflated costs and over-reporting of non-tax benefits to the advantage of 
receiving tax credits could write-off CIT revenues (Auerbach 2007, 167). Essentially, 
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CIT is often subject to intense avoidance efforts since its liability is higher than the other 
tax instruments (Richardson 2015). As result, a major challenge is that tracing tax 
avoidance is a complex task in jurisdictions that have poor domestic financial institutions, 
high corruption rankings, and weak tax administration (Devos 2014; Tanzi 2017). 
Additionally, shifting of costs and profits between mines and exploration properties could 
duplicate those transactions thereby significantly reducing the CIT base (Guj et al. 2017). 
 
Fourth, CIT concessions are commonly used as incentives for attracting foreign direct 
investments since mining is characterised as high-risk and capital-intensive (Mansour and 
Keen 2009). The concessions provide tax relief to exploration activities and mines that 
are considered high risk (Bhatt 2013, 252). The concessions constitute a tax write-off 
over a period covering the early part of a mine life, which allow investors to recover their 
investment capital (Davies et al. 1978; Emerson 1982). For example, a negotiated CIT 
holiday granted on ad hoc basis in PNG is biased towards risk-taking firms that face the 
same systematic risks (Filer 2012). However, a prolonged CIT holiday introduced during 
a non-boom period is likely to cause fiscal imbalance as the industry enters a boom 
period. For a ten year tax holiday, an investor may attain the ROR on the quasi-rent in 
year five, and enjoy a tax-free production for the next five years (James 2013; Sheikh-
Ahmad 1997). This could result in wasteful extraction, increase inequality and create a 
negative perception of a tax system being too lenient (Bhatt 2013).  
 
In summary, after attaining a normal ROR on investment, the CIT causes low 
distortionary effects on the capital invested (Gordon 1985). However, a high CIT rate 
could raise the liability, which reduces the value of a firm. Because of this, a firm’s 
attitude towards reducing the CIT liability using overcapitalisation as well as cost and 
profit shifting is a major challenge facing most jurisdictions (Rao and Sengupta 2014). 
Further, maintaining the CIT rate at around 30 percent and protecting the tax base from 
fiscal leakages with a well-resourced tax administration can ensure sufficient flows of 
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CIT revenues to a government. Aside from the four factors discussed, a combination of 
market price and deposit quality determine the magnitude of CIT revenues a government 
may plan to receive (Baffes et al. 2015). The CIT and dividend withholding tax (DWT) 
and other rent-based taxes are also influenced by these factors influencing the tax base. 
 
 
2.4.4 Dividend withholding tax (DWT) 
 
DWT is an in personam tax that is used to regulate the repatriation of dividends to both 
non-resident and resident equity investors (Kumar 1991; Otto 2001). The objective of 
DWT is to encourage reinvestment within a jurisdiction by restricting dividend payments 
to equity investors. For instance, the DWT may induce an investor to reinvest in energy 
saving, tailing reclamation and production expansions in the present investment. 
However, the restriction on corporate decisions with regard to dividend repatriation is a 
disincentive to attracting equity investors in mineral exploration and development (Sarma 
and Naresh 2001). Unlike other tax instruments, the DWT reduces a company’s value 
since it is applied to post-tax cash flows (Kanniainen and Panteghini 2013). 
 
Auerbach (1986) points out that the DWT is a ‘second layer tax’ on the capital gains, 
which reduces the dividend payments to common shareholders. In that context, the use of 
DWT to encourage reinvestment in downstream processing is a weak argument. This is 
because geological attractiveness and favourable market conditions often encourage 
profits to be reinvested within a jurisdiction (Poterba and Summers 1984). Further, a high 
DWT rate could affect raising equity capital at the stock market earmarked for 
exploration, which can affect the chances of delineating a new mine (Forster and Bills 
2013). Hence, DWT’s purpose seems to be ineffective in some cases where a policy 
allows for mineral producers to keep profits abroad, especially for nations that export raw 
minerals without downstream processing. 
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2.4.5 State equity participation 
 
Policy on equity participation is common in developing countries as they aim to generate 
dividends through direct involvement in extraction activities (McPherson 2010; Padmore 
1992; Sims 1985). Foreign firms dominating the mining industry create an impression 
that state and community are spectators, especially in developing countries (Conde 2017). 
This perception has encouraged PNG to directly participate through stake ownership at 
both exploration and extraction stages since their land is traditionally-owned, while the 
GoPNG owns the minerals (Macdonald 2016). However, the economic viability and costs 
of stake ownerships in mining operations are arguably unclear.  
 
The main focus of equity participation is to earn dividends and accumulate assets 
(McPherson 2010). However, uncertainty of when equity dividends would become 
accessible makes equity interest ownership as a form of ‘symbolic’ shareholding  
(Hancock 2002). The symbolic nature of equity participation could be culturally 
acceptable as it provides a sense of local control and ownership against foreign firms 
entirely controlling the industry. On the other hand, investors often secure political 
tolerance and strengthen their social license to operate by permitting some community 
involvements (Pike 2012). Additionally, equity interests could compromise 
environmental standards and allow an investor to use antagonistic tactics to suppress 
genuine community concerns that could arise relating to incidence of fiscal depravity 
(Campbell 2013,  216). For instance, the GoPNG being a partner in a mining project 
allows investors to use disciplinary forces (police and defence forces) to suppress 
community concerns (Jackson 2015). 
 
Three most common equity interest ownership types are: free-carried interest (FCE), 
fully paid equity (FPE) and fully paid production equity (FPPE). The FCE allows 
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investors to deduct positive cash flows against equity capital costs until they are fully 
offset (McPherson 2010). As a result, the term ‘free-carried’ is not exactly free. The 
investor has to recoup its equivalent cost of equity plus interests prior to a community 
accessing the dividends (Muganyizi 2012). Further, the FCE gives rise to a free-rider 
problem since an investor has to commit the upfront equity capital costs on behalf of the 
community (Kim and Walker 1984), which exposes the firm to financial risks.  
 
The FPE involves a market-based financial arrangement where the state has to meet the 
upfront cost of equity participation at the mine development stage (McPherson 2010). 
FPE resembles a Brownian tax if the equity capital costs are settled annually over a debt 
period. On the other hand, the FCE resembles a RRT if state’s upfront capital cost 
contribution is expensed against future cash flows by carrying forward the unrecouped 
cost of equity at the market interest rate (Kumar and Radetzki 1987; Sarma and Naresh 
2001). Both FCE and FPE participation allow the state to access equity dividends on the 
corporate profits after fully expensing the cost of equity against future equity cash flows. 
Further, the state acts as an ordinary shareholder to receive dividends from corporate 
profits when the FCE and the FPE are managed by investors. In this arrangement, the 
state places less influence on corporate decisions compared to the FPPE (Lundstøl, 
Raballand and Nyirongo 2013).  
 
The FPPE is a partial nationalisation type of equity interest ownership where the 
government and the community place direct claims on portions of the physical minerals 
produced (Mendes 2015). It significantly reduces the deposit reserves when compared to 
royalties, which means that the state has the discretion to dispose-of the equity interests at 
a market value. Further, FPPE’s financial arrangement is similar to that of FPE, which 
resembles a production sharing type of direct participation compared to the FPE 
(McPherson 2010). The production sharing resembles a hybrid Brownian tax, such as the 
RSPT where the state refunds pre-tax expenses (operating costs, royalties, depreciation 
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and interest) using its share of equity cash flows. The FPPE dividends become accessible 
after fully refunding the extraction costs and repaying the cost of acquiring the equity 
interests. Compared with the FCE and FPE, the FPPE has more negative effects than 
positive ones (Barton 2016). 
 
To facilitate the equity participation policy in mining and oil and gas developments, the 
GoPNG established separate management companies known as state owned enterprises 
(SOE) (Fallon 2015; Jackson 2015; Stuva, Iida and Okazoe 2013). As often the case in 
PNG, delaying of the expected equity dividends places an obligation on the state to 
subsidise the operational costs of the SOEs that manage the equity interests. These 
additional financial commitments expose the local stakeholders to financial risks 
(McPherson 2010). Hence, the cost of rent-seeking could increase state’s credit rating and 
divert funds away from meeting the social development needs of PNG (Hancock 2009; 
Sunley and Baunsgaard 2001). 
 
In summary, governments perceive that direct equity participation could assure investors 
of long term fiscal stability, sharing risks in terms of providing development capital, and 
offer socio-political security required for a smooth operation of a mining project (Filer 
2008). On the other hand, a community could be willing to accept the risks of owning 
equity interests, such as sacrificing resources in the early years of production with the 
expectation of receiving dividends in later years (Kadenic 2015). However, the increasing 
trend towards equity participation and nationalisation raises the question of why 
governments insist on maintaining the equity participation policies (e.g., Lund 2014b). 
The claim that equity participation encourages skill development and technology 
transfers and creates employment through establishment of the SOE is not clearly evident 
in PNG. Also, the financial risks and social costs are not studied in the literature. This 
thesis will investigate the risks of owning the equity interests in a mining operation and 
how a government can fulfill the revenue collection objective.  
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2.5 Indirect taxes 
2.5.1 Import (duty) tax 
 
Import duties are an indirect in rem levy, a type of royalty on the importation of physical 
capital. Import taxes increase the fixed costs of imported equipment (Campbell 2003; 
Otto 2006). They behave similar to the regressive royalties and the effects are similar to 
an interest withholding tax. Import taxes increase the capital cost while a withholding tax 
on interest payments increases the cost of sourcing debt capital. By increasing the capital 
cost of equipment, an import tax prolongs the time until which a ROR on quasi-rents is 
realised. It also affects the tax base and delays the expected time for realising the 
revenues. 
 
Industrialised nations use import duties as a way of encouraging domestic production 
(Chandrasekhar 1987). In the mining industry, developing countries cannot provide 
substitutes for importation of capital and technology, which are significant inputs to 
production. In recognition of this disadvantage, concessions on import duties are often 
granted for the importation of capital and specific goods that a nation does not produce 
(Singh and Ghosh 1988; Warhurst and Isnor 1996). A government could be tempted to 
impose import duties as a way of raising taxes in the early stages of a mine operation. 
However, they increase the cost of capital and equipment importation (e.g., Campbell 
2004). In recognition of these implications, governments tend to offer preferential 
treatment by exempting capital equipment used for exploration and mine development 
from paying these duties. This concession enhances fast-tracking of a mining project and 
reduce the cost of importing capital and technology. 
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2.5.2 Export taxes 
 
According to Otto (2006), most jurisdictions apply export tax on raw minerals as an 
indirect (in rem) levy. It has the same distortionary effects as those of regressive royalties 
since the levy is imposed when goods or commodities reach an importer’s territory 
(Fliess and Mård 2012). Export tax can be set either on a “per unit basis or an ad valorem 
(value) basis” (Otto 2006, 23). The levy restricts exports of raw commodities and 
encourages value-adding downstream processing within the country that is exporting the 
minerals. However, export tax on a mineral commodity can affect the expansion of the 
extractive sector and affect the macroeconomic growth within a jurisdiction, as well as 
cause supply shortages that can lead to price increases (Korinek 2013). Commodity price 
cycles can also complicate the ability of investors to invest in downstream processing, 
which can reduce exploration and mine development in the long run (Otto and Cordes 
2002). 
 
Fliess and Mard (2012) collected data on mineral export restrictions globally and found 
that China and Russia have imposed legislations to restrict mineral exports. Export 
restrictions, especially by industrialised countries attempt to protect domestic mineral 
endowments so that internal industrialisation needs can be met. Some countries such as 
Fiji, Namibia, Sierra Leone and South Africa, impose restrictions on gold and diamond to 
regulate illegal exports (Fliess and Mård 2012). They find that export taxes are a 
disincentive to investment and may cause distortions in production efficiency similar to 
those caused by royalties. 
 
Export tax cannot be an effective tool to encourage downstream processing unless 
developing countries have the processing technology that can add value to the mineral 
being produced. For instance, Indonesia recently enacted a legislation to ban the export of 
unprocessed ore concentrates (Topstad and Karlsen 2015). They note that the legislation 
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has not been practically applied despite undergoing numerous reviews due to lack of 
constructing downstream processing facilities. Further, export tax could affect 
exploration and mine development in cases where a nation does not have the required 
processing technology and a market destination for the final products (Fliess and Mård 
2012). 
 
 
2.5.3 Employee payroll tax (EPT) 
 
Employee payroll tax (EPT) is the largest revenue collector next to CIT from employees 
in the mining industry in PNG. The EPT behaves progressively during boom periods due 
to increased workforce, while it behaves regressively during non-boom periods due to 
declining local labour engaged in the industry. The progressivity of EPT is often weak 
due to salary range changes depending on the distributions of skill levels and promotions 
achieved by employees (Motuma and Bekana 2015). These also include Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) adjustments and negotiated payroll, including motivational incentives such 
as production bonuses, which may increase the distribution of incomes (Imbun 2002). 
 
However, EPT is normally regressive since salary rates are fixed and distributed across 
skill levels and promotional awards are often limited (Imbun 1997) and does not respond 
to mineral price cycles. As a result, the magnitude of EPT revenues depends on the skill 
distributions and the size of the workforce. For instance, during PNG’s liquefied natural 
gas (LNG) project construction phase between 2010 and 2014, the total direct tax 
revenues increased (Avalos et al. 2015, 24) due to an increase in local workforce and 
importation of skills and labour from abroad. Additionally, contractor payroll taxes, and 
goods and services taxes on disposable incomes contribute significantly to the total tax 
revenues from mining activities (Devos 2014). 
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To maintain regressivity and increase productivity, investors often keep the EPT rates 
constant by increasing the number of low-skilled workers they employ (Checchi and 
García-Peñalosa 2008). During periods of low commodity prices, a mine operator may 
lay-off workers to reduce their labour costs. Since the EPT is regressive, its rate does not 
respond to mineral price increases because the marginal tax rate remains constant and 
therefore the cost of labour declines. This triggers a demand for labour that in turn causes 
the EPT to temporarily behave progressively, which increases revenues. 
 
 
2.6 Techniques for analysing taxes  
 
There is no unified method for assessing specific issues associated with mineral taxation. 
The contradictions amongst theoretical constructs and diversity of actual policies suggest 
that tax appraisals are fragmented (Lund 2009). A classic example is found in Ergas and 
Fincus (2014) who are skeptical of KPMG Econtech, a consultant firm that used a 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model in the Henry Tax Review. The authors of 
that study recommended replacing royalty with a RRT. However, Ergas and Fincus 
(2014) use a partial equilibrium model to argue that royalties can generate substantial 
revenues for Australia. Further, Smith (2013) makes a critical overview of the models 
used for analysing different aspects of tax policies. He found inconsistencies in 
researchers’ choice of methods such as using a single decision variable or in some cases 
ignore the interface amongst multiple risk variables. Additionally, conceptual analysis of 
the taxation theory using stylist resource models and descriptive case studies are common 
in the mineral taxation literature. 
 
Descriptive case studies are useful for expanding the theoretical knowledge and practical 
policy applications (Garnaut and Clunies-Ross 1983). However, descriptive studies do 
not efficiently measure the real time behaviours of investors and governments for two 
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reasons. First, actual sacrifices involving market price, capital and extraction costs are 
subject to technological and competitive forces (Cuddington and Nülle 2014). These 
behaviours could be effectively captured by a multiple period quantitative model 
compared to a single-phased qualitative study. Second, since governments have turned to 
evidence-based policies, quantitive assessments of the actual tax burden and rent 
distributions are required. Although studies such as Boadway and Keen (2014, 2010) lay 
the foundation for building theory and resolve specific issues, optimal models are socially 
biased (Sørensen 2007). This is because stylist resource models investigate how taxes 
affect the optimal extraction of mineral deposits using value optimization models (Land 
2009) that do not measure the magnitudes of the actual tax revenues that could be 
transferred to the society in real time. 
 
A basic tax model must have variables representing the tax deductibility of upfront 
capital investments, tax credits, debt interest deductibility, and LCF provisions, which are 
the main features underlying a neutral tax system. Smith (2013) emphasises that a reliable 
tax model must build in neutrality function as it is the basic ingredient for measuring a 
firm’s behaviour associated with a tax policy. Further, a reliable quantitative tax model 
should address the uncertainty of input variables for cash flow tax systems. It is 
significant in establishing a stochastic tax base (continuous and random over time) of a 
conceptual model (Lund 2009). Samis, Davis, and Laughton (2007) advocate the concept 
of adjusting these uncertain variables separately from their sources, showing that the use 
of RO method is significant for neutralising these uncertainties. 
 
Blake and Roberts (2006), and Samis, Davis and Laughton (2007) use various types of 
RO methods to study contingent taxes, although some of those studies were not intended 
for a comprehensive analysis of resource tax systems. The main contribution made by 
these studies is that using the RO methods reduces the uncertainty associated with cash 
flow volatility. This is significant for predicting the probability distributions of the tax 
base compared to non-stochastic cash flows derived using the discounted cash flow 
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(DCF) method (Samis et al. 2005). The RO method corrects some weaknesses of the 
DCF method, which assumes the tax base is linear, thereby introducing errors in 
forecasting the tax revenues (Samis, Davis and Laughton 2007). 
  
The RO method, including the Monte Carlo simulation (MCS) technique make the tax 
base stochastic that in turn sample the distribution of burden and revenue forecasts for 
long life mining projects. The multiple period projection of unit or value-based royalties 
are linear when using the DCF method. It is against the Jensen’s inequality, which states 
that a mean of a non-linearity is not same as a deterministic price (MacKie-Mason 1990). 
In this context, the probability distributions of gross revenues correctly estimate the 
royalty performance compared to the linear DCF method. Moreover, Samis, Davis and 
Laughton (2007) demonstrate that variance (uncertainty) of the RRT is reduced when 
using the RO and the MCS technique. Regardless of the tax expenses and deductions, 
reducing an uncertainty maximises the tax revenue projection more than the DCF method 
(Samis, Davis and Laughton 2007), although in reality it may not be the case. 
 
In summary, there is a lack of a unified method for tax policy analysis. To rectify this 
condition, deriving a stochastically distributed tax base through reducing the uncertainty 
of input variables can lead to develop real option based models. Samis et al. (2005, 286) 
note that “in the absence of flexibility, the only difference between the two approaches is 
the manner of accounting for the effects of cash flow uncertainty on the asset value”. 
There are no differences in the cash flow equation structures that facilitate depreciation, 
interest expenses, loss offset, and configure multiple taxes for a long life mine (Guj and 
Garzon 2007). Since the RO method being an extended development from the DCF 
method, a cash flow tax model can easily adopt the structure of these methods (Samis et 
al. 2005). 
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2.7 Techniques for forecasting uncertainty variables  
 
To perform a credible mineral evaluation and tax analysis, the first step involves 
forecasting the cash flows that are the basis for evaluation models commonly applied to 
the mining industry (McLaren 2012). Cash flows involve transactions of a firm’s 
earnings against operating costs and non-cash charges (depreciation and debt interest 
deductibles) that define the tax base (McLure, Mintz and Zodrow 2015). Therefore, 
determining the reliability of price and operating cost forecasts affects the tax base, which 
is significant for performing a credible tax analysis. Market-based prices can be used 
either directly for asset valuation, or to determine the parameters as inputs for numerous 
other forecasting techniques that can be used (Guj and Garzon 2007). 
 
RO solution techniques such as the Black-Scholes (BS) model (Brennan and Schwartz 
1985; Merton 1976), the geometric Brown motion (GBM), and the binomial decision tree 
analysis (BDTA) are considered advanced forecasting techniques (Haque, Topal and 
Lilford 2014). The BDTA technique was first constructed by Cox, Ross and Rubinstein 
(1979). It has the flexibility to numerically configure prices for long life mines when 
compared to the BS model. The latter is a closed form solution technique (Haque, Topal 
and Lilford 2014). On the other hand, the BS model is an options pricing technique that 
has attracted wide application for valuing assets. The BS model assumes that risk-free 
interest rates and volatility are constant for pricing financial stocks that may not work 
well for mining projects. Further, despite the BS model being a closed form solution, it 
values mine closure and re-opening options by approximating the actual values (Davis 
1995; Benninga 2000). 
 
Various forms of the RO techniques have been used to evaluate the timing preference for 
investment decision-making such as abandon, start constructing a mine now or delay 
(shut-down) until market price improves (Kelly 1998). She used a binomial option 
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pricing technique to determine whether to develop the Lihir gold project (not developed 
at that time) and concluded that price, costs and deposit quality would determine excising 
those options (Hall and Nicholls 2007). Real options require techniques that are flexible 
for decision-making compared to now or never decision-making based on the DCF 
method. Their studies demonstrate that the binomial lattice technique can concurrently 
forecast long-term price trends, costs and cash flow distributions to determine the values 
(NPV) of mining projects (Dehghani and Ataee-pour 2013). 
 
 
2.7.1 Binomial lattice technique 
 
The binomial decision tree analysis (BDTA) is an extension of decision tree analysis 
(DTA) technique. It is useful because it provides an open form framework from which 
the price paths can be configured from a network of branches (Page 1998). Flexibility in 
the DTA technique enables analysing optional decisions by using time-dependent 
volatility and risk probabilities within a network of branches (Brandao and Dyer 2005). 
The BDTA systematically extends the branches (nodes) from which stochastic 
distributions of prices can be computed for long life mining projects (Hall and Nicholls 
2007). Within the DTA structure, the BDTA transforms the decision tree into a network 
of interlinked nodes that are useful for forecasting non-reverting prices such as that of 
gold (Cox, Ross and Rubinstein 1979). 
 
Since gold price follows a random walk process, the GBM technique cannot be applied as 
it deviates from the actual price by large margins (Reddy and Clinton 2016). Gold price 
behaves like a financial stock market that follows random and unpredictable price paths, 
which increases over time. Unlike other commodity prices that are generally mean 
reverting (Andersson 2007), physical gold is a derivative of the exchange rate as it is 
traded as a financial stock because the gold price follows a random walk process (Smith 
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2002). He found that daily closing prices that are often used as time series data in 
resource valuation models indeed follow the random walk process. Because of this 
behaviour, the binomial lattice technique can be useful in forecasting gold prices than 
copper prices. Hence, integrating the discrete prices derived using the BDTA with Monte 
Carlo simulation could generate more reliable outcomes. 
 
Development of software such as the LatticeMakerTM eliminates the complexity 
associated with computing variables within the binomial lattice. The BDTA can compute 
the price paths and a secondary lattiice can be construted to configure the cash flows 
from which the value of a real option (a mining project) can be computed (Tan et al. 
2009). As a result, up and down movements are mutually exclusive (Orosi 2015). Both 
cannot occur at the same time because volatility and node price changes are subject to 
new information in the stock market (Cox, Ross and Rubinstein 1979).  
 
Unlike valuing an underlying asset (NPV) along with the options within the binomial 
lattice matrix (e.g., Hall and Nicholls 2007), this thesis only seeks to adjust the 
uncertainty associated with the input variables, mainly the mineral prices and the 
operating costs. Mineral prices are determined by supply and demand forces, with some 
experiencing reversion to long term median (e.g., copper) while others (e.g., gold) are 
non-reverting. The reverting and non-reverting nature of mineral prices make financial 
stocks follow stochastic processes that affect the value of a mineral project and also the 
tax revenue forecasts (Miranda and Brandão 2013).  The price forecast can be carried out 
by modular structure of the binomial lattice as given in Figure 2.3.      
 
Figure 2.3 shows the procedures involved in calculating the node values (state prices) in 
each period represented by symbol Su (price going up); and Sd (price going down). The 
value of each node in the lattice is derived by working backwards from values calculated 
at the end of each branch (Dehghani and Ataee-pour 2013, 2012; Hall and Nicholls 
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2007). The notation σ represents the volatility of the historical prices, which is calculated 
as the standard deviation of the changes daily prices. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Procedures for computing node prices at each node over a three-year period 
 
 
The equations in Table 2.1 will be used to derive the input variables to generate the 
binomial lattice. To simulate the behaviour of prices over the life of a mining project 
using the BDTA, parameters such as spot price (So), price volatility (σ) and risk-free 
interest rate (Rf) are required to derive the risk-neutral probability (p), and upward (u)and 
doward probabilities (d). 
 
As shown in Table 2.1, the discrete time steps are given by ∆t (T/n) (Mun 2002). For 
u>1, at t =0+1, the variable (e.g., price or operating cost) can move up from its current 
level (S0) with probability (pu) (node value). Similarly, for d<1, at t =0+1, the variable 
can move down to a new level (node value) with a probability of pd or 1-pu. The notations 
u and d, are factors designating the probability of state prices increasing and decreasing 
within the lattice matrix (Miranda and Brandão 2013). 
 
Initial value (So)  1st period value 2nd period value 3rd period value 
@ to = ∆t         @t1 = ∆t                @t2 = 2∆t                 @t3 = 3∆t  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So 
Su = uSo 
Sd = uSo 
Suu = u2So 
Sud = udSo 
Sdd = d2So 
Suuu = u3So 
Suud = u2dSo 
Sddu = ud2So 
Sddd = d3So 
d 
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Table 2.1: Equations for computing the node prices as shown in Figure 2.3 
Parameter description Equation/Symbol 
Initial gold price or operating costs: So = Spot price 
Compute node price going up in the lattice: Su= So*u                               (2.4) 
Compute node price going down in the lattice Sd= So*d                              (2.5) 
As node value goes up risk decreases over time: u= 𝑒𝜎√∆𝑡                                (2.6) 
Probability of uncertainty increases over time, t.: d= 𝑒−𝜎√∆𝑡 = 1/𝑢                  (2.7) 
Risk-neutral probability of node value going up: pu=(𝑒−𝑅𝑓∗∆𝑡 − 𝑑)/(𝑢 − 𝑑)    (2.8) 
Risk-neutral probability of value going down:                                             pd = (u-𝑒−𝑅𝑓∗∆𝑡)/(𝑢 − 𝑑)  =  1-pu 
                                            (2.9)   
Discrete time step sequence  ∆t= (T/n)a                             (2.10)           
Volatility obtained from historical price data: σ 
aT is the total time for an option to expire, and n is the time steps 
 
  
2.7.2 Geometric Brown Motion (GBM) technique 
 
GBM technique originated from the Brown motion (BM) model, which was developed 
by Robert Brown (Ermogenous 2006). According to Reddy and Clinton (2016), Robert 
Brown in 1827 discovered particles displaying jittery motions, which became a basis for 
tracing stochastic stock price paths. However, the BM model facilitates negative values 
for market prices that do not represent their behaviours. As a result, it was restructured by 
Weiner (Wiener and Teichmann 1959) by integrating the geometric motion component 
into the BM model. This correction ensures a future price path is independent of the past 
and reverts to a long term mean. In other words, past information (events) do not 
influence the future prices and the reversion is reflected by a stable and stochastic price 
growth over time (Pindyck 1999).  
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Pindyck (1999) identifies the suitability of using the GBM technique is due to 
hydrocarbon prices (crude oil, gas and coal) trends are mean reverting, where the prices 
fluctuate over time. Prices react to short-term information which is volatile, but become 
stable in the long-run as new information erases the effects of older information. He finds 
that hydrocarbon prices revert to a mean at a slow phase over time. Given such 
behaviour, the GBM is a suitable technique for forecasting the forward prices of a 
mineral only if the long term volatility is constant. With contrast, financial options follow 
the random walk process, whose price paths cannot be reliably predicted (Reddy and 
Clinton 2016). The authors found that financial stock price paths forecasted using the 
GBM technique deviated from the actual stock prices by 50 percent because the long 
term volatility of financial stocks are unstable. As for real assets (mining projects), the 
GBM technique can reliably forecast the copper price because its long-term price 
volatility is fairly constant and randomly distributed (Wets and Rios 2015). 
 
The GBM technique has seen broad application in RO-based studies following the initial 
works of Merton (1976), and Dixit and Pindyck (2001; 1995). Guj and Garzon (2007) 
provide a revised version of the model based on the work of Blais, Poulin and Samis 
(2005) to explain the parameters used in the GBM technique, which follows the Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process (McNichols and Rizzo 2012). The GBM technique was first adopted 
in the Black-Scholes model to forecast stock prices, but it lacked the drift component 
because the BS model has the assumption of no-arbitrage (Brewer, Feng and Kwan 2012, 
cited in Reddy and Clinton 2016). The return (profit) condition for real assets such 
mining projects have the common notion of ‘high-risk, high-gain’. It is opposite to the 
no-arbitrage principle, which asserts ‘low-risk, high gain’ without a sacrifice such as 
buying low and selling high (riskless gain) in financial option trading (Fernández 2001). 
However, as for the mining industry, there is no gain (profit) without an initial investment 
where the sacrifice is reflected in a discount rate higher than the risk-free interest rate. 
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Therefore, a risk adjusted discount rate (RADR) could correctly reflect the risk 
conditions of the mining industry. 
 
In order to slow down the speed of reversion, the mineral price risk and reversion factors 
are combined to derive the risk discount factor. The risk discount factor is incorporated 
into the GBM model to moderate the diverging effects on short-term forward prices (Guj 
and Garzon 2007). Following the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, the stochastic price is 
recursively dragged towards a long-term equilibrium price within an expected timing as 
measured by the half-life (Dixit and Pindyck 1994). Half-life is the time for the expected 
price to reach a mid-point (halfway) between the spot price (So) and the long term mean 
(Zhang, Nieto and Kleit 2015b). Stochastic forward prices (dS) are forecasted through the 
following GBM equation: 
            
𝑑𝑆 = �𝛼 + 1
2
𝜎2 −  𝛾𝑙𝑛 �𝑆𝑜
𝑆𝑚
�� 𝑆𝑜 ∗ 𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑆𝑜𝑑𝑧      (2.11) 
 
Where: dS = continuous spot price change 
   dz = Weiner process (random variable over time interval dt) 
    dt = continuously measures the drift of the spot price (So)    
    So = spot price (at time of evaluation) 
    Sm = long-term price median (at time of evaluation) 
    σ   = short-term price volatility (standard deviation)  
               𝛾   = ln (2)/half-life (reversion factor) 
           𝛼   = short-term growth rate of the price median 
 
The Weiner process is defined as: dz = Normal. Inv (RAND, 0, 1)* √𝑑𝑡       (2.12) 
  
  57  
  
  
Where: Normal. Inv (RAND, 0, 1) = standard normal random variables where the mean 
variation is between 0 and 1 over a square root of time 
interval (dt) 
 
Equation (2.11) shows the short-term growth rate of the price median (𝛼), is added to half 
of the squared standard deviation (1
2
𝜎2), which is also the variance. A product of the log 
normally distributed average spot price (𝑙𝑛 �𝑆𝑜
𝑆𝑚
�) and the reversion factor (𝛾), is then 
subtracted from the sum. The result is multiplied by the product of the continuous short-
term drift (𝑑𝑡) and the spot price (𝑆𝑜). The drift in the short-term price can be either 
positive or negative. Its magnitude depends on the degree of price volatility: the higher 
the price drift, the higher the resultant price projection (Sauvageau and Kumral 2017). 
This effect is moderated by the stochastic component (uncertain random shock (𝜎𝑆𝑜𝑑𝑧)) 
in equation (2.11). It makes the price forecast contingent on a positive (or a negative) 
shock while keeping the drift constant (Reddy and Clinton 2016). The uncertain random 
price shock is derived from the product of mineral price volatility (𝜎), spot price (𝑆𝑜), 
and normal distribution of mean variations in the price movements (or Weiner process) 
over a time interval (𝑑𝑧).  
 
Historical price data is required for deriving the parameters needed for the GBM model in 
equation (2.11) because mineral prices behave as stocks that follow the Markov process 
in which the present price paths are predictors of the future trends (Abidin and Jaffar 
2014). Also, mineral prices are lognormally distributed and natural logarithms of 
historical prices are used to compute the daily volatility, which is then used to derive the 
annualised volatility (Guj and Garzon 2007). These authors modified the GBM model by 
discounting the forward prices using the mineral price-risk factor, which restricts GBM 
technique’s ability to over-estimate short-term price paths if there are positive and large 
drifts (Dmouj 2006). The mineral price-risk is a product of the market price-risk and 
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correlation factor derived from the natural logarithm of the Standard and Poor (S&P 500) 
data.  
 
As a synopsis, the GBM and Monte Carlo simulation techniques can resolve the 
uncertainty associated with future price volatility (Swei, Gregory and Kirchain 2016). 
Guj and Garzon (2007) use the GBM model to forecast nickel prices for use in a modern 
asset pricing (MAP) model and compare the results with those of a static DCF model. 
They noticed that NPV derived using the DCF method was higher than that derived from 
the MAP model. The differences were due to directional risk-neutral and risk-averse 
biases associated with the methods used. Further, the binomial lattice and the GBM 
techniques are identified as suitable techniques for reducing the uncertainties of gold and 
copper prices respectively. As argued by Samis, Davis and Laughton (2007), separately 
adjusting the uncertainties of input variables is significant for constructing a financial 
model that establishes a stochastic tax base that is reliable for resource valuation and tax 
analysis. 
  
 
2.8 Summary 
 
This chapter has reviewed the taxation literature in relation to distribution of tax burdens, 
sharing of risks and the policies associated with design of tax systems. The taxation 
framework protects and regulates the distribution of quasi and economic rents that could 
exist in a perfectly competitive market before taxes can be imposed (Boadway 1987). 
However, the Brownian tax and other hybrid systems devised to attain absolute neutrality 
tend to place more emphasis on extraction optimality and give little preference to social 
welfare. This could have affected the efforts made to design a balanced tax system 
resulting in defensive behaviours of the stakeholders. That is, investors protect the rent 
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maximising objective while governments respond with corrective policies in their quests 
to capture a greater share of the mineral wealth extracted (Pedro 2016). 
 
In relation to the problem, devising a balanced mineral taxation that meets the fiscal 
needs of investors and governments is complex (Laporte and De Quatrebarbes 2015). 
Most jurisdictions deviate from the neutrality principle and continue using royalties and 
inefficient rent-taxes that affect the extraction efficiency and reduce revenues (Boadway 
and Keen 2014, 39). The main reasons are: royalties raise more revenues than profit-
based royalties; distortion argument is less varifiable in relation to reduction in mineral 
reserves and complexity associated with administrating the hybrid RRT systems. Given 
this scenario, measuring the equilibrium condition in which revenues should not exceed 
the return in access of the capital employed, which is the main argument that should be 
addressed for devising a balanced mineral tax system. Therefore, measuring the 
proportional distributions of burden and tax revenues amongst the stakeholders is 
necessary to understand the behaviours of investors and governments associated with a 
mineral taxation policy. 
 
The major gap identified relates to the capabilities of governments to raise a high 
magnitude of revenues from the mining industry by making taxes more progressive. The 
literature on tax instruments and systems reviewed in Section 2.4 is silent on the 
theoretical and practical aspects of progressivity. Kamin (2008, 241) identifies this gap 
and enquires why progressivity has not been developed despite the mineral taxation 
literature encouraging mineral endowed nations to devise progressive tax systems (Land 
2010). A progressive cash flow tax system can fulfil the revenue maximising objective, 
thereby resolving the behavioural problems of a government (Venables 2016). Australia, 
Canada and PNG have adopted progressive systems for the respective mining industries 
but their performances have not been studied. 
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A subset of the main gaps mentioned above is that there is a need for devising suitable 
methods to reliably measure the performances of tax instruments for long life mining 
projects. A major concern in cash flow tax modeling is the need for reducing uncertainty 
of input variables to ensure tax instruments behave non-linearly in real time when they 
respond to market conditions. Hence, reducing the uncertainties separately using suitable 
RO solution techniques can establish a reliable tax base. Chapter 3 presents the 
methodology of this study. 
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Chapter 3 : Methodology 
 
Chapter 2 examined the existing literature on mineral taxation and identified the gaps that 
require further investigation with respect to the objectives of this thesis. This chapter 
explains the methodology that will be used for data collection and techniques to reduce 
the uncertainty of input variables for conceptual tax modelling. The evidence-based study 
also integrates historical data, which includes non-tax benefits to analyse the overall 
wealth transfers to PNG from the mining sector.  
 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.1 describes the conceptual outline of the 
research based on the gaps identified in Chapter 2. Section 3.2 explains the procedures 
for dealing with uncertainty surrounding the input variables. Section 3.3 explains the cash 
flow models that are used to generate financial and tax data for the theoretical analysis. 
Section 3.4 discusses the procedures for collecting historical data. Section 3.5 presents 
the functional variables, followed by limitations in Section 3.6, and a summary of the 
chapter in Section 3.7. 
 
 
3.1 Conceptualisation of the research method 
 
Devising tax systems aimed at reducing the average tax burden could lessen the 
preference for community’s fiscal needs. This relates to devising optimal tax systems 
such as non-distorting lumpsum, Brownian and less progressive taxes that tend to reduce 
the marginal tax rate. However, these tax systems tend to ignore the social needs of 
resource owners and may not close the fiscal disparity gaps identified in Chapter 1 
(Mankiw, Weinzierl and Yagan 2009). This complicates the objective of achieving a 
balanced tax system, especially governments having less confidence in their tax systems’ 
ability to collect a high level of revenues. Furthermore, negotiated tax concessions and 
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favourable fiscal terms offered in response to risk situations and the desire to create 
competitive environment, which tend to erode tax revenues (Conde 2017).  
 
The progressive taxation is ignored despite being identified as possessing some positive 
attributes required for designing a balanced tax system. Perhaps a major contributing 
factor for its neglect is the perception that progressivity increases the marginal tax rate, 
and therefore, exposes an investor to a high tax burden (Conrad and Hool 1984). 
However, the relationship between neutrality and progressivity under price, cost and tax 
rate conditions has not been clearly explained. According to Lund (2010), cyclical 
progressivity enhances capital and factor allocations that occur following the extraction 
path, which ensures that taxes are levied on the marginal increases in the tax base. As 
discussed in Section 2.6, the main reason is the lack of using suitable techniques to assess 
progressive tax system’s ability to expose an investor to tax burden while raising 
revenues. There were two issues identified within this gap. 
 
First, structural progressivity is identified to be a suitable technique for analysing the 
revenue collecting potential of the progressive tax instruments in PNG. As mentioned in 
Section 2.6, most descriptive case studies and stylist models establish the economic and 
financial principles of tax designs (Boadway and Keen 2014). However, the lack of a 
suitable technique that processes the time-series numerical data makes these study 
techniques ineffective in capturing the actual tax burdens faced by the mining industry 
and how different tax instruments perform in terms of collecting revenues. For example, 
visualising the difference between RRT and royalties has been confusing because 
governments tend to use value-based royalties more than the RRT (Freebairn 2015). 
Hence, the structural progressivity could be a suitable technique for processing time-
series data to identify which taxes collect much of the revenues. 
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Second, there is a lack of establishing a stochastic tax base that ensures the functional 
variables (TPI, METR and others) are reliable for measuring the performance of various 
tax instruments. As discussed in Chapter 2, reducing the uncertainty of input variables 
makes forecasting the theoretical tax base (pre-tax cash flow) more predictable than if 
used deterministically (Kucharska-Stasiak 2013). The use of RO solution techniques such 
as the GBM, binomial lattice and MCS techniques rectify this setback. The risk-adjusted 
input variables make cash flow tax models more dynamic than the DCF model (Maybee, 
Lowen and Dunn 2010). Hence, reducing the uncertainty ensures the tax revenue 
forecasts are accurate to some extent. The overall conceptualisation of the research 
method is outlined in Figure 3.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1:  Conceptual framework 
 
 Identify and select a theoretical framework 
 Identify concepts of mineral taxation 
 Identify a tax system, which relate to PNG 
 Identify and select tax modelling method 
 Identify and select techniques for addressing 
uncertainty of input variables 
Describe the data processing techniques 
 Identify data sources: (1) conceptual data 
derived through tax modelling; and (2) 
historical data derived from existing mines in 
PNG 
Define the functional variables to measure the 
theoretical and historical tax performances 
Data analysis to reconcile PNG’s mineral 
taxation regime, which includes indirect and 
non-tax benefits to assess the overall mineral 
wealth transfer to the community 
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Figure 3.1 shows that the study connects the theoretical framework with the principles of 
progressivity that could define how tax instruments behave within a neutral tax design 
setting. The progressive tax system can generate revenues without distorting the capital 
and factor allocations. Further, as highlighted in Figure 3.1, much of this chapter entails 
data selection and identifying the techniques required for correcting the imperfect data. In 
that case, identifying suitable techniques to forecast financial and tax data is significant 
for performing a quantitative analysis (Smith 2013). This thesis integrates the theoretical 
and historical analysis of tax performance using different datasets in order to broaden the 
understanding of how tax instruments behave in real time.  
 
This study approach contributes to two outcomes. First, the paired analysis has some 
advantages as the theory-based tax projections alone may not capture the real tax 
performance, nor correctly predict the behaviour of governments. Most corrective tax 
policies such as changes in tax rules come about as a result of governments measuring the 
actual revenues against profits generated by respective mining industries (Ayisi 2015). 
This difference makes the nature of data and the choice of reliable measurement 
techniques significant. Further, the paired analysis ensures that the theoretical results are 
used as benchmarks against the historical results, which provides a deeper understanding 
of how tax instruments perform under risk factors such as fiscal, cost and market 
conditions. 
 
Second, a qualitative approach to analysing a tax policy through a bottom-up collection 
of opinions from the wider community could introduce emotions compared to an 
empirically-driven policy analysis. The Fraser Institute finds that increased political 
interventions and community involvement in policy development tend to raise risk 
ratings (Jackson and Green 2016). Hence, the use of numerical data reduces the bias that 
could arise from using qualitative data, which makes this study a balanced analysis of 
PNG’s mineral taxation regime. 
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Figure 3.2 is an extension of the conceptual framework showing the steps that will be 
followed in the study. The left-hand side of Figure 3.2 shows the procedures involving 
numerical data that will be used for the theoretical tax analysis (Chapter 4). The right-
hand side of Figure 3.2 shows how the historical financial and tax data will be used to 
compute the functional variables (Chapter 5). It follows that the conceptual and historical 
results will be integrated to reconcile the mineral taxation regime in PNG (Chapter 6). 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Outline of the study procedures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tax performance measurements 
Theoretical tax evaluation Historical (actual) tax 
evaluation 
A: Input data: price, costs, 
mine operational data and 
other assumptions  
B: Adjust uncertainties 
of input variables 
C: Model the mining 
taxes 
D: Extract financial and 
tax estimates (data) to 
compute functional 
variables) 
A: Identify samples of existing 
mines in PNG 
B: Collect pre-existing 
historical data: financial (cash 
flow data) direct taxes, 
indirect and non-tax benefits 
C: Compute functional 
variables) 
Integrate conceptual and historical 
evidences 
Reoncile the PNG mineral taxation 
regime 
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3.2 Procedures for theoretical tax evaluation 
3.2.1 Data collection 
 
Since prices of minerals and costs are the major determinants in a mine valuation 
(Kucharska-Stasiak 2013), forecasting the paths of these risk variables are significant for 
long life mines. The sampling techniques used in this thesis were non-experimental and 
based on the theoretically estimated and pre-existing real data. The market and private 
data for the conceptual tax analysis are given below. 
 
• Historical market data comprising of gold and copper prices from the London Metal 
Exchange (LME) were downloaded into Microsoft ExcelTM spreadsheets from the 
internet. As for the copper price, the daily spot prices from January 1978 to December 
2014 were used to compute the parameters for the GBM model. On the other hand, the 
spot gold prices from January 1998 to January 2015 were used to forecast the gold 
price using a binomial lattice method. The prices for copper and gold are presented in 
Appendix A (Table A-1). 
 
This chapter focuses on copper and gold prices only because PNG’s mining industry 
comprises of these minerals with silver as a by-product. Silver productions are 
reported in historical production data. However, its quantity in copper and gold 
deposits are never reported separately at the feasibility stage, which makes calculating 
the value additivity difficult. Hence, conceptual models tend to ignore the values 
added by the by-products. Additionally, forecasting the prices of by-products is not 
required because PNG’s symmetrical progressive fiscal regime captures the total 
export values regardless of producing different minerals and by-products. Moreover, 
the LME historical prices are applied because they are often used as benchmarks for 
setting long-term supply contracts. The copper and gold are sold at competitive market 
prices and producers are price takers. 
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• Private data from the undeveloped Frieda deposit was obtained from a 2010 pre-
feasibility report prepared by the former property owner, Xstrata. The data includes 
resource reserve, production rate and other private data for the Frieda deposit (Table 
3.1). Additionally, the operating and capital costs were obtained from Frieda 
deposit’s pre-feasibility study. 
 
 
Table 3.1: Frieda deposit data 
Parameters Symbol Data Estimates as of 2010 
Diluted reserve (M)  2.8 billion tonnes (untreated rock 
Head Grades (Ḡ):           
                          
Copper: 
Gold: 
0.46 percent per tonne of rock mined 
0.22 grams per tonne of rock mined 
 
Mill Recovery (Rᶬ)  
                         
Copper: 
Gold: 
85 percent copper recovery rate (LOM) 
72 percent gold recovery (first 8 years & LOM is 71%) 
Contained metal (K) 
                                                    
                          
 
Copper:
Gold: 
 
12.9 million tonnes copper metal (refinery output) 
20.4 million tonnes gold metal (refinery output) 
 
Mining Rate:  First 8 years Life of mine (LOM) 
Throughput  60 million tpa 50 million tpa 
Concentrate output  930,000 tpa  716,000 tpa 
Metal output (H):        Copper: 
Gold: 
246,000 tpa copper 
379,000 ounces per year 
190,000 tpa copper 
284,000 ounces per year 
Cost estimation  Xstrata 2010 values  
Capital cost Capex: US$5.3 billion  
Operation cost Opex: US$8.36 tpa*  
Cut-off grade:  
                        
Copper: 
Gold: 
0.2 % equivalent 
0.22 g/t Au 
0.20 % equivalent 
NA 
Mine Life (T)  + 20 years 
*TPA denotes tonnes per year.  
Source: Xtrata Pre-feasibility Report (2010) publicly available from the website: 
http://www.highlandspacific.com 
 
 
3.2.2 Forecasting copper price 
 
This section applies the GBM model described in Chapter 2 (Section 2.7) to forecast the 
copper price due to its mean-reverting tendency (Dixit and Pindyck 2001, 1995). Daily 
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historical copper prices obtained from the LME were used to derive the parameters 
required for the GBM model (Blais, Poulin and Samis 2005). The daily copper prices and 
Standard and Poor 500 (SP500) indices for the period from 2010 to December 2014 were 
used to calculate the correlation factor between market and daily prices (ρmkt) (Figure 
3.3). 
 
 
Figure 3.3:  Monthly copper price path correlating with the SP500. 
 
 
The daily volatility in price returns are higher than those of monthly and yearly spot 
prices due to market’s reaction to events (information) and supply-demand cycles 
(Boehmer and Wu 2013). On the other hand, yearly price returns do not accurately 
forecast the price paths because long-run price volatilities decrease in response to 
receding historical information (Redlinger and Eggert 2016). Short-term (daily) historical 
spot prices tend to give a better measure of volatility since market responses to 
information are spontaneous. The volatility derived using these daily spot prices 
accurately reflects the future price paths (Abidin and Jaffar 2014).  
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Table 3.2: Equations used for estimating parameters based on LME copper prices 
Variable  Equation  
Long term (over 5 years)    
Spot price (US$/t) 𝑆𝑜 = LME spot price as of 31/01/2015    - 
Ln (Spot price) average Φ = Average of [Ln(t+1)-Ln(t)]    (3.1) 
Standard deviation (%) β = Stdev (price range)   (3.2) 
Mean of price (US$) µ = Exp (Φ +0.5*β2)   (3.3) 
Long term price median (US$) 𝑆𝑙 = ((Exp((2* Φ) +2*β
2)) – Exp(2* Φ + β2 ))0.5      (3.4) 
Price volatility (%) σ = 𝑆𝑙 / µ   (3.5 
Price median (US$) 𝑆𝑚 = µ ∗ Exp (-0.5* σ2)   (3.6) 
Median price 1 year ago  𝑆𝑦= µ ∗ Exp (-0.5* σ2)  (Different price range)   (3.7) 
Recent 6 months volatility (%)  σ𝑚 = Stdev (price range)   (3.8) 
Short-term price volatility (%) σ𝑠 = σ𝑚/((1/ϸ)
0.5  where  ϸ = 320 days   (3.9) 
Mineral price risk (%) R𝑚 = F𝑐 ∗ P𝑚𝑟  [see Appendix A]  (3.10) 
    
Short-term (6 months)    
LN (Spot price) average Φ = Average of [Ln(t+1)-Ln(t)] (SAA) 
Standard deviation (%) β = Stdev(price range) (SAA) 
Mean µ = Exp(Φ +0.5*β2) (SAA) 
Short-term median 𝑆𝑠 = ((Exp((2* Φ) +2*β
2)) – Exp(2* Φ + β2 ))0.5    (SAA) 
Price volatility (%) σ = 𝑆𝑠 / µ (SAA) 
Price median (US$) 𝑆𝑚 = µ ∗ Exp(-0.5* σ2) (SAA) 
Short-term growth rate (%) 𝛼 = (𝑆𝑚/ 𝑆𝑠) -1 (3.11) 
Reversion half-life (years)  (a number which fits) - 
Reversion factor ɣ = Ln (2)/half life (3.12) 
Note: 𝐹𝑐 = price correlation factor; 𝑃𝑚𝑟 = price market risk. SAA denotes ‘same as above’. 
 
 
Table 3.2 presents the formulas used to compute the main parameters required in the 
GBM model for forecasting the forward copper prices. The LME spot price of copper 
(So) on the 31st January 2015 was used. The other parameters are the price median (𝑆𝑚); 
mineral price risk (Rm ); short-term growth rate of the price median (𝛼); and reversion 
half-life. Zhang, Nieto and Kleit (2014, 4) define half-life as “the time for the expected 
value to real half way price between the current value (So) and the long term 
equilibrium”. The half-life was assumed to be 2.5 years required for the expected forward 
price to reach the half way between spot price and the mean price (µ). 
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As given in equation (3.5), the long-term price median (Sm) was divided by the mean 
copper price (µ) to derive the short-term price volatility (σ), based on 320 trading days. 
Further, equation (3.3) was used to derive the mean price based on the average natural 
logarithm of daily copper prices. Likewise, equation (3.4) was used to derive the long 
term price median (Sl) based on the natural log and standard deviation of the historical 
prices. 
 
The mineral price risk for copper (Rm) was derived by multiplying the daily market price 
correlation factor (𝐹𝑐 ) by the market price risk (𝑃𝑚𝑟 ) using equation (3.10). The S&P 500 
copper price indices between 2010 and 2014 were correlated using Correlation function 
in Microsoft ExcelTM to derive the correlation factor (𝐹𝑐 ). Next, the market price risk 
(P𝑚𝑟 ) was derived by dividing the mineral risk premium (assumed to be 6 percent) by the 
annualised volatility of the daily copper prices (Guj and Garzon 2007). This led to 
compute the mineral price risks as a product of the 𝐹𝑐, and the 𝑃𝑚𝑟 (equation (3.10)). 
Further, the short-term growth rate (𝛼) was computed using equation (3.11), which 
divided the price median by the long-term median of natural logarithm of the daily spot 
prices from January 1998 to January 2015.  
 
The simulations of the parameters in the GBM model were performed using the 
Microsoft ExcelTM. Starting with the spot price of copper, the prices were simulated for a 
20-year life of the Frieda copper-gold deposit. In Table 3.3, the variance was recursively 
simulated following the Weiner process given in equation (2.12). The equations (3.13) to 
(3.16) were successively used to simulate the expected copper prices presented in Table 
3.3. The expected spot prices were then multiplied by risk discount factors to derive the 
forward prices using equation (3.17). Moreover, lower and upper price confidence 
intervals were assumed to be +10 percent and calculated using equations (3.18 and 3.19) 
(Table 3.3). 
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Table 3.3: Stochastic copper prices using LME spot price and variables in Table 3.2 
Variable Symbol Parameter 
Spot price (US$/t) 𝑆𝑜 6,472 
Price median (US$) 𝑆𝑚 7124.4 
Short-term price volatility (%) σ𝑠 14.25 
Mineral price risk (%) R𝑚  11.89 
Short-term growth rate (%) 𝛼 -0.72 
Reversion half-life (years) - 2.5 
Reversion factor ɣ 0.28 
Upper and lower confidence interval  - +10% 
 
Time Variance 
Median 
price  
Expected 
price 
Risk 
discount 
Forward 
price 
Lower 
10% 
Upper 
10% 
(years) (%)2 ($/unit) ($/unit) Factor ($/unit) Confidence Confidence 
2016 0.0156 6,592.40 6,643.98 0.9853 6,546.38 5,617.62 7,736.32 
2017 0.0245 6,699.10 6,781.81 0.9743 6,607.66 5,480.54 8,188.59 
2018 0.0297 6,789.02 6,890.53 0.9661 6,656.76 5,443.94 8,466.43 
2019 0.0326 6,862.56 6,975.47 0.9599 6,695.55 5,444.21 8,650.42 
2020 0.0343 6,921.48 7,041.33 0.9552 6,725.85 5,458.43 8,776.67 
2021 0.0353 6,968.01 7,092.12 0.9517 6,749.34 5,476.77 8,865.28 
2022 0.0359 7,004.37 7,131.12 0.9490 6,767.46 5,494.89 8,928.50 
2023 0.0362 7,032.56 7,160.97 0.9470 6,781.36 5,511.03 8,974.17 
2024 0.0364 7,054.30 7,183.77 0.9455 6,792.01 5,524.63 9,007.50 
2025 0.0365 7,070.99 7,201.15 0.9443 6,800.13 5,535.73 9,032.02 
2026 0.0365 7,083.76 7,214.37 0.9434 6,806.32 5,544.60 9,050.18 
2027 0.0366 7,093.51 7,224.43 0.9428 6,811.03 5,551.58 9,063.70 
2028 0.0366 7,100.94 7,232.07 0.9423 6,814.61 5,557.02 9,073.81 
2029 0.0366 7,106.59 7,237.87 0.9419 6,817.34 5,561.23 9,081.38 
2030 0.0366 7,110.89 7,242.27 0.9416 6,819.40 5,564.47 9,087.08 
2031 0.0366 7,114.16 7,245.61 0.9414 6,820.97 5,566.96 9,091.37 
2032 0.0366 7,116.64 7,248.15 0.9412 6,822.16 5,568.86 9,094.61 
2033 0.0366 7,118.52 7,250.07 0.9411 6,823.06 5,570.30 9,097.05 
2034 0.0366 7,119.95 7,251.53 0.9410 6,823.75 5,571.41 9,098.90 
2035 0.0366 7,121.03 7,252.63 0.9409 6,824.26 5,572.25 9,100.29 
 
 Equations used 
Variance (A) = ((σ𝑠)2 * ɣ)) * (1-exp(-2* ɣ*T))  where T =  time (years)   (3.13) 
Median price (B) = 𝑆𝑚*(((𝑆𝑜/𝑆𝑚) * exp((𝛼/ɣ)* (1-exp(-ɣ*T))))exp(-ɣT))            (3.14)    
Expected spot price (C) = B*exp(0.5 *B)                                                                    (3.15) 
 Risk discount  factor (D) = Exp(-((Rm *σ𝑠)/ ɣ)* (1-exp(-ɣ*T)))                                   (3.16) 
Forward copper price (E) = C * D                                                                                  (3.17) 
L/C interval  (F) = B * exp(NORMSINV (0.1)*(A)0.5)                                    (3.18) 
 U/C interval (G) = C * exp(NORMSINV (0.9)*(A)0.5)                                    (3.19) 
 
Note: Normsinv is a Microsoft ExcelTM function that computes the lognormal distribution of 
price 
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Figure 3.4: Stochastic copper price reverting to a long-term mean. 
 
 
An important feature of the reverting price process shown in Figure 3.4 is that it follows 
the future copper price path quoted on the LME that are bounded by +10 percent upper 
and lower confidence intervals. It shows that a high price risk discount rate could drag the 
stochastic copper price towards the lower interval boundary, which could be bias to the 
real time price (Azimi, Osanloo and Esfahanipour 2013). In other words, the expected 
copper prices could be over or underestimated within the confidence boundaries. Further, 
Guj and Garzon (2007) performed a 5-year nickel price forecast commencing 2008. Their 
nickel price forecast followed the LME path although there were some variations in the 
initial years due to a high spot price was used at the time of modeling. Hence, the GBM 
model can provide acceptable price approximations as shown by the similarity between 
the real LME price and the calculated forward price paths. 
 
 
 
$3,000
$4,000
$5,000
$6,000
$7,000
$8,000
$9,000
$10,000
0 1 2 3 4 5
C
op
pe
r p
ric
e 
U
S$
/t 
Years 
Copper price stochastic model 
As at 31st of January 2015 
Expected spot Forward price Lower 10%
Upper 10% LME
  73  
  
  
3.2.3 Forecasting gold price 
 
The binomial lattice technique described in Chapter 2 (Section 2.7) was used to forecast 
the gold price over a 20-year period following some steps. The first step was to estimate 
the parameters required for the binomial lattice technique. The initial gold price, So, and 
volatility, σ, were estimated directly from the LME (daily) prices over the period from 
January 1998 to January 2015. Since prices are lognormally distributed, the same 
procedure applied in computing the copper price volatility was used to compute the gold 
price volatility. The spot price as of January 2015 was US$1253/Oz. The annualised 
volatility of 22.24 percent was computed using the short-term price volatility equation 
(3.9). The result was consistent with Hague, Topal and Lilford (2014, 120) who estimate 
the gold volatility to be around 22.27 percent. 
 
The risk free interest rate (rf), price volatility (σ) and time steps (∆t) are the key 
parameters that were applied in the formula described below. 
 
Probability of node value going up:        u = 𝑒𝜎√∆𝑡                             (same as 2.7) 
Probability of node value going down:   d = d = 𝑒−𝜎√∆𝑡 = 1/𝑢         (same as 2.8)  
Risk-neutral probability of node value going up: pu = (𝑒−𝑅𝑓∗∆𝑡 − 𝑑)/(𝑢 − 𝑑)             (2.9) 
Risk-neutral probability of value going down:  pd = (u-𝑒−𝑅𝑓∗∆𝑡)/(𝑢 − 𝑑) = 1-pu    (2.10) 
Risk discount factor:     Rf  = (e(r*t/n))     (3.20) 
 
 
Table 3.4: Parameter estimations using equations (2.7) to (2.10) 
Spot gold price 
(So) US$/Oz 
Risk free interest 
rate (rf) (%) 
Gold price 
volality (σ) (%) 
Time to 
maturity (n) 
Number of 
Steps 
1253 4 22.2a 20 40 
 
Calculations 
Up movement (u) Down movement 
(d) 
Upward 
probability (Pu) 
Downward 
probability (Pd) 
Discount 
Factor 
1.04 0.97 0.50 0.50 0.999 
Note: aEquation (3.9) was used 
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The second step involved the construction of the lattice using the LatticeMaker software 
add-in for Microsoft ExcelTM. Discrete node values in the primary lattice structure were 
simulated using the procedures described in Figure 2.3 (see Chapter 2). For example, in 
2016, the upper node value was calculated as follows: So*u = 1253*1.04 = 1298 and the 
lower node was So *d = 1253 *0.97 = 1210 (Fig. 3.5).  
 
 
Time 0 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Step 0 80640 80680 80720 80760 80800 80840 80880 80920 80960 81000
1253 1298 1344 1392 1442 1494 1547 1603 1660 1719 1781
1210 1253 1298 1344 1392 1442 1494 1547 1603 1660
1168 1210 1253 1298 1344 1392 1442 1494 1547
1128 1168 1210 1253 1298 1344 1392 1442
1089 1128 1168 1210 1253 1298 1344
1051 1089 1128 1168 1210 1253
1015 1051 1089 1128 1168
980 1015 1051 1089
946 980 1015
913 946
882
Expected gold price 1253 1254 1255 1257 1259 1262 1265 1269 1274 1279 1284
Risk-discount factor 0.998 0.996 0.994 0.992 0.990 0.988 0.986 0.984 0.982 0.980
Risk-adjusted forward price 1251 1250 1249 1249 1249 1250 1252 1254 1256 1259
MCS -Stochastic Price 1253 1233 1111 1224 1384 1320 1495 1347 1404 1170 1188  
Figure 3.5: Gold prices project over a 20-year life 
 
 
The third step was to find the average of the continuous up and down values for each 
period to obtain the annual prices to be used over the 20 year period. The averaging was 
possible because the upward and downward probabilities were symmetrical (50 percent) 
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and the discrete values were used as unit prices (Orosi 2015). Further, the growth rate 
with time was reduced since fine granularity of the discrete time step sequence had a 
similar effect to discounting using the mineral price risk. The fine granularity of time 
steps (∆t) reduce the upward and downward probability movements in each step, leading 
to more accurate results that converge with those of the Black-Scholes model (Mun 
2002). The price forecast for 10 years is shown in Figure 3.5, with the full 20-year lattice 
shown in Figure A-1 (Appendix A). 
 
This thesis identified a disadvantage associated with directly using the discrete prices. 
The discrete prices tend to grow at a constant rate identical to inflating the price, gross 
revenues and operating costs using an escalation rate in a DCF model. According to Mun 
(2002, 152), the binomial approach is a “discrete simulation process”, while the GBM 
model is a ‘continuous stochastic simulation process”. This makes the price forecast 
detached from being continuous and stochastic behaviour as expected. For example, 
Dehghani and Ataee-pour (2010) use the binomial lattice technique to forecast a 10-year 
copper price path (2010 to 2020). However, compared with the real LME spot price 
between 2011 and 2016, their price forecasts using the binomial lattice technique were 
overly pessimestic, which led to overestimations. 
 
In another example, Hall and Nicholls (2007) use the binomial lattice technique to 
estimate price and generate cash flows for a coal mine. However, their forecast was not 
consistent with the real LME coal prices between 2008 and 2017. These examples 
suggest that forecasting the forward prices is a complex task since prices are susceptible 
to volatility in the financial market. Having identified these problems, the discrete gold 
prices in Figure 3.5 were discounted using a risk discount factor (equation (3.20)) (Samis 
et al. 2005). The decomposed discrete gold prices using the risk discount factor were 
similar to those calculated using the mineral risk discount factor (equation (3.16)). 
However, the discrete forward prices were not stochastically distributed. 
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To resolve these setbacks, the discrete prices were converted into stochastic variables 
using the MCS technique by setting a minimum and a maximum through a triangular 
probability distribution (Kucharska-Stasiak 2013). The triangulation process was such 
that the probability range was configured using RiskSim software add-in for Microsoft 
ExcelTM and simulated for 10,000 trials. Integrating the MCS technique into the binomial 
process ensured the gold prices were randomly distributed over the 20 years mine life. 
This same technique was applied to forecasting the operating costs in the proceeding 
section. 
 
 
3.2.4 Forecasting operating costs 
 
Since a government is not directly involved in decision-making associated with a mining 
operation, establishing a reliable operating cost forecast is significant for tax modeling. 
The unit operating costs (including labour costs) are the largest cost components in 
mining and investors could increase costs to avoid exposure to high tax liability. For 
example, low cost mine operations can lower output rates and extend a mine life 
(Campbell and Wrean 1984). This could be done by offseting the distortion effects of 
royalty on the cut-off grade (Asad and Topal 2011). However, forecasting the unit costs 
are significant part of the evaluation process as they determine the size of profits and tax 
revenues (Zhang, Nieto and Kleit 2015a). 
 
Historical costs are often used for modeling purposes because bottom-up estimation of 
operating costs are tedious and extracting cost data is expensive (Shafiee, Topal and 
Nehring 2009). Hence, most evaluation studies use historical costs derived from existing 
mine operations, which may vary depending on specific locations. This thesis used 
Xstrata’s 2010 operating cost estimation for the Frieda deposit (Table 3.1) in PNG. It was 
converted to 2014 nominal cost using the United States (US) Consumer Price Index 
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(CPI). To convert the historical operating and capital costs, the following equations were 
used: 
 
Nominal inflation rate in year: τ = CPI (x)  - 1      (3.21) 
         CPI (y) 
    
Where year x = present year 
                   y = past year in which historical cost is determined 
 
Average inflation between year x and y: 
 
                 Average inflation: υ =  CPI (x)  1 / n  - 1         (3.22) 
                        CPI (y)    
 
Where   n = number of year 
      
Nominal annual escalation: ϋ = (1+ τ) * (1+ Ԑ)n – 1     (3.24) 
 
   Where   Ԑ = real escalation rate between year x and y 
 
Nominal cost in year x = cost [year (y)] * (1 + ϋ)     (3.25) 
 
 
Xstrata's operating cost estimate for the undeveloped Frieda deposit was US$8.36 per 
tonne (2010 value) (Table 3.1). The US CPI and a 3 percent real escalation rate were used 
to convert the 2010 historical costs to 2014 nominal operating costs. The reason for using 
the US CPI was that the cost estimations were given in US Dollar although the actual 
operation will be affected by PNG’s CPI and exchange rate. As shown in Table 3.5, the 
real unit opeating cost of US$8.36 per tonne was converted to US$10.12 per tonne 
(December Quarter 2014) to align with the period for which the tax modeling was 
undertaken. 
 
Determining the volatility of operating costs of copper mines was a complex task due to 
the absence of time series data. If the time series operating cost data were available, 
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equation (3.9) would have been used to derive the short term volatility. This study used a 
volatility of 21 percent, as applied by Dehghani and Ataee-pour (2012) to forecast the 
operating costs for a copper mine in their study. 
 
 
Table 3.5: Converting historical to nominal costs at the time of tax modeling 
  
Parameters Values Parameters  Values 
US CPI (Dec 2010): [y] 
US CPI (Dec 2014): [x] 
219.179 
234.812 
US CPI (Dec 2010): [y] 
US CPI (Dec 2014): [x] 
219.179 
234.812 
τ = 7.13 (%) τ = 7.13 (%) 
υ = 1.74 (%) υ = 1.74 (%) 
ϋ  = 21 (%)  ϋ  = 21 (%) Real Opex* (2010) = US$8.36/t Capex* (2010) = US$5.3 M Nominal Opex (2014)  US$10.12/ t Capex (2014) = US$6.4 M 
*Refers to operating cost and capex refers to capital costs 
 
 
The MCS technique used in Section 3.2.2 was also applied to the discrete operating cost 
projections to make them more stochastic. Further, Xstrata's initial capital cost estimate 
of US$5.3 billion (2010 value) was converted to a December 2014 value of US$6.48 
billion using equations (3.21) to (3.25). The results of the binomial lattice simulations are 
presented in Figure 3.6 and the entire simulated results are presented in Appendix A, 
(Figure A-2). The adjusted operating and capital costs for the Frieda copper deposit were 
then used for modelling the mining tax instruments and adjust the production data for 
Frieda deposit in Section 3.2.5.  
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Time 0 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Step 0 40320 40340 40360 40380 40400 40420 40440 40460 40480 40500
10.12 10.12 10.58 11.07 11.57 12.10 12.65 13.23 13.84 14.47 15.13 15.82
9.68 10.12 10.58 11.07 11.57 12.10 12.65 13.23 13.84 14.47
9.25 9.68 10.12 10.58 11.07 11.57 12.10 12.65 13.23
8.85 9.25 9.68 10.12 10.58 11.07 11.57 12.10
8.46 8.85 9.25 9.68 10.12 10.58 11.07
8.09 8.46 8.85 9.25 9.68 10.12
7.74 8.09 8.46 8.85 9.25
7.40 7.74 8.09 8.46
7.08 7.40 7.74
6.77 7.08
6.47
Cost Forecast (US$/t) 10.12 10.13 10.15 10.17 10.20 10.24 10.28 10.33 10.39 10.46 10.53
Risk Discount Factor 0.00 0.998 0.996 0.994 0.992 0.990 0.988 0.986 0.984 0.982 0.980
Risk adjusted forward opex 10.12 10.11 10.11 10.11 10.12 10.14 10.16 10.19 10.23 10.27 10.32
MCS - (US$/t Cu) 10.00 9.97 11.13 11.69 10.53 9.65 9.80 10.25 10.94 11.48 10.04   
Figure 3.6: Operating costs projected over a 20-year life  
 
 
3.2.5 Adjusting production estimates from Frieda 
 
Copper and gold prices, along with the operating costs influence the cut-off grade, which 
in turn will change the initial metal contents (Boadway and Keen 2010). The cutoff grade 
is the main variable used as a benchmark to achieve optimal productivity under cost and 
price constraints (Asad and Topal 2011; Bootsma 2013). The prices and costs were 
integrated into Lane’s cutoff grade model (Lane 1988) to adjust Frieda deposit’s cutoff 
grade and mineral reserve given in Table 3.1. Lane's (1988) minimum cutoff grade (ḡ) 
model given in equation (3.26) was used. 
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(ḡ)   = 
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 (𝑀ᶜ)+𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 (𝑃ᶜ)(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 (𝑃)−𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝑆ᶜ))∗𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 (𝑅ᶬ)           (3.26) 
 
   = (𝑀ᶜ + 𝑃ᶜ)/((𝑃 − 𝑆ᶜ) ∗ 𝑅ᶬ)   
          
 Where ḡ  = cutoff grade at time t 
           Mᶜ  = mining cost 
     Pᶜ  = Processing cost   
           P  = Selling price 
     Sᶜ  = Selling Cost 
     Rᶬ  = mill recovery rate 
 
 
The contained mineral was derived by multiplying the ore quantity above the cutoff 
grade by the average grade, Ḡ (Minnitt 2004). The Ḡ was calculated by dividing the total 
metal content by the total tonnes processed. The quantity above the cutoff grade after 
adjustment (∆ԚM), or the proportion of the mined quantity that goes to the mill was 
calculated using equations (3.27), (3.28) and (3.29): 
 
  ∆ԚM = Ԛo - Ԛo * ḡa  if ḡa > ḡ                (3.27)     
  ∆ԚM = Ԛo + Ԛo * ḡa  if ḡa < ḡ                (3.28)     
 
Where ∆ԚM = adjusted quantity above cutoff grade and ḡa = adjusted cutoff grade                  
 
 Metal content = ԚM = Ḡ * (∆QM) * 𝑅ᶬ        (3.29)  
 
The summary of the prices, costs and primary (deterministic) data for the Frieda copper-
gold deposit are presented in Table 3.6.  
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Table 3.6: Summary of stochastic prices and costs, and Frieda deposit data 
Yr Prod. 
Rate (QM) 
Copper 
output 
Au 
output 
Av. 
Grade 
Av. 
grade* 
Cu 
Price Au Price Opex 
  (Rock t) (tonnes) (Oz) Cu (%) Au (g/t) (US$/t) (US$/Oz) (US$/t) 
1 60000000 246000 379000 0.46 0.22 6546 1233 9.97 
2 60000000 246000 379000 0.46 0.22 6608 1111 11.13 
3 60000000 246000 379000 0.46 0.22 6657 1224 11.69 
4 60000000 246000 379000 0.46 0.22 6696 1384 10.53 
5 60000000 246000 379000 0.46 0.22 6726 1320 9.65 
6 60000000 246000 379000 0.46 0.22 6749 1495 9.80 
7 60000000 246000 379000 0.46 0.22 6767 1347 10.25 
8 60000000 246000 379000 0.46 0.22 6781 1404 10.94 
9 50000000 190000 379000 0.46 0.22 6792 1170 11.48 
10 50000000 190000 284000 0.46 0.22 6800 1188 10.04 
11 50000000 190000 284000 0.46 0.22 6806 1298 10.47 
12 50000000 190000 284000 0.46 0.22 6811 1299 9.89 
13 50000000 190000 284000 0.46 0.22 6815 1114 11.32 
14 50000000 190000 284000 0.46 0.22 6817 1204 13.54 
15 50000000 190000 284000 0.46 0.22 6819 1252 10.53 
16 50000000 190000 284000 0.46 0.22 6821 1256 11.36 
17 50000000 190000 284000 0.46 0.22 6822 1237 11.62 
18 50000000 190000 284000 0.46 0.22 6823 1307 9.73 
19 50000000 190000 284000 0.46 0.22 6824 1373 9.92 
20 50000000 190000 284000 0.46 0.22 6824 1136 15.29 
  Source: Xtrata Pre-feasibility Report (2010) 
 
 
Table 3.7 shows that the quantities of copper and gold above the cutoff grade slightly 
increased as a result of continuous changes in the cutoff grade due to variability in the 
forecasted prices and operating costs. The average grades (Ḡ) for gold and copper 
remained constant because changes in metal contents were small relative to the large 
mineable reserve. The distribution of prices and operating costs influenced the variations 
in the cut-off grade, which in turn caused the metal output to vary from the initial data 
given in Table 3.1. For instance, a fall in the gold price in year 9 naturally caused the 
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cutoff grade to increase, which in turn reduced the gold output to 274,399 ounces per 
year from the initial output estimate of 379,000 ounces per year (Tables 3.1 and 3.7).  
 
 
Table 3.7: Adjusted production estimates for the Frieda copper deposit 
  Mᶜ + 
Pᶜ Sᶜ ḡa, Cu ∆ԚM Ḡ, Cu Ḡ, Au 
  ԚM, 
Cu 
  ԚM, 
Au 
Year  (5.2%) (% Cu) Tm (%) (g/t) Cu (t) Oz Au 
1 7.78 0.52 0.158 67,130,245 0.38 0.45 254,605 301,394 
2 8.68 0.58 0.175 67,886,868 0.38 0.45 257,475 304,791 
3 9.12 0.61 0.183 68,217,326 0.38 0.45 258,728 306,275 
4 8.21 0.55 0.164 67,360,140 0.38 0.45 255,477 302,426 
5 7.53 0.50 0.149 66,717,465 0.38 0.45 253,039 299,541 
6 7.64 0.51 0.151 66,795,132 0.38 0.45 253,334 299,889 
7 7.99 0.53 0.157 67,086,509 0.38 0.45 254,439 301,198 
8 8.53 0.57 0.168 67,548,475 0.38 0.45 256,191 303,272 
9 8.95 0.60 0.176 67,908,447 0.38 0.40 257,556 274,399 
10 7.83 0.52 0.154 66,907,740 0.38 0.40 253,761 270,356 
11 8.17 0.54 0.160 67,202,120 0.38 0.40 254,877 271,545 
12 7.71 0.51 0.151 66,793,153 0.38 0.40 253,326 269,892 
13 8.83 0.59 0.173 67,771,774 0.38 0.40 257,038 273,847 
14 10.56 0.70 0.207 50,704,841 0.38 0.40 192,308 204,884 
15 8.21 0.55 0.161 67,224,783 0.38 0.40 254,963 271,637 
16 8.86 0.59 0.173 67,797,607 0.38 0.40 257,136 273,951 
17 9.06 0.60 0.177 67,969,301 0.38 0.40 257,787 274,645 
18 7.59 0.51 0.148 66,677,240 0.38 0.40 252,887 269,424 
19 7.74 0.52 0.151 66,803,592 0.38 0.40 253,366 269,935 
20 11.93 0.80 0.233 49,512,985 0.38 0.40 187,788 200,068 
Note:  The cost of mineral sales (Sᶜ), estimated as 5.2% of the operating costs. A 95% net smelter 
return (NSR) rate was used to calculate the cutoff grade. 
 
 
3.3 Cash flow tax model 
 
Different types of cash flow tax (CFT) systems were briefly discussed in Section 2.1 
(Chapter 2). As mentioned in Chapter 2, the R+F-based CFT is defined as taxing the 
positive tax base after accounting for capital cost allocations, amortisation, operating 
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costs, debt interest deductions and royalty (Auerbach et al. 2017). It also mimicks the S-
based CFT because the GoPNG imposes dividend and interest withholding taxes 
(Walpole 2012). The Brownian and Garnaut-Clunies Ross versions of the CFT are the 
combinations of the CFT systems that recognise the real increases (decreases) in the tax 
base. 
 
The CFT has some advantages. It attains some neutrality without severely eroding the tax 
base so that governments can have access to revenues after a mine realises its normal 
ROR (Boadway and Keen 2014; Sandmo 1979). Most tax systems are designed to avoid 
distorting the investment decisions so that investors continue to generate profits from 
which governments can have access to revenues in the long run. Further, the CFT can 
control a firm’s debt and equity financing options through thin capitalisation rule to 
ensure interest deductibility does not reduce the tax base (Auerbach et al. 2017). 
Moreover, CFTs facilitate easy calculations of the tax liability and limit cost and profit 
shifting between mining projects. Equation (3.30) is a basic cash flow model as provided 
below. 
 
𝑁𝑃𝑉 = −𝐼0 + � 𝑃𝑉 = −𝐼0 + {� [(𝐺𝑟𝑡 − 𝐶𝑜 − 𝐷𝑡) − 𝑇]} ∗ (1 + 𝑖)−𝑛 𝑛𝑡=1𝑛𝑡=1   (3.30) 
 
Where NPV   = sum of present values 
   PV = CF x discount factor (1+i)n, where i is the discount rate 
    n = number of years (mine life) 
    Io = initial capital costs, including past exploration expenditures 
    Grt  = gross revenue 
    T =Tax (represent all tax inputs) 
   Co = operating cost  
   Dt = annual tax depreciation deductions 
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Equation 3.30 is the standard DCF valuation method used to derive NPV for making 
after-tax investment decisions (Schreiber 2013). It uses deterministic input variables and 
a constant discount rate that assumes risk is fixed throughout a mine’s life. Within the 
DCF method, gross revenues and operating costs are usually escalated at a nominal 
growth rate to cater for future volatility and escalation to cater for improvement in 
technology and innovation. However, this procedure ignores the stochastic distributions 
of the tax base (Shafiee, Topal and Nehring 2009). In the absence of management 
flexibility, incorporating a stochastic cash flow and MCS technique can make the CFT 
model more dynamic (Samis and Davis 2014). 
  
Following the guidance provided by Samis et al. (2005), a dynamic DCF method (RO 
CFT model) was developed by taking uncertainty into account when the stochastic price 
and operating costs were incorporated into the DCF method. Additionally, within the RO 
CFT model, the MCS technique was further imposed to ensure the financial and tax data 
were stochastically distributed (Shafiee, Topal and Nehring 2009). It was referred to as a 
RO MC-CFT model. Further, since PNG’s taxation regime has been a progressive one 
(McLaren and Passant 2015), equation (3.30) was applied to the second-best CFT system 
as described in Chapter 2 (Section 2.1). The mineral taxation policy of PNG allows 
investors to fully expense the capital costs and carry forward cash flow losses that are 
compounded at the risk-free interest rate. 
 
The RO and RO MC-CFT models were used to model PNG’s mineral taxation regime 
that became effective after the 2000 Tax Review (Table 3.8). The direct tax instruments 
comprise of CIT, DWT, royalty, equity participation and an APT, which was a version of 
a RRT. PNG applies an ad valorem royalty across the industry, which includes a special 
support grant (SSG) and Mineral Resources Authority (MRA) levy. PNG also offers a 
0.75 percent tax credit scheme (TCS) as an incentive for mining companies to directly 
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apply a portion of the CIT revenue for infrastructure developments within a host mining 
region.   
 
 
Table 3.8: Details of PNG mineral taxation regime (Revised 2000-2015) 
Basic mining taxes  Tax Rates 
Corporate Income Tax (CIT) 
• Large Scale Mine Income Tax 
• Medium Scale Mine Income Tax 
• Tax credit scheme1 
Acronym 
SML 
ML 
TCS 
(%) 
30 
25 
0.75 
 
Royalties2 
• Ad valorem royalty 
•  Profit-based royalty 
• Mineral Resources Authority levy 
• Special support grant 
• Production levy      
 
 
 
PBR 
             MRA 
SSG 
PL 
 
 
2 
2 
0.25 
0.75 
Ceased in 2006 
 
Quasi-taxes   
• Additional Profit Tax 3                   APT 20 @ 10% threshold ratea  
Equity Holding4 
• Fully paid production equity 
• Fully paid Equity 
• Free carried equity 
 
 
FPPE 
FPE 
FCE 
 
22.5 – 30 (18) 
22.5 – 30 (18) 
22.5 – 30 (18) 
• Value Added Tax (import tax) 
• Dividend withholding tax 
VAT 
DWT 
         Zero Rating5  
10 
 
Capitalisation methods   
  Accelerated-declining balance                   ADB  150 DDB method 
  Amortization  Exploration (AEE)  Pool depreciation 
  Amortisation  Feasibility/dev. Same applies 
     
1 TCS rate reduces the CIT rate as it is an incentive for development purposes in the host region  
2 NSR ad valorem royalty as well as profit-based royalty applied at the Ramu Nickel mine  
3Possible reintroduction after 2012 – 2015 Taxation Review recommendations 
4 State and community equity participation varies (case by case basis) 
5 Equipment for exploration, mining and petroleum/gas are exempted from import duty 
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The CFT model in equation (3.30) was expanded by combining the R+F-based and S-
based CFT to insert the tax instruments as given in equation (3.31). 
 
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑇 = −𝐼0 + � 𝑃𝑉𝑇 𝑛𝑡=1     (3.31)  = −𝐼0 +  �{[(𝐺𝑟𝑡 − 𝐿𝑅) + (𝐿𝑀𝑅𝐴 + 𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐺) − 𝐶𝑜 − (𝐷𝑡 + 𝐴𝑑) − 𝑇𝑃𝐵𝑅 −  𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐸] − 𝑇𝐴𝑃𝑇𝑛
𝑡=1
− (𝑇𝐶𝐼𝑇 − 𝑇𝐶𝑆) − 𝑇𝐹𝐶𝐸/𝐹𝑃𝐸 −  𝑇𝐷𝑊𝑇} ∗ (1 + 𝑖)−𝑛  
 
Where NPVT  = Sum of present values after tax deductions,  
        PVT  = Annual present values after tax deductions 
        Grt = Gross revenue 
               i = Risk adjusted discount rate (RADR) applied to the methods   
     Dt +Ad     = Depreciation and amortisation in time, t 
              𝐿𝑅    = NSR ad valorem royalty as a levy (outflow) 
          LMRA = Mineral Resources Authority levy 
           𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐺  = Special support grant (levy) 
          𝑇𝑃𝐵𝑅      = Profit based royalties 
          TAPT    = Additional profit tax  
     𝑇𝐶𝐼𝑇 = Corporate income tax 
  𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐸 = Equity dividend from fully paid production equity (FPPE) 
        TFCE / FPE   = Free carried equity and fully-paid equity 
   𝑇𝐷𝑊𝑇 = Dividend withholding tax (DWT) 
        TCS = Tax credit scheme that reduces the 𝑇𝐶𝐼𝑇 
    
 
Further clarifications on some aspects of equation (3.31) are presented below:  
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• The ad valorem royalty (LR) calculation was based on the Net Smelter Return 
(NSR) explained by Otto et al. (2006). The NSR accounts for freight, handling 
costs to the point of export and refining costs in the computation of the ad valorem 
royalty payable. 
 
• Other levies, such as Mineral Resources Authority levy (LMRA), and a special 
support grant (LSSG), were expensed against the gross revenue. A MRA levy of 
0.25 percent was calculated similar to the NSR royalty. Also, the SSG was 
computed similar to the NSR royalty and charged at a rate of 0.75 percent. 
 
• PNG offered a profit-based royalty (TPBR) to the Ramu Nickel mine, which was 
outside of the taxation framework. To assess its effects, the PBR was inserted into 
the CFT model as a second-tier to the CIT. The ad valorem royalty was excluded 
before applying the PBR in order to avoid double deductions. 
 
• The CIT (TCIT) was accessible when the pre-tax base became positive. As shown in 
equation (3.31), a TCS rate of 0.75 percent reduced the CIT rate to an effective 
CIT rate of 29.25 percent. This was because mining companies are allowed to 
directly use the TCS funds for infrastructure development purposes in host mining 
regions in PNG. The DWT (TDWT) was imposed on the post-CIT base (before 
adding back depreciation, salvage value, and debt capital inflows). The CIT rate 
was reduced from 35 percent to 30 percent and the DWT was reduced from 15 
percent to 10 percent in the PNG 2000 Tax Review (Hogan and Goldsworthy 
2010). 
 
• As can be seen in equation (3.31), the three types of equity participations (TFPPE, 
TFCE and FPE) were inserted into the model according to the different financing 
arrangements discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.4.5). 
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(1)  Since FPPE is a production sharing, it appears on the pre-tax base in equation 
(3.31). This is because the government refunds an investor the cost of sales, 
royalty and other levies, operating costs, and depreciation and interest 
deductions. Since the GoPNG does not separately sell its share of minerals 
produced, mining companies export the minerals and directly deduct the sales 
expenses. After the deductions, a balance of the equity cash flows is transferred 
to the state owned enterprises (SOEs) that manage the equity interests on 
behalf of the state and community. If the pre-tax base is negative, it may turn 
out to be a Brownian tax as it requires the GoPNG to subsidise the financial 
costs of equity capital and the administration expenses of the SOEs. 
 
(2) To assess the risk distributions, the FCE and FPE were modeled on the post-tax 
CF base the dividends were assumed to be paid out of corporate profits. As for 
the FCE, the GoPNG and the community have access to dividends after fully 
offsetting the equivalent cost of equity from positive post-tax CFs. Likewise, 
under the FPE, if investors are allowed to manage the equity interests on behalf 
of the state and community, positive dividends can be accessed on the 
corporate profits if the equity capital plus interests are fully expensed against 
post-tax cash flows as shown in equation (3.31).      
 
• As for the additional profit tax (APT), a rate of 20 percent was applied to the pre-
tax base (after applying the FPPE). The Taxation Review Committee has 
recommended the GoPNG to re-introduce the APT (Emerson and Kraal 2014). 
The PNG version of the pure RRT with full loss-offset was such that the APT 
becomes accessible on the pre-tax base by setting the cumulative present values 
(discounted at the threshold rate) equal zero. In the past, a 15 percent threshold 
rate was enforced, but it never generated any APT revenues (DMPGM 2014). 
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Therefore, this thesis used a 10 percent threshold rate. The main reason was that a 
lowered threshold rate would demonstrate the ability of the APT to collect 
revenues from porphyry copper-gold deposits in PNG whose average IRRs are 
mostly around 11 percent (Otto and Cordes 2002). 
 
• The capital cost was depreciated using an accelerated declining balance (ADB) 
depreciation technique with a premium of 150 percent. Also, a 15 percent of the 
pre-development and feasibility study costs were amortised over a shorter period 
(four years) compared to the whole of life depreciation expenditures because the 
Frieda deposit has been a Greenfield project. 
 
• Equation (3.31) does not have a variable representing the allowances for interest 
tax deductibility since the model was assumed to be a 100 percent equity-financed 
mining project (Torries 1998). This was because most evaluations are often carried 
out with the 100 percent equity assumption because an investment decision is 
influenced by uncertain input variables, including project and tax risks. However, 
the effects of different thin capitalisation rules will be investigated in Section 4.2 
(Chapter 4). 
 
• A risk adjusted discount rate (RADR) of 5 percent was used to account for 
operational and tax risks, as well as other uncertain variables not directly 
considered in the tax models (Guj and Garzon 2007). The RADR is considered a 
suitable discount rate because risk-averse investors prefer a medium level discount 
rate (Park and Matunhire 2011) rather than the risk-free interest rate despite using 
the RO CFT models.  
 
In summary, although cash flows of mineral projects may not be predicted precisely due 
to market dynamics and uncertainties associated with production, neutralising the sources 
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of volatility was a significant step in the evaulation process. This section has developed 
the RO CFT and the RO MC-CFT methods that were used to model PNG’s mining tax 
instruments. The financial and tax estimates derived using these theoretical models were 
then used to compute the functional variables (Appendix B). 
 
 
3.4 Procedures for historical tax analysis 
 
The historical tax analysis used data collected from the closed Bougainville copper mine 
and two existing mines and these were: Ok Tedi copper-gold, and Porgera gold mines. 
The mines were selected based on their consistent production histories over prolonged 
periods. The data represented periods that covered changes in the tax regime and mineral 
supply cycles from 1972 to 2013. Historical data from the Ok Tedi mine was from 1984 
to 2013. As a result, GoPNG’s expropriation of the Ok Tedi mine in 2014 and its 
temporary shutdown in 2015 did not affect the data. 
 
Considering the sample size, the three real mine samples, along with the undeveloped 
Frieda copper-gold deposit were considered to be an adequate representation of PNG’s 
mining industry, which produces copper, gold, silver as a byproduct and recently nickel 
from the Ramu Nickel mine.  
  
Pre-existing data collected from the three mines sampled were as follows: 
 
• The Bougainville copper mine data was sourced from the Bougainville Copper 
Limited Annual Report. The required financial and tax data are presented in 
Appendix C (Tables C-1 and C-2). 
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• Data for the Porgera mine were obtained from the Annual PJV Statistical Report 
(2013). Appendix C (Tables C-3 to C-6) presents the historical financial and tax 
revenues from the Porgera gold mine. 
 
• Ok Tedi Mining Limited’s (OTML) financial and taxation database for the 1982-
2013 periods were accessed through the PNG Chamber of Mines and Petroleum. 
The Ok Tedi mine compiles annual statistical information specifically at the 
request of the PNG Chamber of Mines and Petroleum. Appendix C (Tables C-7 to 
C-12) presents the historical financial and tax revenues from the Ok Tedi mine. 
 
• Details of PNG’s mining taxation regime were retrieved from the Department of 
Mineral Policy and Geohazard Management (DMPGM) (Table 3.8).  
 
The actual financial and tax data and conceptual data derived using the theoretical models 
described in Section 3.4 were converted into functional variables that measured the tax 
performance.  
 
 
3.5 Defining the functional variables 
 
This section describes the functional variables indexed to measure the theoretical and 
historical performance of tax instruments as presented in Chapters 4 and 5. These 
variables were described in Section 2.3 (Chapter 2). 
 
a) Tax Progressivity Index (TPI): Dependent ratio variable. The TPI is a tool used to 
assess the performance of tax instruments using interval data (Roach 2003). A tax 
instrument is said to be progressive if the marginal tax rate increases relative to an 
increment in the tax base. Likewise, a tax instrument is said to be regressive if the 
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marginal tax rate decreases or remains unchanged as the tax base increases (e.g. 
constant statutory tax rates) (Boadway and Keen 2010). Further, a subset of the 
regressive category is ‘regressive progression’, which describes a progressive tax that 
behaves regressively under certain conditions (Govori 2015). Given these definitions, 
TPIs were computed using the Stroup Index (Stroup 2005) (equation (2.1)). The 
following criteria were applied to interpret the degree of tax progressivity 
(regressivity) as depicted in Figure 3.7: 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7: Lorenz curve showing the degrees of progressivity. 
 
 
(i) Perfect linear progression (proportional progression): TPI = 0; 
Condition: equilibrium 
• If the TPI = 0, the tax progressivity is said to attain perfect equilibrium. In this 
condition, tax burden and government’s share of tax revenues are proportional 
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to the profit-making ability of a mining project. It is represented by the red 
curve running parallel to the Lorenz curve (broken line in Figure 3.7). With 
reference to equation (2.1), the TPI = 0, which is given by (1-(𝐶𝑇𝑅𝑡/𝐶𝑇𝐵𝑡)) = 
(1-1) = 0, when 𝐶𝑇𝑅𝑡 = 𝐶𝑇𝐵𝑡     
 
This condition is known as perfectly linear progression where a tax curve runs 
parallel with the Lorenz concentration curve.   
   
(ii) Degrees of progressivity when TPI>0;  
Condition: linear degree of progressivity 
• Under the condition in which the TPI > 0, a decreasing area under the 
Lorenz curve reflects a tax instrument that is strongly progressive and has 
reached linear progressivity (see Zone A in Fig. 3.7). Tax curves within zone 
A are strongly progressive where the METR and progression coefficients 
remain relatively stable irrespective of the changes in the tax base (Kremer 
and Stähler 2016). Tax instruments within the optimal progressivity area 
(boundary) capture a high magnitude of tax revenues (Fig. 3.7).  
 
Condition: weak degree of progressivity 
• Under the condition in which the TPI > 0, the area between the tax curve 
increases and the tax curves shift downward (concave) from the Lorenz 
curve. This condition is said to be weakly or concavely progressive when 
the tax curves fall within zone B (see Fig 3.7). The term non-linear is used 
to mean that a tax curve bends downwards further away from the Lorenz 
curve (Mankiw, Weinzierl and Yagan 2009).  
 
(iii) Regressive progression: +TPI; 
Condition: low degree of regressive progression 
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• If the TPIs are postive and eventually become negative (+TPI) over time, 
the tax curve will be slightly above or below the Lorenz curve. A tax 
instrument under this condition is said to behave regressively progressive 
(notation C in Figure 3.7). This condition could reflect an overpayment 
situation since profit-based progressive tax instruments do not normally 
behave regressively. Additionally, this condition could be due to a time lag 
effect arising from mismatched tax-base with delayed tax payments.  
 
(iv) Regressive: -TPI 
• If the TPIs are less than zero (TPI < 0), the tax curves lie above the Lorenz 
curve. This condition is regressive and represented by the notation D in 
Figure 3.7. This is a common behaviour for levies, excise and duties.  
 
(v) Absolute progression: TPI =1 
• If the TPI = 1, a tax instrument is at an absolute neutrality stage. This 
situation arises when the post-tax base is zero leading to the TPI = 1, (i.e., 
1-(𝐶𝑇𝑅𝑡/𝐶𝑇𝐵𝑡 = 0)). This is a neutrality condition, which is rare and, is 
similar to the condition where the METR equals zero (the absence of tax 
instruments) as explained below. 
 
b) Marginal Effective Tax Rate (METR): Dependent ratio variable. The METR is an 
economic variable used to assess the cumulative distortion of an entire tax system 
(Chen 2000). It measures distortion to the ability of the capital invested to add 
economic value by producing the last unit of output (Gillen and Gados 2007). A zero 
METR reflects the situation where a tax instrument does not distort the invested 
capital. If the pre-tax IRR equals the post-tax IRR, the tax system is said to be purely 
neutral. That is, when the 𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑟𝑒−𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒[𝑎] = 𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒[𝑏], the METR = 0 in 
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equation (2.3) (e.g., [a-b]/a =0). This reflects a pure neutral condition in which tax 
instruments are absent. 
 
However, in the presence of taxes, the METR must be greater than zero (METR > 0). 
If the reduction in the post-tax IRR is small compared to the pre-tax IRR, the METR 
will be lower than the statutory rates (Fullerton 1983). Given such scenarios, the tax 
instruments are said to underperform in their attempts to capture the incremental rents. 
On the other hand, if the reduction in the post-tax IRR is higher than the pre-tax IRR, 
the METR will be high. This may reflect that a government is over-taxing the industry 
(Gillen and Gados 2007). This study will identify the ideal METR for the mining 
industry by measuring the net effective tax rate. 
 
c) Net Effective Tax Rate (NETR): Dependent ratio variable. The NETR is a residual tax 
rate after accounting for tax adjustments. It measures the net tax burden faced by an 
investor and the exact amount of revenues that would be collected after accounting for 
possible fiscal leakages and trade-offs. Musgrave (1959) identifies 1-TPI as a measure 
of residual progression. In relation to this, the NETR is computed as a product of the 
METR, residual progression (1-TPI), and the proportion of actual tax revenues 
paid (𝑇𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑃/𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃). 
 
            𝑁𝐸𝑇𝑅             = METR x (1 − TPI)𝑥 𝑇𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑃/𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃    (3.32) 
 
Where NETR   = net effective tax rate 
            METR  = marginal effective tax rate (METR)  
 1 − TPI = residual progression coefficient TPATP/TTTP   = proportion of revenues collected from an individual tax 
revenues paid divided by total tax revenues paid  
 
Tax revenues are paid to the government after accounting for revenue leakages through 
sources such as tax holiday, profit and asset transfers, over-capitalisation and weak tax 
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administration (Guj et al. 2013). Hence, factoring the actual tax revenues paid by the 
residual progression coefficient and METR gives a true measure of the effective tax rate. 
The factoring process makes the theoretical NETR to be slightly lower than the METR. 
An advantage of the NETR is that it can measure the effective tax rate for individual tax 
instruments, while the METR measures the overall tax burden. Note that the METRs of 
individual tax instruments can be measured as demonstrated by Chen and Mintz (2015b). 
 
A validity test was required to assess the usefulness of the NETR that can be reliably 
used for tax policy analysis purposes. To illustrate how the NETR was computed, the 
financial and tax estimates and the functional variables were computed using the 
conceptual data derived using the RO CFT model as shown in Table 3.9. Also, historical 
data from the former Bougainville and the existing Ok Tedi copper and the Porgera gold 
mines were used to compute the variables required for equation (3.32) to derive the real 
NETR.  
 
 
Table 3.9: Illustrative computations of the NETR for CIT using equation (3.32) 
Variable Theoretical* Historical Remarks  
METR* 0.45 0.34 PNG’s mining industry average METRs  
TPI 0.0485 0.33 PNG’s mining industry average TPI for CIT  
𝑇𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑃/𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃  70 70 CIT is about 70 percent of the total direct 
taxes (Chen and Mintz 2013)   
 
Theoretical NETR for CIT:  
𝑁𝐸𝑇𝑅 = METR x (1 − 𝑇𝑃𝐼)𝑥 𝑇𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑃/𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃 = 0.45 x (1-0.0485) x 70% = 30% = CIT rate 
Historical NETR for CIT: 
 𝑁𝐸𝑇𝑅 = METR x (1 − TPI)𝑥 𝑇𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑃/𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃 = 0.34 x (1-0.33) x 70% = 16% ≠ CIT rate 
 
Source: see Tables 4.3 and 5.9 (Chapters 4 and 5) and 1-TPI is the progression coefficient 
(Musgrave 1959). *METR is used as percentage point in order to derive the NETR 
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Table 3.9 presents the illustrative computations of the NETR using the variables derived 
from the theoretical model and historical data for the samples of mines in PNG. A proof 
of the NETR being a reliable variable is that it must be equal to the statutory CIT rate. In 
this case, the theoretical NETR is equal to the statutory CIT rate of 30 percent, which 
proves that the residual effective tax rate is reliable. This result suggests that under risk-
neutral conditions (no fiscal leakages), a government can collect revenues at the 
conceptual NETR equal to a statutory rate. Alternatively, the real NETR for the CIT is 
lower than the statutory rate, which reflects that the CIT does not always capture 100 
percent of the taxable incomes. 
 
As the TPI moves closer to linearity (TPI = 0), the NETR approaches the statutory tax 
rate (e.g., NETR for the CIT= 30 percent). If the TPI is large (> 0.2), the METR declines 
and the NETR would correspondingly fall below the statutory rate. On the other hand, the 
METR and TPI will be zero only if the government does not tax the mining industry. The 
following criteria are used: 
 
 NETR = statutory tax rate: reflects the tax system (or tax instrument) has the 
capacity to collect 100 percent of the taxable revenues.  
 
 NETR < statutory tax rate: reflects the tax instrument (or system) is weak in 
collecting 100 percent of the taxable income. This condition will be featured by 
high progressivity indices (TPI), concaved progressivity curves against the Lorenz 
curve and a low METR (less tax revenues collected). 
 
 NETR > statutory tax rate: reflects the industry is being over-taxed, beyond the 
ability to pay. 
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d) Average Effective Tax Rate (AETR): Dependent ratio variable. This variable 
measures the tax burden placed on the mining industry (Otto 2000). However, it is not 
an effective measure of tax burden faced by investors. Since most tax rates are 
constant, changes in the tax base can cause the AETR to increase (decrease) and may 
not clearly show whether a tax system is attractive or not (Gordon, Kalambokidis and 
Slemrod 2003). Further, the AETR does not measure the burden associated with the 
marginal increases in the tax rate. Some important aspects of the AETR were 
explained in Section 2.3 (see equation 2.2). 
 
e) Measuring investor returns and wealth transfer rates  
(i) Effective Wealth Transfer (EWT) rate: Ratio variable. This variable measures the 
rate at which a portion of the gross revenue is captured by the tax system, including 
the non-tax benefits. The EWT rate is significant for two reasons. First, the EWT 
rate measures the cumulative cash transfers including transport, economic and 
social capitals that are not captured by the direct tax instruments. The TPI, METR 
and NETR omit these wealth transfers in the evaluation processes (Loayza and 
Rigolini 2016). Confining a study to direct tax instruments only undervalues the 
aggregate wealth transfers to the community (O'Faircheallaigh 2012), which is 
biased towards investors who make commitments in meeting the social needs of 
local communities (Yakovleva 2017). 
 
Second, policy decisions are often influenced by the actual minerals produced, price, 
costs and actual revenue flows to the government. Hence, the EWT rate captures the 
actual aggregate wealth transfers relative to the gross outputs and measure the entire 
benefit distributions amongst investors, capital and factor providers and governments.  
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(ii) Effective investor transfer (EIT) rate: Ratio variable. This variable is a ratio of post-
tax CFs to the gross revenues, which is a measure of profit transfers to an investor 
after the risk allocations. The EIT rate distinguishes the manner in which the second-
best neutrality distributes different types of rents to the stakeholders. That is, quasi-
rents flow to capital and input factor providers, profits flow to investors, and tax and 
other benefits flow to a nation as a whole. It is computed by dividing the post-tax 
cash flows by the gross revenues to grasp a clear picture of how much gross output 
flows to the investor. 
 
Although the EWT and EIT rate calculations are simple, these variables answer the 
question of how much of economic rents flow to the investor and how much of the 
resource revenues are transferred to the society after considering the distributions of 
economic rents and quasi-rents to suppliers of inputs to production (Magno 2015). 
The EWT and EIT rates were used in conjunction with the TPI, METR and NETR 
for analysing the overall performance of the tax instruments. 
 
 
3.6 Limitations 
 
The lack of data from government institutions such as the Internal Revenue Commission 
(IRC), and relying on the data provided by mining companies could weaken the 
interpretation of the results and policy recommendations. The bottom-up data 
assimilation employed by the mining companies could introduce concerns around the 
validity and accuracy of the data. Government tax authorities in PNG do not perform 
regular tax audits, especially the source-based indirect and non-tax benefit redistribution 
to host region communities (Banks 2006). However, the database created by the mine 
operators can be considered reliable because investors attempt to improve social 
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responsibility reporting by making data available to the government authorities 
(Fernandez-Feijoo, Romero and Ruiz 2014). 
 
Another limitation is that the theoretical and historical data did not represent external 
factors that could influence the performance of the tax instruments. Complex interactions 
and competitive behaviours of investors, governments, and community can also affect 
both rent and tax revenue collection objectives. Additionally, the existence of multiple 
factors such as the market price and deposit quality (Maybee, Lowen and Dunn 2010) 
affect the performance of tax instruments. 
 
Generally, the historical data could be affected by information asymmetry, cost and 
revenue shifting, weak tax administration coupled with tax concessions, reduce tax rates 
through tax competition, over-investments and tax credits could cause leakages in the 
aggregate revenues that flow to a government. These factors are complex to capture and 
quantify in a theoretical model. Moreover, the conceptually estimated and historical data 
rigidly trace the future and past tax performances only and do not cogently explain the 
manner in which tax payers adapt and behave towards a tax system (Smith 2013). 
 
 
3.7 Summary 
 
The theoretical tax model resembles a typical risk-based economic modeling of a mining 
project at the feasibility stage to derive the financial and tax data required for computing 
the functional variables. This was achieved by using the GBM technique to forecast the 
copper prices, and the bionomial lattice technique to forecast the gold prices and 
operating costs, which led to develop the RO CFT method withn which the tax 
instruments were inserted. The theoretical tax modeling was necessary to derive a 
stochastic tax base to ensure the revenue projections were representatively distributed 
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over the life of a mining project. Additionally, the historical financial and tax data 
extrapolated the performance of the tax instruments between 1972 and 2013. An 
advantage of the parallel analysis is that a comparative analysis of the performance of tax 
instruments can be made at different points in time.  
 
As mentioned in Chapters 1 and 2, there is a lack of developing techniques to measure 
the performance of a progressive tax system. In response to that, this study used the 
structural progressivity technique to simultaneously track the actual degree of tax burden 
and benefit distributions in terms of governments capturing revenues over the life of a 
mining project. Tracking the burden and fiscal benefit distribution patterns using the 
Lorenz curve and progression coefficients assisted in identifying the effects of supply-
cycles, tax reforms and fiscal leakages. The results are presented in the proceeding 
chapters. 
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Chapter 4 : Theoretical Tax Analysis 
 
This chapter presents the results of the theoretical tax analysis described in Chapter 3. 
The financial and tax data presented in Appendix B were derived using the RO CFT and 
MC-CFT methods in Microsoft ExcelTM described in Chapter 3. These data were used to 
compute the theoretical progressivity indices and other functional variables. The 
progressivity indices for each of the tax instruments were averaged and weighted to 
obtain the statistical results. The METR, NETR, AETR and wealth transfer rates were 
computed using the equations given in the previous chapter.   
 
Section 4.1 presents the results of the direct tax analysis. Section 4.2 performs series of 
simulations to examine the effects of tax adjusting techniques such as tax depreciation, 
tax holiday, and thin capitalisation polices on tax progressivity. Section 4.3 simulates the 
price and tax rates using the RO CFT method to test the distribution of tax burdens and 
identify the ideal level of the functional variables and the CIT rate. Section 4.4 simulates 
the combinations of basic tax instruments with the quasi-taxes (equity participation, APT 
and profit-based royalty) to examine what constitutes a suitable combination of the direct 
tax instruments. Section 4.5 provides a summary of the chapter.    
 
 
4.1 Performance of direct taxes 
 
Table 4.1 presents the TPIs for the royalty and the levies applicable to the mining sector 
in PNG. The RO CFT method derived a TPI of 9.90 x 10-6 for the NSR ad valorem 
royalty. The strong progressivity of the ad valorem royalty demonstrates it has the 
capacity to respond to marginal increases in the gross revenue. The total average TPIs for 
royalty including the MRA levy and SSG remained unchanged (9.90x10-6), reflecting 
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their strongly progressivity behaviours. The TPIs for the SSG and MRA levy were 
similar to TPIs for the ad valorem royalty since the net NSR technique was used.  
 
 
Table 4.1: TPI for royalty and levies 
 
 
RO CFT Method Total MC CFT Method Total
Year Royalty (a)MRA Levy SSG (c ) (a +b +c ) FPPE (d ) Royalty Levies SSG (a +b +c ) FPPE (d )
2016
2017 1.40E-05 1.40E-05 1.40E-05 1.40E-05 na 0.0014 0.0014 0.0014 0.0014 na
2018 1.71E-05 1.71E-05 1.71E-05 1.71E-05 na -0.0070 -0.0070 -0.0070 -0.0070 na
2019 1.51E-05 1.51E-05 1.51E-05 1.51E-05 na -0.0022 -0.0022 -0.0022 -0.0022 na
2020 1.89E-05 1.89E-05 1.89E-05 1.89E-05 na -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 na
2021 2.31E-05 2.31E-05 2.31E-05 2.31E-05 na 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 na
2022 1.72E-05 1.72E-05 1.72E-05 1.72E-05 na -0.0018 -0.0018 -0.0018 -0.0018 na
2023 1.42E-05 1.42E-05 1.42E-05 1.42E-05 na -0.0038 -0.0038 -0.0038 -0.0038 na
2024 1.77E-05 1.77E-05 1.77E-05 1.77E-05 na -0.0044 -0.0044 -0.0044 -0.0044 na
2025 1.38E-05 1.38E-05 1.38E-05 1.38E-05 na -0.0032 -0.0032 -0.0032 -0.0032 0.8544
2026 1.08E-05 1.08E-05 1.08E-05 1.08E-05 na -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0015 0.6712
2027 8.26E-06 8.26E-06 8.26E-06 8.26E-06 0.7957 -0.0033 -0.0033 -0.0033 -0.0033 0.5448
2028 7.13E-06 7.13E-06 7.13E-06 7.13E-06 0.6497 -0.0030 -0.0030 -0.0030 -0.0030 0.4470
2029 5.21E-06 5.21E-06 5.21E-06 5.21E-06 0.5195 -0.0020 -0.0020 -0.0020 -0.0020 0.3414
2030 4.10E-06 4.10E-06 4.10E-06 4.10E-06 0.4146 -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0014 0.2728
2031 3.12E-06 3.12E-06 3.12E-06 3.12E-06 0.3136 -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0016 0.2093
2032 3.01E-06 3.01E-06 3.01E-06 3.01E-06 0.2342 -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0015 0.1532
2033 2.27E-06 2.27E-06 2.27E-06 2.27E-06 0.1649 -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0016 0.1126
2034 2.21E-06 2.21E-06 2.21E-06 2.21E-06 0.1048 -0.0017 -0.0017 -0.0017 -0.0017 0.0694
2035 8.15E-07 8.15E-07 8.15E-07 8.15E-07 0.0472 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0008 0.0327
2036 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Average 9.90E-06 9.90E-06 9.90E-06 9.90E-06 0.3244 -0.0020 -0.0020 -0.0020 -0.0019 0.3372
-
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The average TPI for royalty derived using the MC-CFT model was -0.0020 and the 
average of the total was -0.0019. The negative indices show that at times the ad valorem 
royalty and levies became regressively progressive. The variations in the TPIs were due 
to the recursive and random behaviours of the input variables. The recursive and random 
behaviours of the MC simulation caused the tax base to return negative and positive 
values every time a cell within the Microsoft ExcelTM was activated. Its activation 
spontaneously sampled the price and costs that in turn increased the cumulative royalty 
and levy payments that were slightly over 50 percent relative to the cumulative gross 
revenues, resulting in the negative TPIs (Figure 4.1). 
 
Unlike the production-based royalties, the TPIs for FPPE (0.3244 and 0.3374) were 
derived from the respective methods. These TPI values reflect the FPPE progressivity is 
weak and not capable of capturing the dividends as expected. In this thesis, the FPPE was 
modeled by allocating 18 percent (the FPPE rate) of the gross revenues that were 
expensed against the mining company’s pre-tax expenditures (e.g., royalty, depreciation 
deductions and operating costs). This procedure correctly represented all the costs being 
refunded to a mine operator before expensing the balance of FPPE cash flows against 
equivalent cost of acquiring the equity interests. This process delayed accessing the 
dividends, which resulted in high TPIs (e.g., 0.3244) or weak progressivity as reflected in 
Figure 4.1. 
 
The tax base did not influence the dividend generating ability of the FPPE. Rather, it 
relied on the government’s ability to source the capital cost of acquiring the equity 
interests and prudent management of the equity cash flows. Further, the time series TPIs 
for the FPPE were excluded from grouping along with that of royalty and levies to avoid 
weakening the total progressivity of those levies and profit-based taxes as shown in Table 
4.2. The exclusion of FPPE was partly reasonable since the GoPNG considers equity 
participation as a policy and not a tax instrument. 
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Table 4.2: Tax progressivity indices (TPIs) for profit-based taxes 
RO CFT Method TOTAL  RO-MC CFT method TOTAL
Year CIT PBR FPE FCE DWT APT D/TAXES CIT PBR FCE FPE DWT APT D/TAXES
2016
2017 0.4043 na na na 0.4043 na 0.4187 0.0330 na na na 0.0330 na 0.1890
2018 0.2215 0.5152 na na 0.2215 na 0.2507 0.0330 0.4847 na na 0.0330 na 0.1890
2019 0.1549 0.3385 na na 0.1549 na 0.1877 0.0330 0.3353 na na 0.0330 na 0.1890
2020 0.1175 0.2404 na na 0.1175 na 0.1534 0.0330 0.2871 na na 0.0330 na 0.1890
2021 0.0950 0.1813 na na 0.0950 na 0.1313 0.0330 0.2320 na na 0.0330 na 0.1890
2022 0.0781 0.1381 na na 0.0781 na 0.1158 0.0330 0.1652 na na 0.0330 na 0.1890
2023 0.0662 0.1078 na na 0.0662 na 0.1057 0.0330 0.0972 na na 0.0330 na 0.1890
2024 0.0581 0.0871 na na 0.0581 na 0.0987 0.0330 0.1053 na na 0.0330 na 0.1890
2025 0.0521 0.0716 na na 0.0521 na 0.0929 0.0330 0.1317 na na 0.0330 na 0.1890
2026 0.0471 0.0588 na na 0.0471 na 0.0874 0.0330 0.1179 na na 0.0330 na 0.1890
2027 0.0423 0.0476 na na 0.0423 na 0.0839 0.0330 0.1340 0.8221 na 0.0330 na 0.1470
2028 0.0389 0.0392 na 0.8436 0.0389 na 0.0806 0.0330 0.1292 0.6871 na 0.0330 na 0.1150
2029 0.0359 0.0319 na 0.6733 0.0359 na 0.0781 0.0330 0.0808 0.5199 na 0.0330 na 0.0754
2030 0.0335 0.0261 na 0.5360 0.0335 na 0.0756 0.0330 0.0659 0.4115 na 0.0330 na 0.0498
2031 0.0312 0.0208 0.7649 0.4100 0.0312 na 0.0735 0.0330 0.0564 0.3354 0.7500 0.0330 na 0.0318
2032 0.0294 0.0096 0.5714 0.3063 0.0294 na 0.0719 0.0330 0.0721 0.2465 0.5777 0.0330 na 0.0107
2033 0.0278 0.0067 0.4026 0.2158 0.0278 na 0.0706 0.0330 0.0709 0.1927 0.4274 0.0330 na -0.0020
2034 0.0264 0.0043 0.2559 0.1372 0.0264 na 0.0691 0.0207 0.0664 0.1267 0.2994 0.0207 0.6253 0.0002
2035 0.0119 0.0020 0.1154 0.0619 0.0119 0.4509 0.0564 0.0087 0.0545 0.0664 0.1207 0.0087 0.2633 0.0032
2036 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0511 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Average 0.0827 0.1071 0.4220 0.3980 0.0827 0.4509 0.1212 0.0311 0.1493 0.3787 0.3625 0.0311 0.4443 0.1222
 
 
Table 4.2 shows the TPIs for FCE were consistently positive, and the indices were high 
across the calculation methods (0.3980 and 0.3762) and that of the FPE were 0.4220 and 
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0.3608 respectively. The high TPIs reflect that the FCE and FPE are weakly progressive 
and demonstrate that they generate small amount of dividends. The performance of the 
FCE and FPE were identical in some cases where the curves bowed away from the 
Lorenz curve. The FPPE, FCE and FPE exhibited weak progressivity to demonstrate that 
they are not efficient in capturing the dividends as expected compared with the other tax 
instruments, (Figure 4.1). 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Progressivity curves for taxes plotted against the Lorenz curve. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 is a graphical representation of the TPIs presented in Table 4.2. The x-axis and 
y-axis are the cumulative pre-tax cash flows and the cumulative taxes paid respectively 
are plotted against the Lorenz curve. The FCE and FPE curves followed along the x-axis 
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for some time before turning upward from left to right. These curves being parallel with 
the x-axis before turning away from the Lorenz curve is due to delays in accessing the 
equity dividends. Further, in Table 4.2, the TPIs for APT were consistently positive and 
high for both calculation methods (0.4509 and 0.4389). Moreover, a simulation of the 
threshold rates was required to observe the behaviour of the APT as shown in Figure 4.2. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Simulations of threshold rates for the APT 
 
 
In Figure 4.2, the APT progressivity curves were plotted against the cumulative pre-tax 
cash flows for threshold rates ranging from 1 to 20 percent. This study used the 10 
percent threshold rate, which was lower than an 11 percent IRR of the Frieda deposit. 
Yet, the progressivity of APT was weak. The progressivity curves moved further away 
from the Lorenz curve as the threshold rates increased up to 14 percent: a point at which 
the mine was unable to generate the APT revenues as expected. This shows that a 
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threshold rate higher than 14 percent could not capture the desired excess profits. On the 
other hand, threshold rates between 10 and 13 percent captured a low magnitude of APT 
revenues as it was the case with the Frieda deposit. Further simulations show the 
progressivity of APT improves when the FPPE was excluded in the RO CFT model. 
Similarly, combining the FPPE with the direct taxes weakened the progressivity of CIT 
and other basic tax instruments.  
 
Table 4.2 shows the TPIs for CIT were consistently positive (0.0827 and 0.0320) and 
strongly progressive. This result is also reflected in Figure 4.1, where the CIT curve and 
the Lorenz curve are approximately parallel to each other. Further, the theoretical NETR 
for CIT is 30 percent [0.45*(1-0.0576)*70], which is equal to the statutory CIT rate. In 
this calculation, the 45 percent (0.45) is the industry level theoretical METR (see Table 
4.3) and 0.0576 is the average TPI for CIT at the industry level. Further, the behaviour of 
DWT was similar to the CIT with positive indices resulting from both calculation 
methods (0.0320) (Table 4.2). These results indicate that both CIT and DWT being 
strongly progressive would generate higher magnitudes of revenues when compared to 
equity participation and RRT. 
 
The TPIs for profit-based royalty (PBR) were also positive for both calculation methods 
(0.1071 and 0.1487) (Table 4.2). The progressivity index derived using the RO CFT 
method was higher (weaker) than that of the MC-CFT method. In both cases, the 
progressivity curve for the PBR being close to the Lorenz curve (Fig. 4.1) shows that it is 
capable of generating a substantial amount of revenues. However, the results were 
slightly biased due to the whole of life tax base of the Frieda deposit modelled being 
consistently positive, which may not reflect the actual scenarios. 
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Table 4.3: Theoretical METRs for the RO CFT and MC-CFT methods. 
RO-CFT method Direct MC-CFT method Direct
Year Free CF Pre-tax Post-Tax Taxes Royalty ETR Free CF Pre-tax Post-Tax Taxes Royalty* ETR
ROR (%) ROR(%) ROR METR METR (%) ROR (%) ROR (%) ROR (%) METR METR (%)
2016
2017 -69 -86 -96 -11 -1 78 -68 -86 -93 -8 -1 -8
2018 -25 -58 -73 -26 -6 32 -26 -56 -70 -25 -6 42
2019 -3 -37 -54 -45 -58 33 -3 -41 -56 -36 -58 23
2020 10 -23 -39 -72 14 35 10 -26 -41 -57 14 29
2021 18 -14 -29 -115 8 36 17 -16 -30 -92 8 31
2022 22 -7 -21 -225 6 39 22 -9 -23 -149 6 31
2023 25 -2 -16 -873 5 40 25 -4 -17 -299 5 33
2024 27 2 -12 781 4 40 27 0 -13 -5062 4 36
2025 29 4 -9 312 4 41 28 2 -9 508 4 36
2026 29 6 -6 202 4 42 29 4 -7 262 4 56
2027 30 8 -4 149 4 75 30 6 -4 173 4 69
2028 31 9 -2 124 3 75 30 7 -3 139 3 68
2029 31 10 -1 107 3 77 31 9 -1 111 3 75
2030 31 11 0 96 3 79 31 10 0 99 3 72
2031 31 11 1 87 3 80 31 10 1 88 3 76
2032 31 12 2 81 3 81 31 11 2 81 3 76
2033 32 12 3 76 3 82 31 11 3 76 3 77
2034 32 13 4 72 3 83 32 12 3 71 3 78
2035 32 13 4 68 3 59 32 12 4 67 3 54
2036 32 13 5 65 3 51 32 12 5 63 3 54
Average 32 16 9 46 3 58 32 15 9 44 3 50
Pre-tax RORs represent the cash flows without taxes (except royalty); (b) post-tax RORs 
affected by taxes; (c) METRs for profit based taxes; (d) METRs for royalty and levies; and (e) 
ETRs include the production levies. *Royalty includes MRA levy and SSG. 
 
 
 
Table 4.3 shows the METRs derived from the RO CFT and MC-CFT methods were 46 
percent and 44 percent respectively. The RO CFT model derived a higher METR than the 
MC-CFT model because the latter enhanced random distribution of the tax base. The 
negative METRs were the results of no taxes paid in the early production years and the 
  110  
  
  
accelerated deductions using the ADB depreciation technique. The average theoretical 
METR calculated for PNG’s mining industry is 45 percent [(46+44)/2], which is for the 
direct tax instruments only, including the royalties and the levies. The METR being a 
measure of the tax burden, PNG’s mining industry is expected to perform at around the 
45 percent METR benchmark. 
 
The METRs for royalties stabilised around the 3 percent statutory royalty rate (including 
MRA levy and SSG) after some variations in early production stages (Table 4.3). The 
METR for royalty was computed by dividing the difference of the IRRs based on the 
gross revenues and that of the pre-tax base, which correctly reflected the distortion on 
capital allocation. A further simulation indicated that existing PNG’s royalty of 2 percent 
reduces the NPV by 5 percent. This meant that for every 1 percent increase in the 
statutory royalty rate, the NPV is distorted (reduced) by a 2.5 percent.  
 
This thesis devised the NETR as a new variable, which proved to be more efficient in 
capturing the precise tax burden compared to the AETR. Theoretical NETR for PNG was 
calculated using the variable specifications made in Section 3.5 (Table 3.9). Given the 
industry level METR of 45 percent and the corresponding average TPI being 0.121, 
PNG’s theoretical NETR is about 40 percent [0.45*(1-0.121)*100], assuming the tax 
system captures 100 percent of the taxable profits. Moreover, the NETR was lower than 
the METR because it was based on the residual progression coefficient that accounted for 
the revenue leakages within the taxation system. Given a correct set of data, the NETR 
can precisely measure the tax liability and the actual wealth transfers to the society. 
 
 
  
  111  
  
  
 
Table 4.4: Distributions of wealth transfer and investor return rates (percentages) 
RO CFT method MC CFT method
Year Investor Direct Taxes Royalties Total Investor Direct Taxes Royalties Total
EIT (a ) EWT (b ) EWT(c  ) EWT (d ) EIT (a ) EWT (b ) EWT(c ) EWT (d )
2016
2017 14 11 3 14 26 15 3 18
2018 19 14 3 17 21 12 3 15
2019 19 14 3 17 20 12 3 15
2020 21 15 3 18 19 11 3 14
2021 21 15 3 18 21 12 3 15
2022 23 17 3 20 24 14 3 17
2023 25 17 3 20 23 13 3 16
2024 24 17 3 20 26 15 3 18
2025 22 16 3 19 27 25 3 28
2026 25 17 3 20 26 25 3 28
2027 29 30 3 33 30 28 3 31
2028 26 27 3 30 24 22 3 25
2029 28 29 3 32 24 22 3 25
2030 27 28 3 31 33 31 3 34
2031 29 30 3 33 35 32 3 35
2032 28 29 3 32 28 26 3 29
2033 28 29 3 32 31 28 3 31
2034 29 30 3 33 33 31 3 34
2035 31 32 3 35 24 22 3 25
2036 29 30 3 33 32 29 3 32
Average 25 22 3 25 26 21 3 24
Notes: (a) effective investor transfer rate; (b) effective wealth transfer to the community through 
direct taxes; (c) effective wealth transfer to the community through royalties; (d) total effective 
wealth transfer through the direct taxes. 
 
 
Table 4.4 presents the EIT and the EWT rates for the RO CFT and MC-CFT methods 
showing the distribution of the total values of minerals extracted. The EWT rates 
presented are for the direct taxes, the ad valorem royalty and the levies only. The average 
-
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EWT rates for the direct taxes were 22 and 21 percentages for both methods. The slight 
variation was due to the highly stochastic nature of the MC-CFT method. On the other 
hand, the industry level average EWT rate for royalty was about 3 percent, which 
included the levies, SSG and MRA levy. The RO CFT method derived EIT and EWT 
rates that were equal to each other (25 percent), although there were slight variations 
using the MC-CFT method. These theoretical results suggest that there is equality in 
redistribution of the benefits amongst investors, GoPNG and the community. The 
reduction in inequality is the result of progressive tax system’s ability to fairly distribute 
rents, tax burden and revenues. 
 
As a synopsis, variable specifications of the conceptual methodology limit the use of 
policy tools that inevitably narrowed the data analysis in this section. Such limitations 
neglected some basic policy aspects that are often necessary for practically constructing a 
taxation design such as the LCF provision, tax holiday and thin capitalisation policies. 
Thus, further simulations were crucial to broaden the understanding of how these policy 
tools influence the tax base, the degree of progressivity, and the tax burden distribution 
associated with price and tax rate changes.    
 
 
4.2 Tests for effects of tax adjusting techniques on progressivity 
 
There are policy choices for applying the accelerated declining balance (ADB) and 
straight line (SL) depreciation techniques within the LCF policy, and a 10-year tax 
holiday and thin capitalisation rule as practiced in PNG. These policy tools were 
simulated using the RO CFT method to observe the changes in the TPI, METR, EIT and 
EWT rates and NPV by keeping the copper and gold prices and the tax rates constant 
(Table 4.5).  
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The TPIs and other variables under the base case in Table 4.5 were derived from the RO 
CFT method based on Frieda deposit’s positive tax base (no cash flow losses). Within the 
no cash flow loss scenario, when a switch was made to apply the SL depreciation 
technique, the NPV increased to US$4.04 billion compared to US$3.85 billion derived 
when the ADB technique was applied. Similarly, the TPI for CIT increased to 0.137 
compared to the 0.083 TPI derived using the ADB depreciation technique. These results 
show that the SL depreciation technique improves the whole of mine life NPV compared 
to the ADB technique. However, it weakens the progressivity where the government gets 
less tax revenues in the mature production year if only under a no loss condition exists. 
The whole of life tax deductibility by the depreciation deductions against the positive tax 
base after attaining the ROR on investment reduces tax revenues. 
 
 
Table 4.5: Assessing the effects of SLD and ADB techniques and tax holiday policies 
Variables Dep. techniques LCF with 3 percent uplift rate 10-year Tax Holiday
ADB* SL Yr-1 Yr-3 Yr-5 Yr-7 With LCF Without LCF
TPI for CIT 0.0827 0.0957 0.0857 0.0934 0.1244 0.1851 0.2969 0.3343
TPI for direct taxes 0.1212 0.1263 0.1440 0.1953 0.2263 0.2707 0.4927 0.5145
METR 46 49 50 62 78 94 62 31
AETR 58 54 54 48 49 51 43 58
W/transfer rates
EIT 25 23 22 18 13 9 18 21
EWT 25 24 24 22 21 20 19 24
Economic Variables
NPV ($ bln) (i  = 5%) 3.75 4.04 2.89 1.27 -0.53 -2.03 1.02 5.2
*Used as a base case for this analysis 
 
 
  114  
  
  
The effects were offset by high tax liability at the mature production stages despite the 
ADB technique enhanced rapid capital recovery in the early production periods (high 
NPV). This reduced the NPV (US$3.85 billion). The ADB technique seems to expedite 
capital recovery in early periods and strengthens progressivity at mature stages of a mine 
life through offsetting the effects of NPV gains (losses) and revenue gains (losses) to the 
government. As well, it was difficult to observe changes occurring in the functional 
variables because the cash flow losses diluted the effects of the depreciation techniques. 
 
The risk-free interest rate of 3 percent was imposed on the cash flow losses to assess how 
the cumulative tax credits affect the progressivity of the direct tax instruments. The risk-
free interest rate represented the opportunity cost of the cash flow losses in the present 
investment. To represent realistic scenarios, the simulations were performed by inflating 
the operating costs by 200 percent to induce the losses to occur over a 7-year period, 
therefore, initiating a limited LCF policy.  
 
Table 4.5 shows the progressivity of CIT gradually weakened from the base case TPI 
(0.0827 to 0.1869) over successive LCF periods. Similarly, aggregate progressivity of the 
direct tax instruments weakened with the TPIs sliding from 0.1212 to 0.2707 relative to 
the Lorenz curve. These results reflect that cumulative cash flow losses with compounded 
interests weakened the progressivity through a delayed accessing of the tax revenues. On 
the other hand, cash flow losses reduced the NPVs and the EWT rate exceeded the EIT 
rate. In high risk or low price scenarios, the LCF with compounded interest rate 
accumulate tax credits for additional years, which is identical to a tax holiday. 
 
To assess how the progressive tax instruments behave under a negotiated tax holiday, the 
CIT was omitted in the model for over a 10-year period and simulations were performed 
with and without LCF scenarios. As shown in Table 4.5, the scenario of tax holiday with 
the tax base loss significantly weakened the CIT progressivity with a TPI of 0.2969 and 
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that of the total direct taxes was 0.4927. Tax holiday being granted without a tax base 
loss in this analysis was the worst scenario in which the TPIs of CIT and that of total 
taxes further weakened (0.3343 and 0.5145). These results reflect that tax concessions 
granted to profitable mines tend to cause fiscal imbalance by substantial margins as 
shown by the high NPV (US$5.2 billion) and a low METR of 31 percent. These 
simulations show that the LCF provision is an efficient form of concession policy 
compared to a negotiated tax holiday because the latter shields tax instruments from 
responding to changes in the tax base. 
 
Another major policy tool is the thin capitalisation rule, which ensures excessive debt 
interest deductions do not reduce the tax base. PNG has a 3:1 ceiling on thin 
capitalisation (75 percent debt to 25 percent equity capital). However, there is a proposed 
change to a 2:1 ceiling (50 percent debt to 50 percent equity capital). To test these 
options, some options for thin capitalisation rules were simulated to identify an ideal 
ceiling range between the two extremes (100 percent equity and 100 percent debt capital) 
of financing a mining project (Table 4.6). The scenario simulation of 100 percent equity 
capital (0:1 ratio) generated the TPI for CIT of 0.0827 and a total TPI of 0.1212, which 
was identified as an ideal base case against other financial arrangement scenarios.   
 
For the 4:1 ceiling, Table 4.6 shows that the TPIs of CIT increased from 0.0827 to 0.088 
and the aggregate TPIs for the direct tax instruments increased from 0.1212 to 0.1255. 
The NPV decreased by a small margin ($3.75 billion to $3.68 billion). These results show 
that a 25 percent debt to 75 percent equity capital financing arrangement tend to weaken 
the tax progressivity as well as the NPV from the base case. 
 
For the 2:1 ceiling, the TPI for CIT and that of the total direct taxes increased 
significantly from the base case TPI (from 0.1212 to 0.1580). Also, the NPV slightly 
decreased from the previous case and EWT rate exceeded the EIT rate (24 percent > 21 
  116  
  
  
percent), although the IRR increased by substantial margins. These results reflect that a 
50 percent debt/equity thin capitalisation policy further weakened the tax progressivity 
from the base case due to increase in the interest deductibility against the tax base. 
 
 
Table 4.6: Effects of thin capitalisation policy on tax base and progressivity 
Thin capitalisation ratios
Debt/Equity ratio Base case 25% debt/ 50% debt/ 75% debt/
100% equity 75% equity 50% equity 25% equity 100% debt
Ceiling 0:1 4:1 (a ) 2:1 (b ) 3:1 (c ) 1:0
TPIs:
  -CIT 0.0827 0.088 0.1286 0.1909 0.2513
  -Direct taxes 0.1212 0.1255 0.1580 0.2069 0.2878
W/transfer rates:
  -EIT rate (%) 25 24 21 20 20
  -EWT rate (%) 25 25 24 23 22
Economic Variables
   -NPV ($ bln) (i  = 5%) 3.75 3.68 3.51 3.34 3.13  
(a) Ratio refers to a $1 debt for every $4 equity capital; (b) $1 debt for every $2 dollar equity 
capital; and (c) $3 debt for every $4 equity capital. 
 
 
As for the 3:1 ceiling, the TPI for CIT and that of the total direct tax instruments 
increased substantially (0.1909 and 0.2878 respectively) and the NPV decreased from the 
previous case ($3.34 billion). Similar trends were observed for the scenario with thinly 
capitalised investment (100 percent debt financing). In this scenario, the TPI for CIT and 
that of the combined direct taxes further weakened by substantial margins (0.2513 and 
0.2878 respectively) from the base case. Also, the NPV was reduced  to $3.13 billion 
from the base case.  
 
Table 4.6 shows that as the proportion of debt capital increases, the interest deductibility 
increases against the tax base, which weakened the CIT progressivity and the NPV. Aside 
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from the two extremes (0:1 and 1:0 ratios), the 2:1 ceiling seems to be an ideal thin 
capitalisation policy because the tax base erosion is moderate compared to the 3:1 ceiling. 
This finding contributes towards devising a suitable thin capitalisation rule to protect the 
tax base that could make the tax instruments more progressive, which could suit 
government’s objective of maximising revenues from the mining industry.   
 
 
4.3 Sensitivity tests for price and tax rates 
 
The behaviour of progressivity indices are influenced by changes in mineral prices that in 
turn affect the performance of tax instruments in terms of collecting revenues and also the 
profitability of a mine. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, all the profit-based tax 
instruments, including the value-based royalties respond to changes in price, tax rates, 
production rates and operating costs. To test these scenarios, series of price simulations 
were performed to substantiate the main argument that strong progressivity increases the 
marginal tax rate. To perform these simulations, the copper and the gold prices were 
successively increased and decreased in steps of +25 percent to a minimum of -75 percent 
and likewise the prices were allowed to increase by 100 percent. 
 
As shown in Table 4.7, when the copper and the gold prices were successively increased 
to 100 percent, the TPIs of CIT were reduced from the base case (0.0827 to 0.0178) and 
gradually moved towards the Lorenz curve. The similar trend was observed for the TPIs 
of total direct taxes (0.1212 to 0.0354). Concurrently, the METR and NETR increased by 
1 percentage point at each step of increasing the prices by 25 percent. These results show 
that the marginal tax rate does not increase as expected when progressivity increases 
during periods of high profit.  
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Table 4.7: Effects of changes in price and tax rates on variables. 
 
(a)  Base case refers to initial results obtained from the RO CFT method; (b) APT was omitted because it distorted the TPIs 
of CIT; and (c) METR*(1-TPI).
PERCENTAGE CHANGES
Base case (a )
MINERAL PRICE CHANGES -75 -50 -25 0 25 50 75 100
TPI for Taxes (b )
   - CIT na na 0.1518 0.0827 0.0380 0.0276 0.0217 0.0178
   - Dividend Withholding Tax 0.89 0.78 0.1518 0.0827 0.0380 0.0276 0.0217 0.0178
   - FPPE na na na 0.0361 0.3189 0.2641 0.2371 0.2025
   - Royalty (MRA levy & SSG) 4.00E-05 2.00E-04 1.39E-05 1.04E-05 8.34E-06 6.95E-06 0.0000 5.21E-06
   - TPIs for Total Direct taxes 0.8947 0.7812 0.1977 0.1212 0.0694 0.0526 0.0423 0.0354
   - METR (%) na na 64 44 44 45 46 47
   - NETR (c ) (%) 51 39 41 43 44 45
   - AETR (%) 12 14 46 60 69 77 78 82
Fiscal distribution
   - EIT rate (%) -251 -32 16 25 30 33 36 38
   - EWT (Total Direct taxes) (%) -29 -4 16 25 31 34 37 39
   - NPV ($ billion) (i =5%) -1080 -280 0.59 3.85 7.12 10.38 13.66 16.92
TAX RATE CHANGES
TPI for Taxes
   - CIT 0.0609 0.0609 0.0609 0.8270 0.0609 0.0609 0.0609 0.0609
   - Dividend Withholding Tax 0.0609 0.0609 0.0609 0.8270 0.0609 0.0609 0.0609 0.0609
   - FPPE 0.3605 0.3605 0.3605 0.3605 0.3605 0.3605 0.3605 0.3605
   - Royalty (MRA levy & SSG) 1.04E-05 1.04E-05 1.04E-05 1.04E-05 1.04E-05 1.04E-05 1.04E-05 1.04E-05
   - TPIs for Total Direct taxes 0.1425 0.1326 0.1292 0.1212 0.0966 0.0922 0.0887 0.0860
   - METR (%) 30 36 41 44 53 59 66 74
   - NETR (c ) (%) 26 31 36 39 48 54 60 68
   - AETR (%) 32 40 50 60 73.00 88 106 128
Fiscal distribution
   - EIT rate (%) 33 30 27 25 22 20 17 14
   - EWT (Total direct taxes) (%) 18 20 23 25 28 31 33 36
   - NPV ($ billion) (i =5%) 5.82 5.16 4.51 3.85 3.20 2.55 1.89 1.24
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These results were further affirmed by slow increases in the METR and the NETR that 
were offset by large increases in the NPV ($3.85 billion to $16.92 billion) when the 
prices increased by 100 percent. In this setting, the EWT rate exceeded the EIT rate by 
about 1 percentage point. The simulated results show that a price-induced strong 
progressivity reduces inequality and does not necessarily increase the marginal tax rate 
by substantial margins that can cause a distortion. 
 
On the other hand, as the prices were made to decrease towards a negative 75 percent, the 
TPIs became distorted and all the other functional variables became unstable. In both 
cases, there were no negative progression coefficients as the prices were made to 
increase. This reflect that progressive tax instruments cannot become extremely 
regressive during low profit periods under those conditions but the historical case may be 
different due to actual time lag effects as observed in Section 4.1. Further, the AETR 
increased by large margins as the prices were made to increase. Such a behaviour of the 
AETR did not correlate well with any of the changes in the TPIs and the METR. The 
high AETR did not indicate that the marginal tax rate has increased pertaining to the 
price-induced strong progressivity compared to a tax rate-induced progressivity. 
 
Similarly, some allowances for changes in the CIT rate were made to observe the 
relationship between progressivity and tax burden that exist when tax rates increase. The 
objective was to identify the ideal rate for the CIT, progression coefficient range, METR 
and NETR for PNG’s mining industry. The simulations were carried out by iteratively 
increasing the CIT rates in steps of 25 percent to a maximum of 100 percent and decrease 
the base CIT rate up to 75 percent. The simulations were performed using the RO CFT 
method by keeping the other input variables constant.  
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Table 4.7 shows the TPIs of CIT remained relatively constant when the rate was 
successively made to increase and decrease. The TPIs of total direct taxes decreased at a 
slower phase when the CIT rate increased by 100 percent. Likewise, the METR increased 
by larger margins (44 percent to 74 percent) and the NETR increased from 39 percent to 
68 percent. The EWT rate exceeded the EIT rate (36 percent > 14 percent). Also, the 
NPV decreased from the base case ($3.85 billion to $1.24 billion). These results indicate 
that strong progressivity induced by an increase in the CIT rate significantly increases the 
marginal tax rate and therefore the tax burden. 
 
When the CIT rate of 30 percent was reduced by 75 percent, the TPIs of direct tax 
instruments weakened (0.1212 to 0.1425), the NPV increased (from $3.85 billion to 
$5.82 billion), and the EIT rate exceeded the EWT rate (33 percent > 18 percent). The 
METR and NETR also decreased by substantial margins. These results suggest that 
decreases in the CIT rate weakens the progressivity leading to erosion of revenues. 
 
The simulated results led to identify an ideal CIT rate for PNG. A 25 percent reduction in 
the CIT rate slightly weakened the progressivity (0.1292) from the base case and the 
EWT reduced by 2 percent (28 percent to 25 percent). On the other hand, the increase in 
the CIT rate by 25 percent increased the METR to 53 percent from the base case. These 
results show 30 percent is the ideal CIT rate for PNG. At the 30 percent CIT rate, the 
theoretical METR and NETR were 44 percent and 39 percent respectivley, and the EIT 
and EWT rates were equal at 25 percent. These results were consistent with the results 
obtained in Tables 4.2 and 4.3. The ideal NETR is around 40 percent and the METR falls 
within a range between 40 to 45 percent. At these levels, the TPI range between 0 and 
0.20 was identified as an effective boundary, which exist below and closer to the Lorenz 
curve. The tax instruments found within the ideal progresivity boundary tend to capture 
higher magnitude of tax revenues than those that are outside of the boundary. 
 
  121  
  
  
4.4 Sensitivity tests for optimal combinations of multiple tax instruments 
 
The objective of this section was to simulate the quasi-tax intruments against the basic 
tax instruments to identify a suitable mix that could complement with the results found in 
Section 4.1. The basic tax instruments comprised of the ad valorem royalty, CIT and 
DWT and the quasi-taxes comprised of the equity participation, APT and PBR. Using the 
RO CFT method, a series of simulations were performed by adding each quasi-tax 
instrument to the basic tax instruments by simulating one at a time, along with various 
other combinations. The simulated results are presented in Table 4.8. 
 
Basic taxes (Royalty, CIT and DWT) 
 
The TPI for the basic tax instruments was close to the Lorenz curve (0.0852), and the 
corresponding METR and AETR were 35 and 48 percent respectively. These results 
show the tax burden faced by the investors is low without introducing the quasi tax 
instruments. Similar results were observed where the EIT rate exceeded the EWT rate by 
6 percent (30 percent > 24 percent). The TPI, METR, EIT and EWT rates indicate that 
the basic tax instruments alone could be reasonable under the risk-neutral conditions for 
adopting a simplified taxation regime to attract foreign direct investments. That said, the 
low METR also left an opportunity for other quasi-tax combinations to raise it to a 
reasonable level. 
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Table 4.8: Results for combinations of multiple taxes. 
 
 
 
Combinations of basic and quasi taxes
Basic Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 Case 7
Taxes APT FCE FPE FPPE APT &FPPE PBR APT,FPE &PBR
TPIs for Quasi Taxes (0.3980) (0.3993) (0.42203) (0.3605) (0.4551; 0.3605) (0.111) (0.385;0.422 &0.111)
TPIs for Basic Taxes
   - CIT 0.0498 0.0498 0.0498 0.0498 0.0609 0.0609 0.0475 0.1130
   - DWT 0.0498 0.1120 0.0498 0.0498 0.0609 0.0280 0.0475 0.1130
   - Royalty (MRA levy & SSG) 1.04E-05 1.04E-05 0.0000 1.04E-05 1.04E-05 1.04E-05 1.04E-05 1.04E-05
   - Total Direct taxes 0.0852 0.0688 0.0890 0.0864 0.1024 0.2200 0.0826 0.1910
   - METR (%) 35 40 46 45 47 48 36 53
   - AETR (%) 48 62 62 60 60 65 46 79
Fiscal distribution (%)
   - EIT rate 30 26 25 25 25 24 31 22
   - EWT (Direct taxes & royalties) 24 28 26 25 25 26 21 26
   - NPV ($ bln) (i =5%) 5.25 4.49 3.89 3.89 3.85 3.71 5.42 3.30
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Case 1: Basic taxes plus additional profit tax (APT) 
 
When the APT was added to the basic instruments, the total TPI slightly rose to 0.0688, 
which reflected that the APT weakens the total progressivity. However, the TPI for CIT 
remained steady (0.0498) because the APT was imposed on the net CF after imposing the 
CIT. Since the TPI for APT was high (0.3980), it was not capable of capturing profits 
above the required threshold rate and therefore did not capture much revenues from 
excess profits (if any existed). Also, the METR increased from 35 percent to 40 percent 
due to collection of some revenues from the existence of additional profits above the 
normal ROR. The fiscal transfer gap between the EWT and EIT rates slightly increased 
(28 percent > 26 percent). 
 
The NPV slightly increased, which reflected that APT does not cause an economic 
incidence. However, a threshold rate below the project IRR could capture the quasi-rents, 
and therefore cause distortion. As demonstrated in Figure 4.2, a lower threshold rate (e.g., 
10 percent used in this thesis) reduced the NPV from the base case ($5.25 billion to $4.49 
billion). This result was due to the distorting effects of the FPPE being absent in the tax 
model and carry-over credits, which reduced the progressivity (slightly higher TPIs) and 
increased the NPV. These simulations show that depending on the threshold rate, the 
combination of the basic taxes and the APT is slightly unsuitable for high cost/low-rent 
mines. Also, the APT (RRT) does not cause tax burden unless the threshold rate is below 
the normal ROR.  
 
 
Cases 2 and 3: Basic taxes plus free carried equity (FCE) and fully paid equity (FPE) 
 
The FCE and FPE were separately simulated using the 3 and 12 percent interest rates 
alluding to different equity financial arrangements. The respective TPIs were 0.3993 and 
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0.4220. In both cases, the METR rose to 46 percent, the EIT rate exceeded the EWT rate 
by 2 percent, and the NPV reduced from the base case ($5.25 billion to $3.89). The total 
TPIs of the basic tax instruments and that of the FCE and FPE remained steady (0.0688 
and 0.0864). These results show that the FCE and FPE once combined with the basic 
taxes collect relatively small amounts of revenues for the community. As shown in Table 
4.8, the progressivity of CIT remained relatively unaffected because the FCE and FPE 
were imposed on the post-CIT cash flows or more specifically on the corporate profits.    
 
Although the NPVs derived from the cases 2 and 3 were same, inclusion of the FCE 
weakened the combined progressivity of the basic taxes compared with the FPE. The 
difference was due to the treatment of the cost of FCE as an internal loan to the investor, 
which was analogous to the FPE. The basic tax instruments and the FPE was a favourable 
combination as reflected by the slightly lower METR because it freed the cash flows 
from the internal debt obligations that would be faced by investors. 
 
 
Case 4: Basic taxes with fully paid production-based equity (FPPE) 
 
The TPI for FPPE was 0.3605 and combining the FPPE with the basic taxes weakened 
the average TPI for the total direct tax instruments from the base case (0.1024). The 
METR increased from 46 percent to 48 percent from the base case. The EIT rate was 
reduced by 5 percent and the EWT rate slightly increased by 2 percent. These results 
show that FPPE itself being weakly progressive erode revenues that could have been 
collected if it was not combined with the basic tax instruments. This was caused by 
erosion of the tax base arising from deadweight losses through reductions in the total 
mineral outputs. These results suggest that there is wasteful extraction arising from 
reduction in the mineral reserve when the FPPE is combined with the basic tax 
instruments. Further simulations of the FPPE rates were necessary to identify a suitable 
range of rates for the equity stake ownership in mining projects (Fig 4.3). 
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Figure 4.3: Equity interest rates plotted against the Lorenz curve 
 
 
Figure 4.3 shows the progressivity curves for the FPPE rates ranging from 0 to 50 percent 
were measured against the pre-tax cash flows over the 20-year life of the project. The 
curves show that there was no dividend accessible from owning the equity interests at 
FPPE rates less than 10 percent. The government and community may have access to 
some equity dividends from FPPE rates above the 10 percent benchmark. 
 
 
Case 5: Basic taxes plus APT and FPPE 
 
This scenario tested the suitability of combining the basic taxes with the FPPE and the 
APT. This combination of the basic and quasi-tax instruments, which represents the real 
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situation in PNG where a Taxation Review Committee has recommended reintroducing 
the APT. This combination of tax instruments weakened the total progressivity by 
significant margins (0.0852 to 0.220) and the METR increased to 48 percent from the 
base case. However, the METR did not change significantly from the base case because 
the APT and FPPE were weakly progressive (0.450 and 0.400) (i.e., small amounts of 
revenues were collected). When comparing this case with case 1, the FPPE eroded APT’s 
ability to capture revenues from excess profits due to the wasteful extraction problem 
mentioned in case 4. This finding suggests that APT cannot be expected to raise 
substantial revenues from taxing excess profits once it is combined with the FPPE and 
basic tax instruments.  
 
  
Case 6: Basic taxes with the PBR 
 
This scenario was simulated to test the adoption of PBR at the Ramu Nickel mine in 
PNG. The shift from ad valorem royalty to PBR produced a TPI of 0.111 in combination 
with the basic taxes. However, the total TPI remained steady (0.034) from the base case. 
The METR slightly increased by 1 percent (36 percent > 35 percent), while the EIT rate 
exceeded the EWT rate (31 percent > 21 percent). The strong performance was attributed 
to the PBR being applied as a second-tier tax to the CIT and consistently positive tax base 
of the Frieda deposit being assessed. Further, delaying the PBR revenues was seen to be a 
major problem, especially for low quality and high cost mines compared to the ad 
valorem royalty.  
 
 
Case 7: Basic taxes plus APT, FPPE and PBR 
 
In this scenario, the total TPI increased by a substantial margin (0.1910) from the base 
case (0.0852) when the basic tax instruments were combined with the APT, FPPE and the 
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PBR. The corresponding METR was 53 percent, the EWT rate exceeded the EIT rate by 
4 percent (26 percent > 22 percent) and the NPV decreased from the base case ($5.25 
billion to $3.30 billion). These results suggest that the combination of basic tax 
instruments with the quasi-taxes greatly influenced the combined progressivity to be 
weak and tends to crowd-out the revenue generating potentials of the strongly progressive 
tax instruments. 
 
As mentioned in case 6, the PBR revenues are accessed at the early stages of a mine life 
only if the tax base is positive. On the other hand, the FPPE and the APT revenues are 
delayed mainly because of their weak progressivity alluding to the tax base uncertainty, 
the costs of acquiring the equity interests and setting a suitable threshold rate. Finally for 
this section, there are avenues for integrating some quasi-taxes with the basic tax 
instruments. However, a suitable combination of the multiple tax instruments should not 
deviate from the theoretical values of the TPI, METR and NETR identified and 
established in Sections 4.1 and 4.3.  
 
 
4.5 Summary 
 
This chapter has presented the data analysis using the techniques described in Chapter 3. 
The case study used data from the undeveloped Frieda copper-gold deposit to model 
PNG’s mining tax instruments. The first part of this chapter used the TPI, METR, NETR, 
and EIT and EWT rates to measure the ability of individual taxes, royalty and levies to 
raise tax revenues. The second part of the chapter simulated the tax adjusting techniques 
that influenced the degree of progressivity for the various tax instruments to support the 
main results obtained in the first part of the chapter. Remarkably, the tax model results 
and those derived from the simulations were similar to each other, which suggest the 
methods and techniques used were reliable. 
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The results obtained from simulations of depreciation techniques, LCF, tax holiday and 
thin capitalisation rules generated some significant results that are useful for addressing 
some specific tax design issues in PNG. These are the major techniques applied for 
protecting the tax base that in turn will strengthen the progressive tax system. The 
simulated results are useful for strengthening the progressive mineral taxation regime of 
PNG through an accelerated depreciation technique. It is supplemented by a time-
dependent LCF provision that recognises the riskless capital invested and the operating 
costs. The LCF provision within the progressive tax system is indeed a concession and 
therefore, PNG does not need a tax holiday. Moreover, the thin capitalisation rule of 2:1 
protects the tax base thereby making the tax instruments more progressive and improves 
the economics of a mining project compared to the debt to equity ratio of 3:1, which is 
presently applied in PNG. 
 
The scenario analysis involving copper and gold prices, and tax rate changes cogently 
explained the degree to which strong progressivity and changing tax rates influence the 
marginal tax rate to increase. The price simulation results cogently showed that increased 
progressivity of tax instruments associated with increasing profitability of a mine does 
not cause the marginal tax rate to increase as often argued in the mainstream taxation 
literature. The results also showed that as profitability falls, progressivity makes a vertical 
adjustment so that tax burden is recognised on the ability to pay. This finding is 
significant for PNG to make policy adjustments to strengthen its progressive mineral 
taxation regime, while maintaining a competitive level of the statutory tax rates. 
 
The scenario analysis of the combinations of taxes was required to identify some suitable 
mix of tax instruments that could reduce wasteful extraction and fulfil the revenue 
maximising objective. The simulation results showed that the basic tax instruments 
collect much of the revenues for PNG but there are rooms for devising additional tax 
instruments to bring the net wealth transfer to an acceptable level. However, the results 
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showed that combining APT and FPPE with the basic tax instruments makes PNG’s 
mineral taxation most unattractive in the world. According to these results, PNG can 
increase the CIT rate to an acceptable level if the FPPE is abolished. 
 
The validity of the theoretical results relied on the techniques used for reducing the 
uncertainty of input variables, which led to forecasting a more reliable tax base. The 
findings of the study illustrated that ignoring uncertainty made the results more 
susceptible, especially if the NPV and the AETR were used for measuring the distribution 
of tax burden. It was necessary to establish reliable theoretical TPIs, METR, NETR and 
other findings associated with PNG’s mining taxation regime to make a comparative 
analysis of the historical tax performance in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 5 : Historical Tax Performance Analysis 
 
Chapter 4 used the theoretical tax revenues and financial data to measure the performance 
of direct tax instruments under various price, cost and risk conditions. This chapter 
computes the progressivity indices, METR, NETR, wealth transfer rates and other 
variables using the real-time data presented in Appendix C. Further, inclusion of non-tax 
data allowed the computation of aggregate fiscal benefits generated by the sample of 
mines assessed. This approach goes beyond the limitations of the theoretical tax models 
in Chapter 4, which did not capture the non-fiscal benefits such as land use compensation 
and expenditures on infrastructure and human development. The indirect tax instruments 
and non-tax benefits were included in the total EWT rates for this analysis. 
   
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.1 presents the results for direct tax 
instruments, indirect taxes and non-tax benefits for the Bougainville copper mine 
between 1972 and 1988. Section 5.2 presents the results for the Ok Tedi copper mine 
between 1982 and 2013. Section 5.3 presents the results for the Porgera gold mine from 
1984 to 2012. Section 5.4 presents a summary of the chapter. 
  
 
5.1 Bougainville Mine 
 
Table 5.1 presents the TPIs calculated for the direct tax instruments associated with the 
former Bougainville mine. There was no time series data for the royalty payments, 
despite some royalty proceeds were paid over the short-lived mine operation. However, 
the 1.25 percent royalty rate at that time was lower than the present average applied in 
most mining jurisdictions. As a result, a total royalty payment of about PNGK 74 million 
represented about 0.1 percent of the gross outputs over the 16 years of the mine 
operation. Hence, a royalty rate below the present rate of 2 percent is suboptimal. 
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Table 5.1: TPIs for direct taxes of the Bougainville mine (closed). 
Year FCE CIT DWT APT* Total DT
1971 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1972 0.29 na 0.32 na 0.56
1973 0.03 0.99 0.08 na 0.39
1974 0.13 0.55 0.16 na 0.31
1975 0.13 0.51 0.17 na 0.30
1976 0.14 0.44 0.17 na 0.28
1977 0.13 0.40 0.17 na 0.26
1978 0.09 0.34 0.13 na 0.22
1979 0.02 0.23 0.07 na 0.14
1980 -0.01 0.19 0.03 na 0.11
1981 0.00 0.16 0.04 na 0.10
1982 0.01 0.13 0.05 na 0.10
1983 0.03 0.08 0.07 na 0.10
1984 0.03 0.06 0.07 na 0.09
1985 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.67 0.07
1986 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.33 0.04
1987 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.21 0.01
1988 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Average 0.06 0.26 0.10 0.30 0.18  
*APT revenue payments placed together to make the TPI calculation convenient. 
Source: Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL) annual report (2013) (Appendix C, Tables C-1 
and C-2) 
 
 
Table 5.1 shows that the TPIs for CIT were consistently positive, and the average TPI 
(0.26) was slightly outside of the ideal degree of progressivity boundary identified in 
Section 4.3. The TPIs approaching zero (Lorenz curve) represented CIT’s potential of 
collecting a high magnitude of revenues at the mature stages of mine’s life. Given the 
CIT captured about 70 percent of the revenues, Bougainville mine’s NETR was 21 
percent [0.40* (1-0.26) *70]. It was about 16 percent below the 35 percent statutory CIT 
rate that existed between 1972 and 1988. It shows that there were some underpayments of 
the accessible CIT revenues. Further, the average TPI of 0.10 for the DWT was within 
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the effective progressivity boundary, which performed stronger than the CIT and the APT 
because the DWT was imposed on the post-tax base. 
  
The GoPNG received the APT payments only four times during the period analysed: first 
in 1974, second in 1979, third in 1980 and fourth in 1988. The irregular payments of the 
APT revenues and the lack of time series data made computing the TPIs difficult. This 
setback was resolved by grouping the cumulative APT payments towards the last periods 
to maintain the continuity of TPI calculations, leading to a well-structured curve that 
demonstrated the burden distributions (see Fig. 5.1). This approach enabled the 
progressivity curve to correctly represent the APT performance since matching the APT 
payments with the cumulative pre-tax base did not affect the results. 
 
The average TPI for APT being 0.30 (Table 5.1) reflects it was unreliable in capturing the 
excess profits. The APT revenues became accessible due to a high mine profitability 
impelled by a copper boom in the early 1970s, and low capital and operating costs as the 
Bougainville mine was located near the coast. Conceptually, the APT revenues would 
have become payable when the cumulative PVs of the pre-tax CFs were discounted using 
the threshold rate that equaled to zero. This meant that the threshold rate was triggered 
when the IRR was equal to 15 percent in 1974. However, the APT payments just three 
years after the mine was commissioned were inconsistent with theory as it was too early 
for the mine to trigger the threshold rate prior to attaining the normal ROR in 1979. 
 
Figure 5.1 is a structural representation of the degree of progressivity along the Lorenz 
curve for the direct tax revenues paid by the Bougainville mine. The TPI curves for 
profit-based taxes are slightly concaved at the base along the x-axis, which is normal for 
allowing the investor to attain the pre-tax ROR before government can access the tax 
revenues. The CIT progressivity is slightly outside of the optimal margin compared to the 
DWT. Further, the APT curve bowing downwards to show that it was weakly 
  133  
  
  
progressive. On the other hand, the progressivity curve for FCE was more closer to the 
Lorenz curve compared to all the tax instruments. This was because both FCE and DWT 
were based on the post-tax base and were paid out of the corporate profits. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1:TPIs for direct taxes plotted against the Lorenz curve. 
 
The TPI for FCE was 0.06, which shows that there were substantial amounts of equity 
dividends paid between 1972 and 1988. The early dividend payments arose from positive 
tax base in the first year of mine operation, which rapidly offset the capital cost of equity 
participation. Although the company could have recouped its share of equity capital cost 
plus interests, strong progressivity of the FCE contradicted with that of the theoretical 
FCE (Table 4.2). As observed in Table 4.7, the strong progressivity of the FCE was 
equivalent to that of the DWT because these taxes were paid out of corporate profits. As 
the post-tax base became positive, the FCE and DWT became more progressive than the 
tax instruments imposed on the pre-tax base. 
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Table 5.2: METRs and wealth distributions from the Bougainville mine. 
Free Cash Pre-Tax Post-Tax METR AETR EIT EWT EWT EWT Total
Year Flow ROR ROR ROR DT (a) (b) (C ) EWT
1972
1973 -82 -95 -95 0 18 29 5 49 4 58
1974 -22 -45 -43 0 9 63 5 19 2 25
1975 -8 -16 -22 -30 46 39 27 16 1 44
1976 18 -10 -16 -50 34 24 10 24 2 36
1977 25 -5 -11 -120 45 20 13 23 2 37
1978 29 -2 -8 -320 47 14 10 23 2 35
1979 32 1 -4 5 51 21 13 21 2 36
1980 34 7 1 90 59 24 27 14 1 42
1981 36 10 3 70 53 21 19 14 1 34
1982 37 10 4 60 63 8 9 16 1 26
1983 37 11 4 60 70 4 8 17 1 26
1984 38 12 6 60 48 14 14 12 1 27
1985 38 13 6 50 70 4 7 15 1 23
1986 38 13 6 50 57 9 9 15 1 25
1987 39 13 7 50 52 13 11 14 1 26
1988 39 14 8 40 48 22 16 11 1 28
Total 39 15 9 40 48 21 13 19 2 33  
Source: Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL) annual report (2013) (Appendix C: Tables C-1 and C-2) 
*METR for royalty was computed by the IRR for gross revenue minus IRR for gross revenues less royalty divided by 
the IRR for gross revenue. (a) direct tax instruments, (b) indirect and non-tax benefits, and (c) royalty. 
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The average TPI for total direct tax instruments was 0.18, which was within the 
acceptable progressivity boundary (Table 5.1). Further, the actual METR for 
Bougainville mine was 40 percent (Table 5.2), which was significantly high compared to 
the theoretical METR of 45 percent. Bougainville mine’s high METR was attributed to 
positive tax base in the early production years, which was similar to that of the Frieda 
deposit model. Based on the combined TPI and METR, the industry level NETR for the 
Bougainville mine was 30 percent [0.4*(1-0.26)*100], which was to some respect within 
the proximity of PNG’s theoretical NETR of 40 percent established in Chapter 4. This 
shows that the Bougainville mine generated substantial revenues for PNG when 
combined with the indirect and non-tax benefits. 
 
The EIT rate exceeded the EWT rate for the direct taxes (21 percent >13 percent) (Table 
5.2). However, the total EWT rate comprising of direct and indirect tax instruments, and 
non-tax benefits exceeded the EIT rate (33 percent > 21 percent). Also, the EWT rates for 
indirect and non-tax benefits exceeded that of the direct tax instruments (19 percent >13 
percent). This shows that while the direct tax instruments alone were incapable of 
transferring a satisfactory level of benefits to the community, its combination with the 
non-tax benefits was able to transfer a substantial amount of resource revenues. 
 
 
5.2 Ok Tedi Mine 
 
Table 5.3 shows that the average TPI for royalty was strongly progressive (0.07), but 
slightly weaker than the theoretical case in Section 4.1. The progressivity of ad valorem 
royalty decreased (negative TPIs) during low mineral prices (1991 to 2000) and became 
strongly progressive during high prices (2003 to 2012). This shows that progressivity of 
value-based royalties decrease during period of low prices and increase during high 
prices. This result was observed to occur in Table 4.1 (Chapter 4) with the MC – CFT 
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model as a result of time-lag effects. Additionally, the TPI for mining levy was weakly 
progressive (0.21) and the combined TPI was 0.170 when the mining levy was introduced 
in 1998. When the mining levy was phased out in 2006, the progressivity of ad valorem 
royalty improved between 2007 and 2013 (Table 5.3).  
 
Table 5.3 shows the CIT progressivity was weak (0.36). The NETR for CIT was 13 
percent [0.30*(1-0.36)*70], which was below the statutory CIT rate. This performance 
was unrelated to the CIT rate, which was reduced from 35 percent to 30 percent in 2000. 
Rather, the negative TPIs were due to a decline in copper and gold prices during the 
global recession between 2007 and 2008, whose effect continued to 2012 and onwards. 
The negative TPIs were caused by time-lag effects where the cumulative CIT revenues 
exceeded the cumulative pre-tax cash flows by more than 50 percent. This result shows 
that progressivity of the profit-based taxes increase during periods of high profit and 
decrease to regressive progression during periods of low profit (Fig. 2.2). Further, the 
average TPIs for DWT and royalty withholding tax were 0.32 and 0.27 respectively. The 
actual progressivity of DWT being weak suggest that there were few dividends paid to 
host communities partly since the Ok Tedi became a 100 percent locally-owned mine in 
2002. 
 
Figure 5.2 graphically presents the TPIs in Table 5.3 to show the degree of progressivity 
of the direct tax instruments, royalties and levies paid by the Ok Tedi mine between 1982 
and 2013. Ok Tedi mine paid the DWT taxes in 1998, and the CIT proceeds and equity 
dividend payments were received after the mine attained its pre-tax ROR in 1991. The 
cumulative tax payments did not reach 20 percent until 2004, except for the levies (Table 
5.4). As a result, the tax curves are concentrated near the origin along the x-axis, which is 
why weak tax instruments that are expected to form concave curves are not clearly 
demonstrated in Figure 5.2. This result was due to high costs associated with the 
geographical location of the Ok Tedi mine. 
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Figure 5.2: TPIs of taxes for the Ok Tedi mine are plotted against Lorenz curve. 
 
 
Ok Tedi mine’s average TPI for the total direct taxes was 0.39, which was outside of the 
effective progressive range (0>TPI<0.20) identified in Section 4.3. This performance was 
characterised by a low METR of 30 percent (Table 5.4) and similarly the NETR was 18.3 
percent [0.3*(1-0.39)*100]. These results were lower than the theoretical ones because 
most of the tax revenues became accessible after Ok Tedi mine’s 10-year payback period 
due to cost challenges associated with environment and social impacts. This result shows 
that low performance of the direct tax instruments is more predictive for porphyry copper 
deposits that share similar geological and geographical settings to that of the Ok Tedi 
copper mine. 
 
  
Key 
Lorenz curve 
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Table 5.3: TPIs for all types of taxes between 1982 and 2013 for the Ok Tedi mine. 
Year Royalty Levy Total R+L CIT Equity Div. DWT Royalty WHT Total DT
1982 na na na na na na na na
1983 na na na na na na na na
1984 0.74 na 0.96 na na na na na
1985 0.45 na 0.97 na na na na na
1986 0.33 na 0.73 na na na na na
1987 0.32 na 0.65 na na na na na
1988 0.26 na 0.61 na na na na na
1989 0.29 na 0.56 na na na na na
1990 0.00 na 0.52 na na na na na
1991 -0.07 na 0.31 0.47 0.91 na na 0.61
1992 -0.04 na 0.24 0.55 0.82 na na 0.65
1993 -0.02 na 0.23 0.61 0.75 na na 0.68
1994 0.01 na 0.22 0.67 0.72 na na 0.71
1995 -0.16 na 0.22 0.71 0.77 na na 0.75
1996 -0.10 na 0.02 0.66 0.80 na na 0.73
1997 -0.09 na 0.07 0.63 0.76 0.90 na 0.68
1998 -0.05 0.95 0.10 0.63 0.69 0.79 na 0.66
1999 -0.03 0.89 0.07 0.62 0.63 0.66 na 0.63
2000 -0.01 0.71 0.03 0.57 0.66 0.69 0.82 0.60
2001 0.01 0.45 -0.06 0.50 0.61 0.64 0.71 0.54
2002 0.02 0.16 -0.19 0.48 0.59 0.62 0.59 0.52
2003 0.03 0.05 -0.29 0.47 0.41 0.50 0.45 0.46
2004 0.03 -0.04 -0.34 0.38 0.32 0.40 0.37 0.37
2005 0.04 -0.03 -0.34 0.32 0.11 0.21 0.19 0.26
2006 0.03 0.10 -0.27 0.18 -0.01 0.08 0.17 0.13
2007 0.03 0.03 -0.07 -0.03 -0.05 0.03 0.13 -0.02
2008 0.02 0.00 -0.05 -0.05 -0.02 0.05 0.12 -0.03
2009 0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.02 -0.04 0.02 0.07 0.00
2010 0.03 0.08 -0.02 0.02 -0.06 0.00 0.07 0.00
2011 0.02 0.08 0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 0.06 -0.04
2012 0.01 0.02 0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 0.03 -0.02
2013 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Average 0.07 0.21 0.17 0.36 0.41 0.32 0.27 0.39  
Source: Ok Tedi Mining Limited (OTML) production and financial data (2013) (Appendix C: 
Table C-8) 
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Table 5.4: METRs for direct taxes and royalty and ETRs for the Ok Tedi mine. 
FCF Pre-tax Post-tax Direct taxes Royalty + Levies
Year ROR ROR ROR METR METR AETR 
1982 na na na na na na
1983 na -100 na na na na
1984 -85 -96 na na 0 na
1985 -41 -64 na na -2 0
1986 -20 -39 -59 -52 -5 0
1987 -5 -24 -37 -56 -17 0
1988 1 -17 -33 -97 82 0
1989 9 -10 -28 -2 10 0
1990 14 -3 -19 -4 8 0
1991 17 0 -14 39 7 2
1992 19 3 -11 528 6 14
1993 21 4 -9 309 5 15
1994 22 6 -6 190 5 5
1995 24 8 -2 131 4 3
1996 24 9 -1 107 4 28
1997 25 10 -1 107 4 -317
1998 25 10 0 98 4 46
1999 26 11 1 91 4 61
2000 26 11 2 81 3 38
2001 26 12 3 78 3 132
2002 26 12 3 73 3 50
2003 27 13 5 65 3 51
2004 27 13 6 56 3 52
2005 27 14 8 46 3 47
2006 27 15 10 38 3 64
2007 28 16 11 33 3 67
2008 28 16 11 31 3 69
2009 28 17 12 29 3 21
2010 28 17 12 27 3 51
2011 28 17 13 27 3 94
2012 28 17 13 27 3 45
2013 28 17 13 27 3 58
Total 28 18 13 30 3 37
Source: Ok Tedi Mining Limited (OTML) production and financial data (2013) (Appendix C: 
Table C-7) 
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Table 5.5: Distributions EIT and EWT rates for Ok Tedi mine. 
ERTI EWT EWT EWT EWT EWT
Year (a ) (b ) (c = a+b) (d ) Total (c +d )
1982 0 0 0 0 0 0
1983 0 0 0 0 0 0
1984 0 0 28 28 7 35
1985 -26 9 41 50 2 52
1986 20 0 5 5 1 6
1987 26 0 8 8 1 9
1988 9 0 6 6 14 20
1989 6 0 3 3 26 29
1990 17 0 2 3 25 28
1991 14 21 3 24 30 54
1992 10 2 3 4 30 34
1993 10 2 2 4 29 33
1994 19 1 2 3 23 26
1995 16 1 2 2 16 18
1996 18 5 3 8 22 30
1997 -4 13 6 19 48 67
1998 8 5 3 7 23 30
1999 9 8 3 11 28 39
2000 12 5 3 7 22 29
2001 5 8 3 10 25 35
2002 9 6 3 9 25 34
2003 15 11 2 13 20 33
2004 24 15 3 18 27 45
2005 32 20 2 21 18 39
2006 41 32 1 33 14 47
2007 40 32 2 33 13 46
2008 32 26 2 29 19 48
2009 39 12 2 15 16 31
2010 40 27 2 29 16 45
2011 27 29 3 32 11 43
2012 27 16 4 21 14 35
2013 7 4 6 10 19 29
Average 16 10 5 15 18 33  
Notes: (a) direct tax instruments, (b) royalty and levy, and (c) a + b, (d) non-tax benefits.  
Source: Ok Tedi Mining Limited (OTML) production and financial data (2013) (Appendix C: 
Tables C-8 to C-12) 
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The EWT rates show that there were substantial amounts of non-tax benefits flowed to 
local communities surrounding the Ok Tedi mine. Although the average EIT rate 
exceeded the EWT rate based on the direct tax instruments (16 percent > 10 percent), the 
addition of non-tax benefits caused the EWT rate to exceed the EIT rate (33 percent > 16 
percent). This meant that indirect and non-tax benefits make up for the fiscal disparity 
gap created by weak progressivity of the direct tax instruments. The total wealth transfer 
rate constituted a high magnitude of benefits flowed to PNG and host Ok Tedi 
communities. 
  
Data provided in Appendix C show that between 1982 and 2013, about 70 percent of the 
total tax and non-tax benefits from the Ok Tedi mine flowed to rest of PNG. This 
comprised of CIT, business development and other indirect taxes. Out of the 30 percent 
benefit streams that were retained within the host Ok Tedi region, 16 percent flowed to 
rest of the Western Province and 14 percent was retained by landholder communities. 
These benefit distributions were in form of royalties, equity dividends, compensation, 
non-tax benefits, infrastructure created through the TCS and SSG and spin-off business 
activities. However, the entire social and economic assets created by the Ok Tedi mine 
could be underestimated due to data limitations and the techniques used in this study, 
which focused on few variables that were easily accessible. 
 
 
5.3 Porgera gold mine 
 
Royalty and levies for the Porgera gold mine are presented in Tables 5.6 and 5.7. The ad 
valorem royalty was strongly progressive throughout the mine life, with an average TPI 
of 0.022, which was consistent with that of the Ok Tedi mine. The excise and duties and 
mining levies collected small amounts of revenues as they performed regressively (-
0.107).  
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Table 5.6: TPIs for the Porgera mine (1990-2012). 
Com. & EPG Exercise & Royalty Total
Year CIT Equity (FPPE) Duties DT
1990 na na na 0.045 na
1991 na na na 0.035 na
1992 na na na 0.015 na
1993 0.533 na 0.775 0.025 0.571
1994 0.57 na 0.685 0.029 0.597
1995 0.526 na 0.384 0.026 0.535
1996 0.518 na 0.274 0.023 0.519
1997 0.505 na 0.158 0.020 0.499
1998 0.493 na 0.054 0.014 0.48
1999 0.487 na -0.133 0.098 0.461
2000 0.477 na -0.251 0.075 0.443
2001 0.486 na -0.379 0.050 0.441
2002 0.475 na -0.425 0.044 0.428
2003 0.432 na -0.447 0.044 0.388
2004 0.367 na -0.437 0.039 0.313
2005 0.305 0.547 -0.461 0.028 0.252
2006 0.311 0.449 -0.480 0.023 0.253
2007 0.289 0.209 -0.473 0.011 0.225
2008 0.242 0.239 -0.368 -0.001 0.193
2009 0.182 0.220 -0.293 -0.010 0.145
2010 0.169 0.126 -0.179 -0.020 0.14
2011 0.01 0.020 -0.096 -0.045 0.002
2012 -0.05 -0.050 -0.050 -0.055 -0.05
Average 0.366 0.220 -0.107 0.022 0.342  
Source: Porgera Joint Venture information booklet (2013) (Appendix C: Tables C-3 & C-4) 
Note: (a) CIT was adjusted to isolate mining levy and 4 percent mining levy was estimated. 
 
 
Historical data presented in Appendix C shows the central government (GoPNG) retained 
about 77 percent of the total royalty proceeds and redistributed 23 percent to the host 
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Porgera communities. The royalty proceeds distributed were as follows: EPG received 50 
percent; SML landholders 15 percent; Porgera Landholder Association has 12 percent; 
Children’s Trust Fund 10 percent; and Young Adults Association 8 percent. Substantial 
amounts of royalty proceeds were generated from the Porgera mine and distributed to 
these local stakeholders. 
 
The average TPI for CIT was weakly progressive (0.366), which was outside of the 
effective progressivity boundary. This implied that Porgera mine paid only 63 percent of 
its CIT payable. The functional variables detected the problem but did not explain why 
the Porgera gold mine underpaid the CIT relative to the tax-base. Porgera mine’s NETR 
for CIT was 13.2 percent [0.33*(1-0.366)*63], which was about 16.8 percent lower than 
the statutory rate of 30 percent. Porgera mine’s CIT performance was similar to that of 
the Ok Tedi mine, but both were lower than that of the Bougainville copper mine.   
 
The progressivity of FPPE was weak as shown by the TPI of 0.240 (Table 5.6). It was 
due to inconsistent payments of equity dividends between 1990 and 2006. The Porgera 
community and the EPG initially have a 5 percent FCE interest in the Porgera mine. The 
FCE type of equity interest was changed to FPPE following an industry protest against 
the FCE between 1990 and 1994. In Figure 5.3, the FPPE curve moving along the x-axis 
at early periods reflects that FPPE dividends have been delayed or inconsistent in the 
most productive stages of the mine life. 
 
In Figure 5.3, strong progressivity of the direct tax instruments in early production years 
was due to the Porgera mine produced over a 1 million ounce of gold for two successive 
years (1992 and 1994) (Appendix C: Table C-3). As a result, the mine attained its normal 
ROR in 1994 after commissioning in 1990 (Table 5.7). However, the progressivity curves 
for CIT and total tax instruments bow downwards away from the Lorenz curve despite 
the mine having high production rates and low costs, especially at the mature production 
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periods. The low METR of 19 percent reflects that Porgera has been a low-tax paying 
gold mine in PNG (Table 4.7). The total TPI for direct taxes being 0.342 constitutes a 
NETR of 13 percent [0.19* (1-0.342)*100], which is significantly lower than the 
theoretical NETR of 40 percent. 
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Figure 5.3: Tax progressivity curves the Porgera mine. 
 
Table 5.7 also presents the rates of fiscal distributions among the stakeholders relative to 
gross values extracted from the Porgera mine. The EIT rate exceeded the EWT rate by 18 
percent (28 percent >10 percent) based on the direct tax instruments. The EIT rate 
exceeded the EWT rate (28 percent >24 percent) when combining human capital, 
infrastructure (SSG and TCS), compensations, and business development, together with 
the direct and indirect taxes. This result was inconsistent with the Bougainville and Ok 
Tedi mines. There were less direct and indirect and non- tax benefit streams flowed to the 
Porgera region, Enga Province and rest of PNG between 1990 and 2012. This shows that 
the Porgera being a world class gold mine paid less direct tax revenues and the overall 
wealth transfer was substantially less than the copper mines. 
  
  145  
  
  
Table 5.7: METR and ETRs, EIT and EWT rates for the Porgera mine 
Marginal Effective tax rate (%) EWT RATE
Year FCF Pre-tax CF Post-tax CF METR METR Royalty Direct Indirect Total Non-Tax Total
ROR ROR ROR DT Royalty EIT EWT Taxes Taxes Benefits EWT
1989
1990 -86 -97 -97 0 0 21 1 -1 0 61 60
1991 -11 -91 -73 -2 -6 10 1 -1 0 13 12
1992 21 -31 -33 -4 3 32 1 42 5 12 59
1993 33 -9 -13 -57 3 44 1 7 2 14 23
1994 40 0 -6 1409 2 26 1 16 3 14 33
1995 44 8 -1 111 2 27 1 11 3 14 28
1996 46 12 3 78 2 22 1 7 3 13 23
1997 47 13 3 75 2 8 1 11 4 17 32
1998 48 16 8 52 2 47 1 10 4 13 27
1999 49 18 10 44 2 34 1 10 2 11 23
2000 49 19 12 37 2 31 1 5 1 8 14
2001 50 21 14 33 2 38 1 7 1 8 16
2002 50 21 15 30 2 26 1 11 1 7 19
2003 50 22 16 29 2 18 1 12 1 6 19
2004 50 23 16 27 2 24 1 8 1 5 14
2005 50 23 17 27 2 19 1 4 1 5 10
2006 51 23 17 26 2 27 1 9 2 7 18
2007 51 24 18 25 2 35 1 13 2 6 21
2008 51 24 18 23 2 36 1 9 1 4 14
2009 51 24 19 23 2 29 1 8 2 4 14
2010 51 24 19 23 2 23 1 25 2 4 31
2011 51 25 19 22 2 33 1 10 2 3 15
2012 51 25 19 22 2 36 1 -1 3 4 6
Average 51 26 21 19 2 28 1 10 2 11 24  
Source: Porgera Joint Venture (PJV) information booklet (2013) (Appendix C: Tables C-3 to C-6) 
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5.4 Summary of historical results 
 
The significance of the ad valorem royalty being strongly progressive (with a TPI of 
0.050) was that it timely captured the marginal increase in gross revenues. Concerning 
the distortion, the average METR for royalty was fixed at the 2 percent statutory rate. 
When the MRA levy and SSG were added, the METR increased to 3 percent. On the 
other hand, the levies were regressive with negative TPIs and therefore captured small 
amount of revenues for the government.   
 
PNG’s average TPI for CIT was 0.3287 and given the average METR of 30 percent, the 
real NETR was about 20 percent [30*(1-0.3287)]. The 20 percent NETR indicates that 
the CIT performed below the theoretical benchmark. This is acceptable because PNG’s 
mining industry has been immature, which involves high costs and risks, fiscal wastage 
through inefficient tax instruments (e.g., FPPE) and risks associated with the socio-
political environment. However, the actual NETR was above the industry average as 
expected. Further, the actual NETR for the overall industry was calculated to be 21 
percent [(30)*(1-0.30)] assuming the tax system had the ability to capture 100 percent of 
the tax liability. The industry level NETR for the copper sector was 25 percent compared 
to the gold mines that were around 13 percent. It reflected that the copper mines 
transferred a higher proportion of the value of the minerals extracted than the gold mines. 
 
The wealth transfer rates for the three samples of mines examined in this chapter were 
averaged to compute the industry level rates. The average industry level EIT rate 
exceeded the average EWT rate of the direct tax instruments by 8 percent (22 >14 
percent). This result was anticipated due to the low average METRs and NETRs based on 
the direct tax instruments. However, the result did not reflect the taxation system being 
imbalanced just because the EIT rate exceeded the EWT rate. When the indirect and non-
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tax benefits were included, the EWT rate exceeded the EIT rate by 8 percent (30 percent 
> 22 percent). These results imply that the TPI, METR and NETR undervalued the actual 
wealth transfers in form of physical assets, human capital and monetary benefits 
distributed to PNG and host communities. These outcomes and the differences between 
the actual and theoretical results generated some significant inferences that will be 
discussed in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 6 : Results Discussion and Recommendations 
 
Chapter 4 used the stochastic cash flows to model the mining taxes and converted the 
theoretical data into ratio variables. Chapter 5 derived the same variables using the 
historical data to analyse the actual tax performances. Both cases computed progressive 
indices, marginal tax rates and wealth transfer rates for a more comprehensive analysis of 
PNG’s mining taxation regime. In light of the findings, this chapter aligns the results of 
the theoretical and the historical analysis for reconciling the tax instruments. 
  
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.1 interprets the performance of the 
royalty, the levies, the PBR and the APT. These royalties and rent taxes are grouped 
together because they have some common links in terms of comparing the burden 
distributions and their abilities to collect revenues. Sections 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 respectively 
discuss the CIT, DWT and equity participation results and implications. Section 6.5 
examines how the study has fulfilled the hypothesis and Section 6.6 discusses the 
methodological implications. Section 6.7 presents the study limitations and Section 6.8 
highlights the need for future research based on this thesis. 
 
 
6.1    Ad valorem royalty and levies, PBR and APT 
 
Strong progressivity of the ad valorem royalty makes it a special case amongst the 
regressive unit-based royalties, excise and duties that do not respond to changes in gross 
revenues. This result is consistent with Gaudin and Padilla (2014) who found that the 
value-based royalties capture the marginal increases in the gross revenues, which is 
significant for communities since minerals extracted are finite (also Conrad, Hool and 
Nekipelov 2015). Additionally, royalties compensate for the negative social and 
environmental externalities that host communities could face beyond a mine life. The 
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revenues collected through the ad valorem royalty can make up for suspected revenue 
leakages from the profit-based tax instruments. Further, the strong progressivity of ad 
valorem royalty appears to attract a wider audience across South America, Africa and 
Asia (Western Australian Government 2015) despite its ability to distort the production 
efficiency.  
  
The ad valorem royalty being strongly progressive did not influence the marginal rate to 
increase and distortion was found to be modest. This result was consistent with that of 
Otto et al. (2006) who noted that burden placed by royalties is around 2 to 3 percent. 
Additionally, Ergas and Pincus (2015) use a partial equilibrium model to argue that 
distortion caused by royalties is small and can raise substantial revenues for Australia. 
The notion of the distortion to extraction optimality is complex to practically verify and 
remains a conceptual argument. Further, the interface amongst the stochastic input 
variables and deposit reserves added to the initial stock through continuous exploration 
within an orebody tend to dilute the effects of distortion on production efficiency. Hence, 
the strong progressivity of ad valorem royalty and its distortion being low suggest that it 
can raise substantial revenues compared to the APT and the PBR. 
 
The PBR was strongly progressive similar to the CIT mainly because the tax base of 
Frieda deposit model was consistently positive, which caused the PBR proceeds to 
become accessible in the first year of production. In reality, high-cost and low-quality 
mineral deposits and short mine lives can delay community’s expectation of receiving the 
PBR revenues sooner than later. In the recent past, PNG allowed the Ramu nickel mine to 
apply the PBR as a second-tier tax to the CIT. However, on numerous occasions, there 
were community protests against the nickel mine operator over delayed remittance of 
royalty proceeds. Thence, the ad valorem royalty is more suitable given the complex land 
and mineral ownership system compared to the profit-based royalties. 
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The theoretical and historical analysis show that the APT had consistently performed 
poorly across PNG’s mining industry before its elimination in 2002. The weak 
progressivity of the APT was mainly attributed to design factors such as the threshold 
rate and uncertainty of the tax base. The uncertainty of a mine’s profitability regulates the 
time for a threshold rate to be triggered (Ergas, Harrison and Pincus 2010). In relation to 
that, different threshold rate scenarios simulated in Figure 4.2 predict that most porphyry 
copper-gold deposits in PNG conditions have IRRs are around 11 percent (including that 
of the Frieda deposit). Therefore, the APT has less chances of raising revenues using 
threshold rates greater than 12 percent from mining porphyry copper and epithermal gold 
deposits in PNG. This finding opposes a proposed reinstatement of the APT in PNG. 
 
PNG Taxation Review Committee (2015) has recommended the reintroduction of APT. 
This scenario was simulated in scenario 5 in Table 4.8. Under the proposed structure, the 
APT rate of 15 percent will be designed with a 15 percent threshold rate to coexist with 
the basic taxes and FPPE. This combination was assessed case 5 (Section 4.4) and the 
results suggest that the APT and FPPE combination could make PNG’s mineral taxation 
regime one of the most unattractive in the world. These results suggest that APT cannot 
coexist with the FPPE because the latter weakens the progressivity of the former, and 
thus it will not generate revenues for PNG. 
 
In the past, tax authorities in PNG did not measure the behaviour of APT in terms of 
taxing the accessible profits. For example, Porgera mine’s IRR exceeded the APT 
threshold rate of 15 percent between 1998 and 2002 (Table 5.7), but PNG’s tax 
administrators did not know that was happening. That being the case, the lack of 
understanding accounting techniques and information asymmetry, intertwined with poor 
tax audit systems complicate assessing when an IRR would surpass the threshold rate to 
trigger the APT payments. Further, recent findings show that Australian government’s 
expenditure planning based on the expectation of receiving the MRRT revenues did not 
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occur (McLaren 2012). These results concur with Ergas et al. (2010). More recently, 
Valle de Souza et al. (2016) noted that the RRT or its hybrid ones do not generate 
revenues as expected mainly due to the uncertainty regarding when a mine would trigger 
a threshold rate. 
 
As a synopsis of this section, the APT is less attractive when compared to the ad valorem 
royalty. This is because the latter collects higher revenues when compared to the PBR 
and APT (Freebairn 2015). Early studies argue that the RRT and its hybrid types should 
completely replace the distorting and regressive royalties (Freebairn and Quiggin 2010; 
Mayo 1979). However, there has been a slow pace of adopting the profit-based royalties 
and the ad valorem royalty has become common in the Asia and Pacific regions (Bowie 
and Ellison 2016). Many nations are adopting the sliding scale ad valorem system. This 
thesis finds that capital losses due to distortion can be small. The royalty proceeds can be 
substituted into social welfare gains if the ad valorem royalty proceeds are wisely 
reinvested into sustainable enterprises rather than redistributing for direct consumption. 
 
 
6.2    Corporate income tax 
 
The theoretical progressivity of CIT was strong and within the effective progressivity 
boundary (Table 4.3) and captured about 70 percent of the total direct tax revenues 
compared to that of other tax instruments assessed. The theoretical NETR for CIT was 
equal to the statutory tax rate, which strongly suggests that PNG’s existing CIT design 
and the related rate have augmented its strong progressivity. The profit-based taxes 
imposed on the post-CIT base (e.g., DWT and FPE) did not affect the CIT progressivity 
compared to those imposed on the pre-tax base (e.g., APT and FPPE). This shows that 
the presence of APT and FPPE decreases the CIT progressivity and erodes revenues if 
they are imposed on the pre-tax base. Further, price and CIT rate simulations in Table 4.7 
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revealed that CIT progression coefficients consistently fell within the effective 
progressivity domain because its payment is proportional to changes in the pre-tax base.   
 
From the historical case study, the actual NETR for CIT was 20 percent, which was 
slightly lower than the statutory CIT rate of 30 percent. In some other studies, the 
Australian Minerals Council (AMC) argues that the aggregate effective tax rate for 
Australia has been 40 percent. Although AMC’s estimate was consistent with the 
theoretical NETR derived in this study, the optimal NETR cannot be achieved in real 
terms unless computations are performed under risk-neutral conditions (Slemrod 1989, 
12). According to the actual results, the claim that CIT captures rents closer to the 
theoretical effective tax rate could be flawed because mining firms do not precisely pay 
the CIT liability at the theoretical NETR (Keightley and Sherlock 2014). The actual 
NETR will be invariant to any reforms intended to cause the CIT to perform at the 
theoretical level if performance measurements are extended under risk-neutral conditions 
(Mankiw, Weinzierl and Yagan 2009). 
 
The CIT performance was influenced by production and supply cycles, and time-lag 
effects. Low prices caused the CIT to temporarily behave regressively progressive 
(negative TPIs) (Table 5.3). It neither increases nor reduces the tax burden because the 
progressive system carries the tax credits over to be offset by the next lag period through 
the LCF provision. This observation is significant for social expenditure planning for 
governments that rely on corporate profits from the extractive sector to respond by 
making appropriate financial and macroeconomic adjustments. The government could 
reduce fiscal deficits by prudent management of social and infrastructure expenditures, 
avoid excessive foreign debts to offset the deficits and use more of resource wealth fund 
savings.  
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On the other hand, investors as price takers would extract at a higher rate when prices are 
high and slow down mining (extraction) rate when prices are low. These strategies adjust 
the long-run market price and mining cost differentials that in turn readjust the 
equilibrium position. The effects of market conditions and investors’ behaviours 
influence the performance of CIT as observed from the samples of real mines 
investigated in this thesis. 
 
The CIT performance based on the Bougainville and Ok Tedi copper mines was much 
better than that of the Porgera mine. This was possibly due to the Bougainville mine 
attaining a positive tax base in the first year of production (Fig. 4.1 and 5.1), which was 
identical to the undeveloped Frieda deposit. By contrast, the Ok Tedi mine was a classic 
example in which the CIT payments were delayed for 10 years. This performance was 
predictable since the Ok Tedi mine has been a low-quality porphyry copper deposit and a 
high-cost operation. The prolonged lag period for accessing the CIT revenues had a 
differential effect on the progression coefficients, resulting in the weaker CIT 
progressivity than that of the theoretical progressivity (Figure 5.1). However, the Ok Tedi 
mine performed strongly when the mineral prices coincidentally improved between 2003 
and 2013 (Fig. 5.3), and after BHP Billiton exited the mine in 2002. To date, the Ok Tedi 
mine has generated greater CIT revenues for PNG over its three decades of operation 
than the Porgera mine did. 
 
Porgera mine’s CIT performance was expected to be strong since it has been a quality 
deposit with a low-cost operation, especially during periods of high price. However, this 
was not the case (Fig. 5.3). At the time of writing this thesis, PNG’s first Extractive 
Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) Report indicated that there were a lot of 
inconsistencies in tax data provided by the Porgera mine. The data irregularities 
complicate auditing tax compliance, and the high level of information asymmetry can be 
a sign of tax evasion (Hines Jr 2014). In another example, the Lihir gold mine (not 
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sampled in this study) has not paid CIT according to the former Mining Secretary and 
2013 EITI Report (EITI National Secretariat 2016). There is a serious resource 
governance issue associated with PNG’s gold mining sector (Bauer and Quiroz 2016). 
 
These issues are critical for highly corrupted jurisdictions with poor domestic financial 
institutions. The tax avoidance exists externally and is complex to trace using the tax 
policy framework. Since tax avoidance through profit and cost shifting are complex to 
detect and rectify, the GoPNG can make use of tax adjusting techniques such as 
depreciation technique, loss carry forward policy, thin capitalisation and tax holiday to 
protect the CIT base to make it more progressive. 
 
First, the ADB depreciation technique enhances early capital allocation (Adkins and 
Paxson 2013) in exchange for collecting more CIT revenues at the later stages of a mine 
life. The ADB technique correctly facilitates risk sharing by deferring the CIT revenues 
until investors have recovered their invested capital. The World Bank opposes the ADB 
technique because it delays the government accessing the CIT revenues (Emerson and 
Kraal 2014). However, the ADB technique regulates the timing for capital allocation and 
balances the distribution of rents and tax transfers amongst the stakeholders. Further, the 
ADB technique reduces tax credits to investors at a mature productive stage of a mining 
project, which in turn strengthens the progressivity of the profit-based tax instruments 
(Table 4.5). On the other hand, the SL depreciation technique slows down the time for 
attaining the ROR on the invested capital and at the same time reduces CIT revenues at 
the mature production stages (Section 4.2). 
 
Second, the 100 percent debt capital weakened the CIT progressivity compared to the 100 
percent equity financing of a mining project (Table 4.6). This effect was due to excessive 
interest deductions against the CIT base before instalment of the debt principal on the 
post-tax base. Presently, PNG has a 3:1 debt-to-equity ratio, which reduced the CIT 
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progressivity and the NPV (Table 4.6). As a result, the GoPNG proposed to reduce the 
thin capitalisation ceiling to 2:1 debt-to-equity ratio, which ensures mining companies are 
eligible for benefit from a 50 percent of their debt interests are tax deductible. In this 
arrangement, non-resident mining companies pay an interest withholding tax on the 
balance (if their leverage exceeded the ceiling). Hence, the 2:1 debt-to-equity ratio is an 
ideal thin capitalisation rule for PNG as it protects the CIT base and improves the 
progressivity of other profit-based tax instruments.     
  
Third, separating the non-cash depreciation expenditures for tax purposes from the 
extraction costs was identified to protect the CIT base in situations where an unlimited 
LCF policy exists (Table 4.5). Risks associated with the initial capital being invested 
diminish upon reaching the ROR on quasi-rents. Compounding the unused capital costs, 
including tax deductible interest at a risk-free rate recognises the opportunity cost of the 
capital being locked in the present investment (Boadway and Keen 2014). In that context, 
logic suggests that an uplift rate imposed on the cumulative losses after attaining the 
normal ROR could unfairly inflate the operating costs, causing over-capitalisation and 
weaken the CIT progressivity. The true neutrality can be attained only if the uplift rate on 
losses being carried forward relate to the unused depreciation allowances. 
 
Continuous compounding of cumulative losses without separating the unused 
depreciation allowances and the extraction costs accumulate tax credits to investors that 
in turn weaken the CIT progressivity as well as other profit-based tax instruments. The 
unlimited LCF provision recognises the production and tax risks that exist over the entire 
life of a mine (Hlouskova and Tsigaris 2012, 561). With resepct to that, excising the 
uplift rate on the entire cumulative losses causes underinvestment and weakens the CIT 
progressivity and that of other strongly progressive tax instruments. This thesis illustrates 
that limiting the compounding of unused depreciation allowances to the payback period 
will improve the CIT progressivity (in Table 4.5). The limited LCF provision with an 
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uplift rate applied to the unused depreciation allowance is identical to a self-adjusting tax 
concession, which offers sufficient tax credits to high-risk mining projects. 
 
Fourth, the fixed CIT holiday weakened the progressivity with a negative METR, and a 
high NPV (Table 4.5). A CIT holiday provides an artificial shelter against the second-
best neutrality over the concession period. The tax write-off over the concession period 
allows rapid recovery of the capital invested. However, changes in price, deposit quality 
and operating costs can allow an investor could make untaxed profits if the pre-tax base 
turns positive before the tax holiday period lapses. In such circumstances, tax holiday 
causes wasteful extraction and weakens the progressivity, leading to a reduction in 
revenues, although it could encourage firms to mobilise capital to high-risk investment 
destinations. 
 
Without the knowledge of communities, the GoPNG grants tax holiday on ad hoc basis 
(case by case basis). It is often instrumented under a mine development agreement, which 
is often drafted by lawyers rather than tax experts. For example, the GoPNG granted a 
ten-year CIT holiday to the Ramu Nickel mine (Nelson 2010), and a twenty-five year 
CIT holiday for the PNG liquefied natural gas (LNG) project. Although the tax break is 
an incentive to reduce initial investment risks, it discriminates against other mining and 
exploration activities that face the same level of systematic risks. PNG already has a 
flexible CIT concession system featured by limited LCF provision with an uplift rate, 
along with the accelerated depreciation on pooled pre-production capital costs, and 
amortisation of all the exploration costs (Hatcher 2012, 434-435). Since the progressive 
tax system has the ability to achieve this function, policy makers need to reconsider the 
use of tax holiday as an incentive to attract foreign direct investment in mineral 
exploration and mine development. 
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Summary, the weak progressivity of actual CIT from the three mines sampled suggest 
that PNG needs to seriously intervene with policy strategies to protect the CIT base from 
being eroded. Chen and Mintz (2015b) find that tax deductibles and other tax evasion 
tactics are the major causes of reduction in the METR. Furthermore, the 2012-2015 
Mineral Taxation Review recommended a reduction of the CIT rate from the present 30 
percent to 25 percent. However, Auerbach (2007, 167) is critical of reducing the CIT rate 
when the actual marginal tax rates have declined, which is consistent with the results of 
this study. The actual NETR for CIT has declined to 20 percent from the statutory rate. 
Thus, a further reduction in the CIT rate could cause the real NETR to decline, which 
could result in substantial losses of CIT revenues. Given these findings, PNG critically 
needs to patch up the policy loopholes to protect the tax base and strengthen the tax 
administration to make CIT more progressive. 
  
 
6.3  Dividend withholding tax 
 
The theoretical progressivity of DWT was similar to that of the CIT, as those taxes have 
the same attributes (Auerbach 1986). Figure 4.2 showed that the 10 percent DWT rate, 
being within the optimal progressivity sphere, demonstrated its ability to collect a high 
magnitude of revenues. The historical progressivity of DWT based on the Bougainville 
mine was strongly progressive, while that of the Ok Tedi mine was weak. The shift from 
a 17 to 10 percent DWT rate did not appear to affect the historical progressivity curves 
for the Ok Tedi and Porgera mines (see Fig. 5.1 and 5.2). The DWT was computed on the 
assumption that corporate decisions are made to pay dividends on all profits, although in 
practice mining firms retain much of their earnings.  
 
The distortion index for DWT was high, similar to the CIT, which affects the value of the 
firm as it was computed on a post-CIT base (Table 5.10). A major effect is that the DWT 
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affects junior firms that rely on equity capital for financing exploration activities. 
Another effect is that given PNG has a foreign-dominated mining industry, investors 
could negotiate with tax authorities for favourable incentives that allow them to retain 
profits offshore and employ complex accounting techniques that are inaccessible by tax 
authorities. This makes the use of the DWT to restrict profit repatriation ineffective. 
Moreover, the DWT could encourage a mine operator to reinvest profits in the present 
mine, especially for highly leveraged investors. Hence, where interest withholding tax 
distorts sourcing debt capital for a mine development, the DWT affects the equity capital 
for exploration activities more than operating mines. 
 
The DWT based on the Bougainville and Ok Tedi mines raised exceptionally high 
revenues since the tax curves were within the optimal progressivity boundary (Fig. 5.2). 
This reflected that there was a tendency for mining companies to pay dividends to equity 
holders from which the GoPNG raised significant DWT revenues. The results indicate 
that CIT and DWT performed within the effective progressivity boundary, thereby raising 
a higher level of tax revenues for the PNG government (Devos 2014, 8) compared to 
equity participation. 
 
 
6.4 State and community equity participation 
 
Previously, PNG had a FCE policy where the GoPNG became an ordinary shareholder in 
the former Bougainville copper mine and equity dividends were paid out of the corporate 
profits. This was the main reason why the progressivity of FCE was strong and the curves 
were parallel to that of the DWT against the Lorenz curve (Figure 5.1). In the early 
1990s, PNG made a policy shift to adopt the FPE, which was also imposed on the post-
tax base. In that arrangement, the government had to procure the equity interests using 
externally sourced capital compared to the internally arranged financial transactions 
  159  
 
  
associated with the FCE. The results of scenario analysis in Section 4.4 showed that FPE 
was better than the FCE. The FCE increased the METR to 46 percent. This result shows 
the FCE is slightly unattractive although other functional variables are identical to that of 
the FPE (Table 4.8). In both cases, if a mine operator cumulatively offsets the equivalent 
cost of FCE against positive equity cash flows (internally) and at the same time treats it 
as a tax deductible item, the progressivity of other tax instruments will be weakened. 
Further, the theoretical and historical analyses of all the equity types were found to be 
weakly progressive (Fig. 5.2 and 5.3).  
 
Presently, PNG’s taxation regime comprises of the basic tax instruments and the FPPE, 
which was identified to raise the METR and reduce the NPV (case 4, Table 4.8). It 
causes two problems. First, deadweight losses (economic inefficiency) arise due to the 
government taking away portions of the mineral outputs before they reach the market. It 
causes higher distortion to reduce a firm’s share of mineral reserves than that of royalty. 
This being the case, the weak progressivity of FPPE exposes both investor and 
government to financial risks. Thus, it becomes a wasteful extraction: deadweight loss to 
the investor and increases social cost to the government. Second, equity participation 
exposes society to risk since it contributes less revenues towards supporting sectoral 
development goals such as capital accumulation, income diversification and skills 
development (Smith and Dorward 2014). Further, due to price uncertainty and equity 
cash flows locked-in to servicing of equity debts using offshore accounts, 
macroeconomic effects such as increased foreign debts, current account deficits and 
depreciation of the currency and foreign exchange shortages have emerged strongly in 
PNG in the 2012-2016 periods (Gilberthorpe 2016). Therefore, PNG’s mineral taxation 
regime with the inclusion of the FPPE is identified to be unattractive (Table 4.8).  
 
GoPNG has maintained its policy stance by taking up equity interests at the exploration 
stage in various exploration projects. For instance, the state entered into a 30 percent 
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equity facility with Nautilus (PNG) Pty Ltd to explore for mineral deposits on the ocean 
floor of Bismarck Sea. Owning equity interests at the exploration stage can raise 
exploration capital domestically and share the risks with investors. As mentioned in 
Section 2.1, it resembles a Brownian tax in which the government can subsidise 
exploration costs so that it can amortise the subsidy costs if the mineral property 
advances into a mining project. Also, state’s direct involvement enhances fast-tracking of 
the social bargaining processes so that a mine development can occur without delays 
(e.g., Banks 2003). However, there is uncertainty associated with when the subsidy costs 
would be recouped. Thus, subsidising exploration costs using public funds in pursuit of 
future dividends diverts the attention away from meeting the social development needs of 
the country.  
 
The GoPNG reserves a 5 percent equity interest for host landholder communities to 
directly participate in mining activities (DMPGM 2014). However, Figure 4.3 showed 
that an equity interest rate less than 10 percent is not economically viable. It makes host 
communities to struggle against the financial risks as they quest to earn future dividends. 
As shown in Section 5.3, the Porgera landowners and the EPG have not benefited much 
from owning the 5 percent FPPE. The dividends were insufficient to offset the cost of 
equity (Figure 5.3). When the dividends were delayed, the EPG and the Porgera 
landowners used public funds and royalty proceeds to repay the cost of equity. They 
occasionally make funds available from other sources when a cash-call from the Mineral 
Resources Development Company (MRDC) is made to meet its management costs. 
Similarly, the Lihir landowners did not realise the dividends expected for owning about 7 
percent FPPE since 1997. As a result, they disposed the equity interests in 2012 and 
entered into spin-off business activities that led to significant capital accumulations. 
Hence, the empirical results strongly suggest that communities in PNG should not own 
equity interests in mining and exploration projects. 
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The GoPNG has pursued an inconsistent and a cyclical policy on equity participation 
with establishments and demolitions of various SOEs such as the former Oregon 
Minerals and Petromin. The same entity has been resurrected in a different name (e.g., 
Kumul Minerals Limited). The frequent changes of the SOEs dilute PNG’s long-term 
ambitions to accumulate assets, transfer knowledge and acquire entrepreneurship skills 
required for sustaining the growth of the SOEs. State equity participation entices the 
GoPNG to use social development funds to subsidise start-up and overhead costs of 
maintaining the SOEs. This thesis predicts that a prolonged recession period can increase 
the burden of subsidising the SOEs, which could force the GoPNG to disband the Kumul 
Minerals as it was the case with the former Oregon Minerals. These implications along 
with distortion to production efficiency and the prolonged lag periods of accessing the 
dividends suggest that PNG needs to rethink its equity participation policy, although it is 
politically and socially complex.  
 
As a summary, this thesis makes these recommendations due to two underlying 
conditions. First, PNG-based investors perceive that equity participation could provide a 
security against political and social disturbances (Emerson and Kraal 2014). Second, 
royalty and equity participation are complex to repeal because GoPNG owns the minerals 
while community have integenerational ownerhip rights to the land (Imbun 2013). 
Therefore, amongst the options assessed, increasing the CIT rate to 35 percent and a 4 
percent increase in the ad valorem royalty rate seems to be a suitable substitute for 
phasing out the FPPE as it increases the total government revenues by 10 percent. These 
options could raise more revenues than if the basic tax instruments are combined with the 
APT and FPPE, which is identified to be most unattractive combination according to this 
thesis. If the GoPNG chooses to maintain its policy stance on equity participation, a shift 
to the FPE type can reduce the overhead management costs and achieve a high 
performance similar to the Bougainville experience. 
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6.5 Integrating the results with the hypothesis 
 
The research explored how a balanced mineral taxation regime could be devised by 
adopting a progressive system. The thesis hypothesised that governments can collect a 
high magnitude of revenues through devising a more progressive tax system that includes 
indirect tax instruments and non-tax benefits. The hypothesis relates to the most asked 
question, which is: how much of the private profits could be transferred for public use? 
Further, the non-tax benefits are not progressive derivatives because they do not respond 
to market dynamics and changes in the tax base. Because of this complexity and in order 
to measure the entire wealth transfers, the non-tax benefits were converted into wealth 
transfer ratios (EIT and EWT rates) relative to the gross outputs (see Section 3.5). 
 
There were no indirect and non-tax benefits in the theoretical analysis and the EIT and 
EWT rates were based on the combination of strongly and weakly progressive direct tax 
instruments, which included the ad valorem royalty, the MRA levy and the SSG. The 
theoretical EIT and EWT rates for the direct tax instruments were equal (25 percent each) 
when the METR was at 45 percent (Tables 4.3 and 4.4). The other balance (50 percent) 
comprising of quasi-rents flowed to capital owners and suppliers of inputs to production. 
This shows that without external influences (e.g., profit and cost shifting), the risk, rent 
and tax revenue allocations are equitable as long as the procedures are transparently 
executed (Magno 2015). This suggest that PNG’s existing taxation regime is theoretically 
balanced (that is, without the FPPE).  
 
From the historical perspective, the EWT rates of non-tax benefits when added to that of 
the direct tax instruments exceeded the EIT rate, which was also indicated by the low 
METR and NETR (Section 5.4). These results were consistent with Mirrlees’ (1971) 
optimal model, suggesting that the historical METR and NETR were not necessarily 
required to reach their theoretical thresholds. A main reason is that investors are 
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competitive in protecting their economic rents compared to governments that do not 
efficiently use their tax systems when it comes to creating a stable mineral taxation 
policy. 
 
A mining levy introduced in the 1990s and the production-based equity participation, 
which the former was repealed along with the APT in 2002, greatly reduced the historcial 
performance. The empirical results suggest the government loses revenues through 
weakly progressive tax instruments and those that cause distortion (e.g., production levy). 
Furthermore, Ok Tedi mine’s EIT rate exceeded the EWT rate by a 1 percentage point 
compared to that of the Bougainville mine. The Porgera mine was the worst case. As can 
been seen, these are evidence of tax evasion amongst the gold mines in PNG when 
compared with the copper mines, which affected the aggregate industry level transfer 
rates.  
 
When indirect tax instruments and non-benefits were added to the direct tax instruments, 
including royalties and levies, the fiscal disparity gap created by the weakly progressive 
tax instruments was reversed. This was reflected by the aggregate EWT rate exceeded the 
EIT rate (Section 5.4). These results fulfilled the hypothesis of the thesis where 
communities can collectively bargain with the government and investors to create 
incentives for them to capture more of the quasi-rents through spin-off business activities, 
as well as direct and indirect employment opportunities created by the extraction 
activities (Filer and Macintyre 2006). In that respect, the GoPNG needs to build 
capacities like skill development and provide seed capital to encourage the communities 
to capture more of the quasi-rents instead of making policy provisions that encourage 
direct participation like stake ownership. However, a point of caution is that non-tax 
benefits cannot be a substitute for paying lower levels of direct tax revenues than the tax-
base requires. This is because the government needs revenues from the direct and indirect 
tax instruments for a fair redistribution of goods and services at the national level and to 
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diversify the resource revenues into other sectors such as agriculture to maintain 
economic stability. 
 
The main problems identified in this thesis were: geological prospectivity and the 
perception of PNG not benefiting from its resource abundance caused socio-political 
instability and the mineral taxation regime was thought to be less competitive. This has 
been exacerbated by the lack of recognising progressive tax system’s ability to raise 
revenues by adjusting to supply cycles and reducing inequality, while accepting some 
trade-offs associated with investors' expectations (Lund 2008). However, the results of 
this study shows PNG’s taxation regime is theoretically a robust system that has not been 
identified by past studies. As a result, it underwent reforms on several occasions (Daniel 
et al. 2000; McLaren and Chabal 2011) to improve the tax competitiveness by 
eliminating production levies and royalties, reduce tax rates and  restore fiscal stability. 
However, the reforms did not focus on performance-based policy reforms aimed at 
strengthening the revenue collecting potentials of the progressive tax instruments. 
 
This study resolves the knowledge gap on the robustness of PNG’s taxation regime and 
where PNG stands amongst other immature economies concerning the CIT and the 
overall tax performance. Although competitive ranking using the AETR has creditability 
issues, a past study by Otto (2009) find that PNG’s international ranking improved 
significantly from having over 70 percent AETR along with Mexico and Indonesia to a 
45 percent ranking with Zimbabwe and Navada (USA). According to this thesis, PNG’s 
theoretical METR and NETR of 45 and 40 percentages affirm that the mineral and 
hydrocarbon Tax Review in 2000 improved PNG’s global competitive ranking. The 
improvement was due to phasing out the 4 percent mining levy and the APT (McLaren 
and Chabal 2011). This study also found that PNG’s historical METR (30 percent) and 
NETR (20 percent) for the CIT to be lower than the theoretical ones, but are above the 
global average METR of 17 percent (Chen and Mintz 2015a; Swan 2012). Therefore, the 
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present taxation regime of PNG does not need a major review aside from the inefficient 
equity participation.  
 
The variations in the real METR and NETR were due to the theoretical data did not take 
into account all the risk factors such as the time lag delays accessing the revenues, 
overcapitalisation and existence of other factors caused the fiscal leakages as observed in 
the historical analysis. The lower averages of the actual TPIs, METRs and NETRs were 
the result of actions taken by mine operators in their quests to reduce risks and maximise 
profits. To counterbalance that, the government has not been proactive towards protecting 
the tax base using the recommended tax adjusting techniques (Section 6.2) to make the 
tax instruments more progressive to ensure a greater share of resource revenues are 
transferred to PNG citizens.  
 
 
6.6 Methodological implications 
 
The lack of a unified methodology for tax analysis has been blamed for contradictory 
empirical results that lead to divergent policy guidance (Lund 2009). Most optimisation 
models obtain empirical results in risk neutral settings that do not reflect the actual tax 
revenues that a mine would generate (Boadway and Keen 2014). This research has 
integrated two techniques that were unique in measuring the performance of tax 
instruments. First, neutralising the uncertainty of input variables improved the internal 
validity of the theoretical results. Second, the structural progressivity analysis enabled 
identifying the revenue collecting potential of the tax instruments and tax burden placed 
on investors. 
 
The theoretical tax models using the RO CFT and MC-CFT methods generated financial 
and tax data that mimicked the future trends. In a perfect setting where the tax base is 
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unaffected by external factors, such as profit and cost shifting, the theoretical and 
historical results should be similar. The theoretical cash flow forecasts were identical to 
the former Bougainville and the existing Ok Tedi copper mines, which suggest that the 
methodology employed was reliable. The establishment of PNG’s theoretical METR (45 
percent) and NETR (40 percent) is attributed to the reliability of the methodology, and 
suggests that reducing the uncertainty in a tax policy is significant for correct 
measurement of burden distribution and tax benefit transfers for a long life mining 
project. 
 
The deterministic DCF method lacks recognition of the probabilistic movement of input 
variables. Shortcut procedures such as inflating the prices, gross revenues and operating 
costs may not produce robust results (Mun 2006). The risk-adjusted cash flow models 
enhanced deriving reliable METRs and NETRs, as well as other variables that enhanced 
the reliable measurement of performance of various tax instruments compared to the 
AETRs. A significant observation was that the historical AETR did not significantly 
differ from the theoretical one (Tables 4.3 and 5.9). The AETR being approximately the 
same for the two case studies suggests that it does not cogently measure the distribution 
of burdens over time when compared to the METR and NETR (Gordon, Kalambokidis 
and Slemrod 2003). A high AETR on its own (without the METR and NETR) could have 
erroneously suggested that PNG’s taxation regime is unattractive. 
 
The structural progressivity approach improved the measurement of the performance of 
the tax instruments. The common use of a point-scale matrix for comparing tax systems 
only provides guidance on determining the structural design of tax systems. The static 
methods do not assess the distribution of burdens or the ability of a tax instrument to 
collect revenues. In contrast, the structural progressivity technique enabled clearly 
tracking of the tax burden distribution over the entire mine life cycle. Further, when 
compared with the traditional understanding of progressivity (Fig 2.1), the Lorenz curve 
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was a useful tool for identifying which tax instruments collected higher revenues than 
others. For instance, the study found that not all rent-based taxes collect revenues as 
expected, and not all royalties are regressive, as often featured in the mineral taxation 
literature. 
 
In both cases, integrating the theoretical and historical data enabled the parallel 
measurements of tax performances in real time. A significant implication of this approach 
was that without the historical results, the theoretical evidence would not have revealed 
the actual magnitude of tax revenues collected. Further, most stylised and hypothetical 
models tend to overestimate the tax performance, undervalue social optimality, and may 
not reflect the actual tax burden and fiscal distributions in real time. This study would 
have inaccurately indicated that investors pay tax at the theoretical METR and NETR if 
the actual tax analysis was not done. This implication would suggest that a parallel 
analysis of the theoretical and historical data generated reliable results, which in turn 
validated the theory and ensured a more balanced policy analysis in this thesis. 
 
In summary, the improved methodology enhanced the precision with which the 
functional variables were forecasted to provide a more accurate prediction of the mining 
taxes in PNG. The deviations between the theoretical and historical results were due to 
the actual risk conditions, such as mine operational uncertainties, social and political risks 
that were not represented in the theoretical models. Therefore, the gap between theory 
and practical aspects of taxation modelling still exists (Mankiw, Weinzierl and Yagan 
2009). It means that conceptual studies alone may not clearly reflect the actual tax burden 
and revenue transfers to society. The validity of the results showed that the methods 
employed were reliable for establishing the relationship between progressivity and the 
revenue collecting potentials of tax instruments within the theoretical, analytical and data 
limitations. 
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6.7 Limitations 
 
This section explains the theoretical, methodological, sampling, measurement and data 
analysis limitations encountered in this study. First, the study focused on the hypothesis 
of how tax instruments would collect revenues and distribute tax burdens and ignored 
other factors required for structural design of a tax system. Criteria such as equity, 
stability, ease of tax administration, flexibility, efficiency and neutrality are the basic 
ingredients for a balanced tax system (Sunley et al. 2012). Although these attributes were 
not considered in determining the optimal mix of tax instruments for PNG, the 
progressive system automatically possesses all these attributes as shown by the results of 
this study (Conesa and Krueger 2006). In other words, a progressive tax system 
distributes the tax burdens as desired by the second-best neutrality framework and 
reduces inequality during periods of high rents and likely to reduce instability as it swiftly 
responses to changes in the tax base. 
 
Second, the lack of data verification weakened the reliability of the results. It was 
difficult to cross-check and verify the firm-based historical data with the Internal 
Revenue Commission (IRC). Additionally, IRC’s confidentiality clause restricted 
accessing the historical data for the purpose of verifying data provided by the mining 
companies. Data anomalies, such as poor reporting, over-payments and mixing of tax 
payment data could have also affected the results. Further, the theoretical tax models 
were constructed under the assumption of 100 percent equity financing. This ignored the 
real situation where most mining companies use a combination of equity and debt capital 
arrangements to finance a mine development. 
 
Third, identifying and drawing specific inferences on tax evasive behaviour has been 
complex to capture using the structural progressivity technique. Duncan and Sabirianova 
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Peter (2012) find that there is no clear relationship between progressivity and tax evasion 
and suggest that developing countries could reduce tax evasive behaviour by adopting 
less progressive and flat taxes is against the tax revenue collection objective. However, 
tax administrators can use the structural progressivity technique to initially detect the 
existence of tax evasion during periods of high prices to impose a higher degree of tax 
audits and penalties that will encourage more tax compliance (Sandmo 2005). Tax 
evasion is becoming extremely complex to track as it involves many countries and is an 
increasing trend in the mining industry (Gumpert, Hines Jr and Schnitzer 2016). That 
said, investigating tax evasion is beyond the scope of this study. 
 
In summary, this thesis was confined to direct and indirect tax instruments, and non-tax 
benefits and ignored the efficiency of redistribution of these benefits. The performance of 
tax instruments and wealth transfer rates indicate that there are substantial financial 
benefits and physical and human capital being created at the micro level. As a result, it 
could be incorrect to make a claim that the fiscal dissipation perception experienced in 
PNG is a redistribution problem because that issue was not investigated in this study. A 
parallel case study along with this thesis could clearly identify why communities in PNG 
perceive that they are not benefiting from the exploitation of its vast mineral resources. 
However, such a broadened study could not be successfully completed due to the 
magnitude of workload and time limitations. 
 
 
6.8 Future research 
 
Further research is required to investigate how revenues collected using direct tax 
instruments and non-tax benefits are redistributed, as this may be inducing community’s 
perception that they are not benefiting from the mining activities (Avalos et al. 2015). 
Ulriksen (2014) presents the redistribution dilemmas facing Botswana’s mining industry, 
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and it is expected that a similar case could exist for PNG. Given the finding of this study, 
the perception of fiscal dissipation could be a redistribution problem, but was not 
investigated in this thesis. A further study is required to investigate the efficiency of 
PNG’s redistribution structures to identify what causes the fiscal dissipation problem. 
Such an extended study which measures both tax performance and efficiency of the 
redistribution systems will enhance devising suitable policy measures to ensure PNG 
citizens benefit from exploitation of its vast mineral endowments.     
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Chapter 7 : Conclusion 
 
The aim of this research was to investigate PNG’s progressive mineral taxation regime in 
order to draw some policy recommendations that could assist in devising a balanced tax 
system. The main gap identified in Chapter 2 was the lack of understanding in how 
progressive tax instruments collect revenues without distorting investment decision 
making. Within this gap, the three issues identified were: (a) the degree of progressivity 
of direct tax instruments; (b) how a progressive tax system works to reduce inequality; 
and (c) identifying a suitable methodology and techniques for enhancing the stochastic 
distribution of the tax base for deriving reliable results. 
 
The steps taken to investigate these issues within the main research question were guided 
by the following questions: 
 
• Can the progressive tax system augment the capacities of individual tax 
instruments to capture a higher magnitude of tax revenues for the government? 
 
• What are the theoretical and practical aspects of the progressive tax schedule that 
makes it a suitable tax system for balancing the fiscal needs of investors and 
governments? 
 
• How do the methodology and techniques impact upon the reliability of the results 
of the thesis? 
 
The overall finding of the study is that existing progressive tax instruments established by 
the 2000 Mineral and Hydrocarbon Tax Review are suitably positioned to capture a high 
magnitude of revenues from the resources sector. This funding is supported by 
identifying the theoretical METR and NETR as globally competitive, which constitute 
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the CIT, DWT and the ad valorem royalty are the main tax instruments that collect much 
of the resource revenues for PNG. The overall industry level tax performance for PNG 
(that is, 30 percent METR) was above the global average METR of 17 percent (Chen and 
Mintz 2015a; Swan 2012). To balance the effects of the tax combinations to a reasonable 
level, repealing the FPPE policy and compensating this shift by raising the ad valorem 
royalty rate and/or a shift to the FPE can reduce distortion, wasteful extraction and 
maximise revenues. 
 
There are policy areas that need improvement for making the tax instruments more 
progressive by adopting the accelerated depreciation technique, 2:1 thin capitalisation, 
discourage tax holidays, a suitable LCF policy and strengthening the capacity of tax 
administration. There is no need for tax holiday because the LCF provision within the 
progressive tax schedule provides sufficient years of tax relief, which could encourage 
investments in risky exploration and mine development. It also enhances the tax system 
to flexibly adjust to periods of low and high rents to make adjustments to risk and rent 
sharing more efficient. Further, addition of indirect taxes and non-tax benefit streams 
make up for revenue leakages from the direct tax instruments. Investors and the GoPNG 
can design incentives for communities to capture more of the quasi-rents from a mining 
operation. 
 
A key prediction of this thesis was about how a progressive tax system would distribute 
the tax burden and reduce inequality. This thesis identified an effective progressivity 
range within the range: 0.0>TPI<0.2. This range is a boundary between the Lorenz curve 
and the threshold progressivity curves marked with a progressive coefficient less than 
0.2, which is identified to be welfare enhancing (Kremer and Stähler 2016, 2). The 
individual tax instruments that fall within this domain tend to have constant progression 
coefficients and remain relatively closer to the Lorenz curve as profitability increases 
(Fig. 4.3). Depending on the cyclical progressivity, this scenario reduces inequality 
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characterised by an effective METR range between 40 percent and 45 percent, and a 40 
percent NETR. The theoretical and the historical progression coefficients, METRs and 
NETRs for PNG can be used as benchmarks for future policy analysis, reforms and 
research in mineral taxation. 
 
Making tax instruments more progressive enhances governments to have a high degree of 
confidence in a tax system’s ability to respond to high profit situations thereby reducing 
the inequality and generate greater tax revenues than flat tax systems. On the other hand, 
progressive tax system equalises the intertemporal burden distributions subject to cyclical 
progressivity under different risk conditions. A price-induced linear progressivity causes 
the progression coefficients, METR and NETR of the direct tax instruments to reach 
steady states as profitability approaches infinity. These attributes suggest that marginal 
tax rate does not always rise beyond the equilibrium limit or beyond an investor’s ability 
to pay if a mine profitability increases (Kremer and Stähler 2016). During low prices, 
progressivity of tax instruments within the limited (or unlimited) LCF provision generate 
tax credits that can be carried over to the next period. This behaviour reduces the tax 
burden that could be faced under a regressive tax system. According to this thesis, the 
CIT rate-induced strong progressivity is the only scenario, which influences the METR to 
increase rapidly that in turn discourages investment decision-making. 
 
The thesis investigated some guidelines for devising a balanced tax policy which allows 
investors to operate mines profitably so that governments can continue to tax the profits 
generated from a sustainable mining industry. From a re-distribution perspective, the 
benefits flowing to investors and governments (profits and tax revenues) depend on the 
preferential treatments given to allocation of risks and rents within the second-best 
neutrality design settings. The time-dependent rent distributions within the taxation 
framework tend to determine how much rent an investor gets for initial risk-taking and 
the share of revenue flows to a government after factor allocations. This provides a 
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broader view than most analytical results would, suggesting that equity, fairness, stability 
and other components required for a balanced tax design are the outcomes of an efficient 
redistributive tax system. The progressive tax schedule fulfills this requirement for a 
balanced tax design. 
 
The methodology took uncertainty into account when tracing Frieda deposit’s value 
creation that led to correctly predict the magnitude of tax revenues. The GBM and 
binomial lattice techniques reduced the uncertainty of the whole of life tax base, whose 
variability was adjusted by the MCS technique. The stochastic tax base accurately 
follows a time-dependent neutrality path over the mine life compared to the deterministic 
DCF method. This was revealed by revenues being delayed at the early stages of a mine 
life. Likewise, a high magnitude of revenues could be collected when risk levels decline 
at the mature production stages if tax adjusting techniques such as the ADB technique 
improve the tax base. However, some setbacks were identified when using the RO 
method. 
 
RO method’s application of a constant risk-free interest rate ignored the cyclical 
progressivity that responded to the dynamic risk conditions at different phases of a mine 
life (Lima and Suslick 2006). This problem was not recognised by Samis, Davis and 
Laughton (2007) who concluded that the use of RO methods could maximise tax 
revenues. Their prediction of RO method’s ability to maximise tax revenues was partly 
due to the constant risk-free interest rate, which assumed a mine was absolutely risk-
neutral throughout its life. However, the value creating ability of a mining project and the 
magnitude of tax revenues depend on uncertainty of commodity prices, costs and deposit 
quality and not the study methodology itself. These factors suggest that tax planners 
should cautiously distinguish the differences between theoretical and actual projections of 
revenues. For example, incorrectly predicting APT’s performance can mislead 
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governments into optimistic social expenditure appropriation and planning that could 
result in budget deficits. 
 
This study is important for some reasons. First, this thesis has applied the structural 
progressivity as an evidence-based analysis tool to measure the behaviour of progressive 
cash flow tax instruments, which has not previously been done in mineral taxation 
studies. The graphical representation of the tax curves against the Lorenz curve and 
projection of time series progression coefficients make tracking the long-term behaviours 
in terms of burden distribution and revenue collecting potentials of tax instruments more 
convenient than the traditional methods. Second, reducing the uncertainty of input 
variables (price and costs) and incorporating Monte Carlo simulation are significant for 
establishing a stochastically distributed tax base that in turn correctly predict the time-
dependent behaviour of the tax instruments and the functional variables. 
 
Third, a parallel study of theoretical and historical tax performance assists in using the 
theoretical results as benchmarks against the historical results to identify and resolve 
policy factors that erode actual tax revenues. Additionally, integrating non-tax benefits 
with the direct tax instruments, royalties and levies in the historical tax analysis captured 
most of the wealth transferred compared to single phased tax study. This approach 
effectively measures and reconciles the redistribution capacity of a tax system. 
 
Finally, the data used in this thesis were compiled by the mining companies. As a result, a 
lack of verifying the actual tax revenues paid to the GoPNG through the IRC and lack of 
auditing of non-tax benefits at the micro level could have affected the results and 
therefore the policy recommendations. The researcher hopes that future studies will 
improve the methodology explained in Chapter 3 and the underlying limitations of the 
techniques employed for analysing the performance of a progressive mineral taxation 
regime in any mineral endowed nation. 
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Appendix A: Parameter estimations for price forecasting 
 
Table A-1: Parameter estimations using historical copper prices 
Date rice (US$ LN(Price
Ln(t+1)-
Ln(t)
Recent 
12 
months φ β µ σ Median (Sm) φ β µ σ Median  (α)
5/01/1998 1694.50 7.4351 (Volatility) Long Long Long Long Long Long Short Short Short Short Short short
6/01/1998 1650.50 7.4088 -0.026 0.80% Current 8.8718 0.213 7291.7 1570.9 21.54% 7124.43 8.8786 0.1997 7321.3 1476.6 20.17% 7173.87
7/01/1998 1656.00 7.4122 0.0033 Annualise 6 months ago 8.9311 0.125 7623.3 956.79 12.55% 7563.49 8.8824 0.1064 7245.1 773.2 10.67% 7203.94
8/01/1998 1667.00 7.4188 0.0066 14.25% 1 Year ago 8.8792 0.2314 7376.2 1729.8 23.45% 7176.10 8.9763 0.0423 7920.3 335.45 4.24% 7913.19
9/01/1998 1645.00 7.4055 -0.013
12/01/1998 1629.00 7.3957 -0.01 Compound Annual Rate of Growth
13/01/1998 1642.00 7.4037 0.0079 -0.72%
14/01/1998 1681.00 7.4271 0.0235
15/01/1998 1657.00 7.4128 -0.014
16/01/1998 1709.50 7.444 0.0312 1. The symbols and equations are defined in Table 3.1
19/01/1998 1683.00 7.4283 -0.016 2. Highlighted parameters are the ones used in Table 3.2
20/01/1998 1677.00 7.4248 -0.004 3. Prices are lognormally distributed (LN (price) that is useful for computing the volatility
21/01/1998 1693.00 7.4343 0.0095
22/01/1998 1689.50 7.4322 -0.002
23/01/1998 1709.00 7.4437 0.0115
26/01/1998 1739.00 7.4611 0.0174  
Price sourced from LME: available www.lme.com 
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Time 0 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035
Step 0 80640 80680 80720 80760 80800 80840 80880 80920 80960 81000 81040 81080 81120 81160 81200 81240 81280 81320 81360 81400
1253 1298 1344 1392 1442 1494 1547 1603 1660 1719 1781 1845 1911 1979 2050 2123 2199 2278 2360 2444 2532
1210 1253 1298 1344 1392 1442 1494 1547 1603 1660 1719 1781 1845 1911 1979 2050 2123 2199 2278 2360
1168 1210 1253 1298 1344 1392 1442 1494 1547 1603 1660 1719 1781 1845 1911 1979 2050 2123 2199
1128 1168 1210 1253 1298 1344 1392 1442 1494 1547 1603 1660 1719 1781 1845 1911 1979 2050
1089 1128 1168 1210 1253 1298 1344 1392 1442 1494 1547 1603 1660 1719 1781 1845 1911
1051 1089 1128 1168 1210 1253 1298 1344 1392 1442 1494 1547 1603 1660 1719 1781
1015 1051 1089 1128 1168 1210 1253 1298 1344 1392 1442 1494 1547 1603 1660
980 1015 1051 1089 1128 1168 1210 1253 1298 1344 1392 1442 1494 1547
946 980 1015 1051 1089 1128 1168 1210 1253 1298 1344 1392 1442
913 946 980 1015 1051 1089 1128 1168 1210 1253 1298 1344
882 913 946 980 1015 1051 1089 1128 1168 1210 1253
851 882 913 946 980 1015 1051 1089 1128 1168
822 851 882 913 946 980 1015 1051 1089
793 822 851 882 913 946 980 1015
766 793 822 851 882 913 946
739 766 793 822 851 882
714 739 766 793 822
689 714 739 766
665 689 714
642 665
620
Expected gold price 1253 1254 1255 1257 1259 1262 1265 1269 1274 1279 1284 1290 1297 1304 1312 1320 1329 1338 1348 1359 1370
Risk-discount factor 0.998 0.996 0.994 0.992 0.990 0.988 0.986 0.984 0.982 0.980 0.978 0.976 0.974 0.972 0.970 0.969 0.967 0.965 0.963 0.961
Risk-adjusted forward price 1251 1250 1249 1249 1249 1250 1252 1254 1256 1259 1262 1266 1270 1275 1281 1287 1293 1300 1308 1316
MCS -Stochastic Price 1253 1233 1111 1224 1384 1320 1495 1347 1404 1170 1188 1298 1299 1114 1204 1252 1256 1237 1307 1373 1136  
 
Figure A-1: Gold price forecast using the binomial lattice and MCS techniques 
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Time 0 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035
Step 0 40320 40340 40360 40380 40400 40420 40440 40460 40480 40500 40520 40540 40560 40580 40600 40620 40640 40660 40680 40700
10.12 10.12 10.58 11.07 11.57 12.10 12.65 13.23 13.84 14.47 15.13 15.82 16.55 17.30 18.09 18.92 19.79 20.69 21.64 22.63 23.66 24.74
9.68 10.12 10.58 11.07 11.57 12.10 12.65 13.23 13.84 14.47 15.13 15.82 16.55 17.30 18.09 18.92 19.79 20.69 21.64 22.63
9.25 9.68 10.12 10.58 11.07 11.57 12.10 12.65 13.23 13.84 14.47 15.13 15.82 16.55 17.30 18.09 18.92 19.79 20.69
8.85 9.25 9.68 10.12 10.58 11.07 11.57 12.10 12.65 13.23 13.84 14.47 15.13 15.82 16.55 17.30 18.09 18.92
8.46 8.85 9.25 9.68 10.12 10.58 11.07 11.57 12.10 12.65 13.23 13.84 14.47 15.13 15.82 16.55 17.30
8.09 8.46 8.85 9.25 9.68 10.12 10.58 11.07 11.57 12.10 12.65 13.23 13.84 14.47 15.13 15.82
7.74 8.09 8.46 8.85 9.25 9.68 10.12 10.58 11.07 11.57 12.10 12.65 13.23 13.84 14.47
7.40 7.74 8.09 8.46 8.85 9.25 9.68 10.12 10.58 11.07 11.57 12.10 12.65 13.23
7.08 7.40 7.74 8.09 8.46 8.85 9.25 9.68 10.12 10.58 11.07 11.57 12.10
6.77 7.08 7.40 7.74 8.09 8.46 8.85 9.25 9.68 10.12 10.58 11.07
6.47 6.77 7.08 7.40 7.74 8.09 8.46 8.85 9.25 9.68 10.12
6.19 6.47 6.77 7.08 7.40 7.74 8.09 8.46 8.85 9.25
5.92 6.19 6.47 6.77 7.08 7.40 7.74 8.09 8.46
5.66 5.92 6.19 6.47 6.77 7.08 7.40 7.74
5.41 5.66 5.92 6.19 6.47 6.77 7.08
5.18 5.41 5.66 5.92 6.19 6.47
4.95 5.18 5.41 5.66 5.92
4.73 4.95 5.18 5.41
4.53 4.73 4.95
4.33 4.53
4.14
Cost Forecast (US$/t) 10.12 10.13 10.15 10.17 10.20 10.24 10.28 10.33 10.39 10.46 10.53 10.61 10.70 10.79 10.89 11.00 11.12 11.24 11.38 11.52 11.67
Risk Discount Factor 0.00 0.998 0.996 0.994 0.992 0.990 0.988 0.986 0.984 0.982 0.980 0.978 0.976 0.974 0.972 0.970 0.969 0.967 0.965 0.963 0.961
Risk adjusted forward opex 10.12 10.11 10.11 10.11 10.12 10.14 10.16 10.19 10.23 10.27 10.32 10.38 10.44 10.51 10.59 10.68 10.77 10.87 10.98 11.09 11.21
MCS - (US$/t Cu) 10.00 9.97 11.13 11.69 10.53 9.65 9.80 10.25 10.94 11.48 10.04 10.47 9.89 11.32 13.54 10.53 11.36 11.62 9.73 9.92 15.29  
 
Figure A-2: Operating cost forecast using the binomial lattice and MCS techniques 
  193  
 
  
Appendix B: Financial and tax data derived from the theoretical CFT models 
 
Table B-1: Financial data estimates derived from the RO CFT model 
Production Copper Gold Price Gross Revenue Tax-Base
Year Copper (t) Gold (Oz) Price (US$/t) US$/Oz (US$) (US$)
2016 -6,480,000,000 -6,480,000,000
2017 253,865 300,518 6,546 1,253 2,038,442,637 913,163,777
2018 257,516 304,840 6,608 1,272 2,089,336,759 775,158,857
2019 251,135 297,286 6,657 1,203 2,029,381,487 756,608,663
2020 253,517 300,106 6,696 1,196 2,056,362,994 820,828,312
2021 250,286 296,281 6,726 1,250 2,053,735,037 828,643,195
2022 259,307 306,961 6,749 1,238 2,130,171,960 959,112,817
2023 259,249 306,891 6,767 1,192 2,120,268,479 1,005,832,171
2024 249,943 295,875 6,781 1,269 2,070,417,154 943,380,531
2025 257,409 274,242 6,792 1,321 2,110,597,072 903,590,025
2026 252,805 269,337 6,800 1,311 2,072,205,202 980,011,285
2027 253,903 270,507 6,806 1,380 2,101,447,046 1,166,351,053
2028 254,146 270,765 6,811 1,213 2,059,433,089 1,040,271,139
2029 258,065 274,941 6,815 1,292 2,113,840,904 1,128,087,681
2030 253,392 269,962 6,817 1,259 2,067,340,984 1,091,029,200
2031 257,732 274,586 6,819 1,295 2,113,164,200 1,188,624,481
2032 256,736 273,525 6,821 1,426 2,141,232,508 1,149,833,936
2033 256,236 272,993 6,822 1,383 2,125,632,587 1,163,665,577
2034 252,616 269,135 6,823 1,406 2,102,017,443 1,160,391,709
2035 256,930 273,732 6,824 1,329 2,117,119,461 1,273,468,057
2036 255,733 272,457 6,824 1,386 2,122,814,634 1,188,732,415
Total 5,100,520 5,674,941 41,834,961,636 20,436,784,881
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Table B-2: Royalty and tax estimates from the RO CF model 
Ad Valorem RoyalMRA Levy SSG CIT DWT S/Equity Royalty & Total Direct Total Gov
Year (NSR based) Free Carried Levies Taxes Income
2016 0 0 0 -1944000000
2017 40,762,655          5,095,332     15,285,996   178,918,124     34,602,555      -                   61,143,983      225,783,955      286,927,937      
2018 41,780,130          5,222,516     15,667,549   226,187,479     43,744,392      -                   62,670,196      285,435,048      348,105,244      
2019 40,581,575          5,072,697     15,218,091   220,774,625     42,697,553      -                   60,872,363      278,604,351      339,476,714      
2020 41,120,332          5,140,042     15,420,125   239,513,597     46,321,648      -                   61,680,498      302,251,812      363,932,310      
2021 41,067,407          5,133,426     15,400,278   241,793,941     46,762,664      -                   61,601,111      305,129,469      366,730,580      
2022 42,598,027          5,324,753     15,974,260   279,864,324     54,125,431      -                   63,897,040      353,172,012      417,069,052      
2023 42,399,675          5,299,959     15,899,878   293,496,798     56,761,936      -                   63,599,513      370,375,378      433,974,891      
2024 41,400,852          5,175,106     15,525,319   275,273,722     53,237,614      -                   62,101,278      347,378,947      409,480,224      
2025 42,206,825          5,275,853     15,827,559   263,663,051     50,992,124      -                   63,310,238      332,726,976      396,037,214      
2026 41,439,070          5,179,884     15,539,651   285,962,393     55,304,791      -                   62,158,605      360,867,409      423,026,014      
2027 42,023,850          5,252,981     15,758,944   340,335,406     65,820,467      -                   63,035,775      429,482,894      492,518,669      
2028 41,183,205          5,147,901     15,443,702   303,545,917     58,705,424      -                   61,774,807      383,056,763      444,831,570      
2029 42,271,715          5,283,964     15,851,893   396,347,966     76,653,231      -                   63,407,573      721,180,487      784,588,060      
2030 41,341,548          5,167,694     15,503,081   383,327,654     74,135,118      -                   62,012,322      697,489,196      759,501,518      
2031 42,257,888          5,282,236     15,846,708   417,617,268     80,766,689      177,292,731     63,386,832      937,174,074      1,000,560,906    
2032 42,818,676          5,352,335     16,057,004   403,988,404     78,130,883      171,506,815     64,228,014      906,589,568      970,817,582      
2033 42,507,186          5,313,398     15,940,195   408,848,082     79,070,738      173,569,914     63,760,780      917,495,161      981,255,941      
2034 42,034,491          5,254,311     15,762,934   407,697,825     78,848,280      173,081,591     63,051,737      914,913,872      977,965,608      
2035 42,337,562          5,292,195     15,876,586   447,426,634     86,531,785      189,947,821     63,506,342      1,004,069,213    1,067,575,556    
2036 42,451,080          5,306,385     15,919,155   417,655,190     80,774,023      177,308,831     63,676,620      937,259,175      1,000,935,796    
Total 836,583,751        104,572,969 313,718,906 6,432,238,403  1,243,987,346  1,062,707,703  1,254,875,626  11,010,435,760  12,265,311,386  
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Table B-3: Financial data estimates derived from the RO-MCS CFT model 
          
 
Free CF Tax-Base CF Post-Tax 
Year 
Copper 
(t) 
Gold 
(Oz) (US$) (Pre-tax CF) CF (US$) 
2016 
  
-6,480,000,000 -6,480,000,000 -6,480,000,000 
2017 253,865 300,518 2,001,378,145 818,787,914 -3,948,891,475 
2018 257,516 304,840 2,107,313,744 854,142,482 655,388,693 
2019 251,135 297,286 2,068,711,083 738,541,388 867,122,436 
2020 253,517 300,106 2,021,201,204 857,850,525 900,405,204 
2021 250,286 296,281 2,100,677,033 825,740,406 858,854,357 
2022 259,307 306,961 2,161,692,259 1,004,787,320 926,465,550 
2023 259,249 306,891 2,126,378,767 1,091,786,959 949,099,246 
2024 249,943 295,875 1,991,190,655 927,421,773 845,706,083 
2025 257,409 274,242 2,120,674,626 832,870,621 764,288,513 
2026 252,805 269,337 2,086,588,357 849,765,354 770,877,594 
2027 253,903 270,507 2,068,501,052 1,354,798,076 914,488,428 
2028 254,146 270,765 2,048,950,259 1,101,433,815 885,480,538 
2029 258,065 274,941 2,087,962,377 1,133,766,762 891,874,093 
2030 253,392 269,962 2,080,839,714 1,049,103,616 817,747,591 
2031 257,732 274,586 2,160,099,347 1,219,480,989 920,542,158 
2032 256,736 273,525 2,149,412,743 1,348,214,639 988,750,196 
2033 256,236 272,993 2,133,276,618 1,173,526,955 872,216,502 
2034 252,616 269,135 2,069,111,303 1,060,079,597 793,888,113 
2035 256,930 273,732 2,126,494,023 1,321,810,266 945,696,526 
2036 255,733 272,457 2,190,521,201 1,212,604,061 896,457,841 
Total 5,100,520 5,674,941 41,900,974,511 20,776,513,518 12,516,458,187 
 
Note: These data will vary from the ones used for computing the progression coefficients and other 
variables because MCS template is active and values change recursively. 
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Table B-4: Royalty and tax estimates derived from the RO-MCS CFT model 
NSR MRA Levy SSG CIT Profit-based S/Equity Paid equity DDW APT Total Direct
Year Royalty Royalty Free Carried Production Taxes
2016 -1944000000
2017 40,762,655 5,095,332 15,285,996 238,918,219 16,375,758 0 0 46,206,503 0 301,500,480
2018 41,780,130 5,222,516 15,667,549 249,234,505 17,082,850 0 0 48,201,660 0 314,519,016
2019 40,581,575 5,072,697 15,218,091 215,502,684 14,770,828 0 0 41,677,966 0 271,951,478
2020 41,120,332 5,140,042 15,420,125 250,316,494 17,157,010 0 0 48,410,916 0 315,884,420
2021 41,067,407 5,133,426 15,400,278 240,946,922 16,514,808 0 0 46,598,851 0 304,060,581
2022 42,598,027 5,324,753 15,974,260 293,191,916 20,095,746 0 0 56,702,972 0 369,990,634
2023 42,399,675 5,299,959 15,899,878 318,577,976 21,835,739 0 0 61,612,606 0 402,026,321
2024 41,400,852 5,175,106 15,525,319 270,617,036 18,548,435 0 0 52,337,017 0 341,502,489
2025 42,206,825 5,275,853 15,827,559 243,027,483 16,657,412 0 0 47,001,230 0 306,686,125
2026 41,439,070 5,179,884 15,539,651 247,957,281 16,995,307 0 0 47,954,647 0 312,907,235
2027 42,023,850 5,252,981 15,758,944 395,323,305 27,095,962 0 244,386,636 76,455,062 0 743,260,965
2028 41,183,205 5,147,901 15,443,702 386,983,264 22,028,676 0 198,682,809 74,842,108 220286763 902,823,621
2029 42,271,715 5,283,964 15,851,893 398,343,283 22,675,335 0 244,086,481 77,039,123 226753352 968,897,574
2030 41,341,548 5,167,694 15,503,081 368,597,310 20,982,072 183,655,575 254,631,507 71,286,286 209820723 1,108,973,474
2031 42,257,888 5,282,236 15,846,708 428,458,548 24,389,620 175,282,934 190,969,244 82,863,380 243896198 1,145,859,923
2032 42,818,676 5,352,335 16,057,004 473,688,472 26,964,293 176,655,563 220,168,602 91,610,794 269642928 1,258,730,652
2033 42,507,186 5,313,398 15,940,195 412,312,828 23,470,539 159,049,532 179,066,701 79,740,816 234705391 1,088,345,808
2034 42,034,491 5,254,311 15,762,934 372,453,666 21,201,592 210,228,793 228,560,242 72,032,101 212015919 1,116,492,313
2035 42,337,562 5,292,195 15,876,586 464,411,428 26,436,205 202,991,776 208,041,106 89,816,624 264362053 1,256,059,192
2036 42,451,080 5,306,385 15,919,155 426,042,374 24,252,081 186,656,085 219,882,845 82,396,094 242520812 1,181,750,292
Total 836,583,751 104,572,969 313,718,906 6,694,904,995 415,530,270 1,294,520,259 2,188,476,173 1,294,786,756 2,124,004,140 14,012,222,592  
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Appendix C: Historical financial and tax data derived from samples of mines in 
PNG 
Table C-1: Financial data from the Bougainville mine (Millions PNGK 1972-1988) 
Free Cash Pre-tax Post-Tax
Year Copper (t) gold (Oz) Silver (Oz) Flow CF CF
1972 95,900            10,702        10,837                   -                        535,714,286-         -                     
1973 189,468          15,256        21,514                   95,900,000           28,100,000           27,700,000         
1974 201,211          14,417        20,997                   252,200,000         145,800,000         158,400,000       
1975 185,237          12,260        15,317                   292,600,000         171,600,000         114,600,000       
1976 186,261          12,276        16,679                   193,100,000         56,300,000           46,200,000         
1977 209,981          12,070        17,798                   208,900,000         60,300,000           41,300,000         
1978 251,058          12,701        17,349                   205,300,000         42,300,000           28,500,000         
1979 211,486          10,336        14,087                   225,100,000         59,700,000           48,000,000         
1980 192,012          7,546          8,198                     343,100,000         158,300,000         83,900,000         
1981 216,323          9,448          10,925                   338,700,000         120,100,000         71,500,000         
1982 249,856          9,043          11,538                   296,400,000         42,300,000           22,800,000         
1983 303,992          9,417          11,458                   283,200,000         31,800,000           11,200,000         
1984 252,278          7,321          8,362                     392,900,000         117,800,000         54,600,000         
1985 291,307          7,854          7,850                     310,900,000         29,600,000           11,600,000         
1986 280,923          7,919          9,045                     317,600,000         48,500,000           28,100,000         
1987 282,211          7,716          8,088                     342,700,000         71,700,000           45,300,000         
1988 26,325            727             727                        415,400,000         138,500,000         90,500,000         
1989 41,596            3,176          3,608                     493,400,000         204,700,000         108,600,000       
1990 -              -                          -                        -                        -                      
Total 3,667,426       170,183      214,375                  5,007,400,000       1,527,400,000       992,800,000       
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Table C-2: Royalty and tax data from the former Bougainville mine (PNGK) 
Year NSR Royalty* CIT DWT APT Equity Div Total GoPNG
1972 3,800,000          - 1,222,222     - 11,000,000   16,022,222       
1973 3,800,000          300,000            9,044,444     - 81,400,000   94,544,444       
1974 3,800,000          49,100,000       8,166,667     17,400,000 73,500,000   151,966,667     
1975 3,800,000          12,400,000       2,966,667     - 26,700,000   45,866,667       
1976 3,800,000          20,300,000       2,966,667     - 26,700,000   53,766,667       
1977 3,800,000          13,700,000       2,377,778     - 21,400,000   41,277,778       
1978 3,800,000          22,000,000       4,455,556     - 40,100,000   70,355,556       
1979 3,800,000          57,500,000       11,877,778   20,400,000 106,900,000 200,477,778     
1980 3,800,000          39,600,000       8,911,111     11,600,000 80,200,000   144,111,111     
1981 3,800,000          20,600,000       2,233,333     - 20,100,000   46,733,333       
1982 3,800,000          17,300,000       1,111,111     - 10,000,000   32,211,111       
1983 3,800,000          46,900,000       5,788,889     - 52,100,000   108,588,889     
1984 3,800,000          15,200,000       1,777,778     - 16,000,000   36,777,778       
1985 3,800,000          19,000,000       4,958,824     - 28,100,000   55,858,824       
1986 3,800,000          28,700,000       4,900,000     - 44,100,000   81,500,000       
1987 3,800,000          50,600,000       11,407,147   - 93,200,000   159,007,147     
1988 3,800,000          70,000,000       13,399,067   23,200,000 108,300,000 218,699,067     
1989 3,800,000          25,700,000       - - 29,500,000       
1990 -                     6,000,000         -                -               6,000,000         
Total 68,400,000        514,900,000     97,565,038   72,600,000  839,800,000  1,593,265,038  
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Table C-3: Financial data for the Porgera gold mine (Millions PNGK 1990 – 2013) 
Gold Silver Free Cash Tax-base Post-Tax
Year (Oz) (Oz) Total gross exports Cash Flow Cash Flow
647,058,823.53-  
1990       265,890 224,227            91,857,555        20,891,937           19,741,761 
1991    1,216,101 593,312          426,893,680        47,716,460           42,117,700 
1992    1,485,077 139,619          492,868,936      166,341,152         159,902,774 
1993    1,156,670 129,860          411,069,164      245,277,988         181,289,777 
1994    1,032,768 133,890          405,765,609      178,724,058         106,700,193 
1995       848,870 90,770          417,962,487      226,852,739         114,750,700 
1996       854,822 106,535          442,263,452      192,167,699           98,666,926 
1997       712,693 100,479          336,637,249      129,372,383           28,290,668 
1998       726,806 91,614          449,310,098      266,383,912         212,650,992 
1999       754,754 100,694          516,951,181      242,771,210         177,188,929 
2000       910,434 110,276          702,753,670      298,904,046         216,713,648 
2001       760,622 113,043          701,033,252      339,663,331         264,620,137 
2002       641,811 126,772          780,464,416      277,704,753         205,180,955 
2003       851,920 164,691       1,086,612,526      324,241,118         200,765,193 
2004    1,019,746 185,336       1,296,237,836      487,248,758         316,608,980 
2005       867,925 157,740       1,178,606,063      383,302,155         228,228,851 
2006       523,358 104,238          915,432,548      336,089,079         248,976,803 
2007       513,177 79,561       1,050,619,029      482,275,519         369,224,854 
2008       632,603 90,610       1,465,666,202      706,641,743         523,661,298 
2009       572,595 94,764       1,510,789,753      674,817,234         438,993,896 
2010       527,399 100312       1,317,772,441      515,262,078         299,213,171 
2011       519,946 106150       1,817,217,959   1,068,717,739         608,590,931 
2012       448,316 91789       1,560,789,567      851,506,360         565,727,136 
2013       448,173 92105       1,551,033,510 719789688.7 -      628,335,884 
TOTAL  18,292,476  3,328,387     20,926,608,183   9,182,663,140      5,627,806,273 
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Table C-4: Tax data for the Porgera mine (Millions PNGK) 
 
 
 
 
  
 NSR Income Customs, Fuel Community & Total Total Royalty Total
Year Royalty Tax and execrise EPG Equity Direct taxes Exc & Duties GoPNG
1990        1,150,176                       -                       -                          -          1,150,176 2,300,352         
1991        5,598,760                       -                       -                          -          5,598,760 11,197,520       
1992        6,438,378                       -                       -                          -          6,438,378 12,876,756       
1993        5,117,283         34,814,623        7,613,538         42,428,161      12,730,821 102,704,427     
1994        5,030,785         46,006,979        4,755,477         50,762,456        9,786,262 116,341,959     
1995        5,391,524         75,254,720      14,737,296         89,992,016      20,128,820 205,504,376     
1996        7,429,566         58,125,949      10,254,719         68,380,668      17,684,285 161,875,188     
1997        6,639,116         52,639,133      10,337,976     18,000,000         80,977,109      16,977,092 185,570,427     
1998        9,701,000         14,419,914      11,639,602         26,059,516      21,340,602 83,160,634       
1999      11,547,250           6,077,953      27,279,031         33,356,984      38,826,281 117,087,499     
2000      14,698,079           7,046,897      27,335,275       5,000,000         39,382,172      42,033,354 135,495,777     
2001      14,552,212         10,611,330      31,060,982     12,000,000         32,449,652      45,613,194 146,287,370     
2002      15,715,840           1,406,577      24,995,958       2,000,000         25,589,381      40,711,798 110,419,554     
2003      21,945,267         26,001,444      28,064,713       4,000,000         58,066,157      50,009,980 188,087,561     
2004      25,946,925         57,806,487      25,036,853     10,000,000         92,843,340      50,983,778 262,617,382     
2005      23,483,964         50,649,757      21,795,340     12,000,000         84,445,097      45,279,304 237,653,463     
2006      18,308,651           1,367,713      21,818,610       9,000,000         32,186,323      40,127,261 122,808,558     
2007      20,953,462         32,029,181      18,043,261         50,072,442      38,996,723 160,095,069     
2008      29,945,588         86,995,283        7,412,926         94,408,209      37,358,514 256,120,520     
2009      30,349,259       137,681,216        7,361,273       145,042,489      37,710,532 358,144,769     
2010      35,158,736       123,755,529        4,423,744       128,179,273      39,582,480 331,099,762     
2011      38,206,906       341,797,868        7,433,316       349,231,184      45,640,222 782,309,496     
2012      27,455,324       189,601,732        6,290,585       195,892,317      33,745,909 452,985,867     
2013        3,091,466                       -          3,091,466 6,182,932         
TOTAL    383,855,517    1,330,054,472    317,690,475     72,000,000    1,719,744,947    701,545,992 4,524,891,404  
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Table C-5: Total benefit redistributions to Enga communities (Millions PNGK)
Mining Direct Taxes Special support Total CompensationDonationsHuman capital Infras Business TOTAL
Year Royalty (a ) Levy (b) & Equity Div. (c)Grant  (d  ) Indirect Taxes (e ( f ) ( g) Dev. (h ) Dev. (i) Dev. (PNG) (j)
1990 1.15       -                  0.70 -                  -             -         0.64   108.47       111    
1991 5.60       -                  3.08 -                  -             -         2.00            0.64   108.47       120    
1992 6.44       -                  3.14 -                  -             -         2.36            0.64   108.47       121    
1993 5.12       -         205                 3.54 30                   -             -         4.71            0.64   108.47       358    
1994 5.03       -         27                    3.25 12                   11.20         1.92       3.97            0.64   108.47       174    
1995 5.39       -         57                    1.58 25                   5.48            0.59       7.62            0.64   108.47       212    
1996 7.43       1.64       39                    5.92 23                   4.56            0.79       4.78            0.64   108.47       196    
1997 6.64       1.25       48                    3.50 22                   3.31            0.73       5.64            17.30 108.47       217    
1998 9.70       1.30       31                    3.59 26                   2.87            1.69       29.08         18.11 108.47       232    
1999 11.55     1.07       26                    3.00 47                   5.15            1.44       4.95            18.34 108.47       226    
2000 14.70     1.41       39                    3.00 47                   4.15            1.67       4.20            18.56 108.47       242    
2001 14.55     0.70       29                    1.80 53                   7.05            2.84       3.75            16.59 108.47       237    
2002 15.72     1.19       30                    1.80 50                   7.62            2.12       4.48            18.73 108.47       240    
2003 21.95     2.78       71                    0.95 59                   6.16            1.20       5.03            23.54 108.47       299    
2004 25.95     4.39       116                 3.50 61                   3.90            5.77       4.25            23.99 108.47       356    
2005 23.48     3.91       106                 2.70 63                   7.78            5.45       8.48            23.92 108.47       353    
2006 18.31     1.52       45                    50.80 63                   8.34            2.01       8.17            31.33 108.47       337    
2007 20.95     2.96       71                    6.30 72                   6.83            2.77       5.95            32.93 108.47       330    
2008 29.95     5.82       140                 6.50 52                   6.97            1.42       7.53            32.70 108.47       391    
2009 30.35     5.51       132                 5.50 62                   7.24            1.76       8.32            30.27 108.47       392    
2010 35.16     4.95       119                 0.00 65                   6.91            1.70       9.18            27.83 108.47       378    
2011 38.21     13.67     328                 0.00 78                   5.23            1.81       11.40         24.01 108.47       609    
2012 27.46     7.58       182                 0.00 76                   9.19            1.70       6.34            24.82 108.47       444    
2013 30.91     -         -                  0.00 89                   10.40         1.10       7.43            21.55 108.47       269    
Total 412        62           1,841              114               1,074              130             40           160             409    2,603         6,845  
 
Notes: 
a) Royalty rate changed from 1.25 percent (1972-1996) to 2 percent NSR (1997-2013). The proceeds are 
distributed to EPG (50 percent); PDA (5 percent); Special Mining Lease Landholders (15 percent); 
Children’s Trust Fund (10 percent); Porgera Landholder Association (12 percent); and Young Adults (8 
percent) 
(b) CIT data for Porgera was contaminated with the inclusion of the Mining Levy. Based on the 
assumption of the 4 percent levy component was separated in order to calculate the METR. 
(c) Direct tax comprises of CIT and equity dividends and there no indications of PJV paid DWT 
(d) SSG was paid to the EPG, of which 50 percent was distributed to the Porgera Development Authority 
to improve infrastructure and livelihood in the region. No SSG data available in the 2010-2013 periods.  
(e) Indirect taxes comprise of payroll salary taxes, dividend withholding taxes; and SSG (but note that 
SSG is separated) 
(f) Compensations comprise of occupation fees, riverine tailings are disposed into Porgera and Kaiya 
rivers; general compensation; community asset and relocation; and occupation fees. 
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 (g) Donations upon request to the Porgera Joint Venture (PJV) 
(h) Human capital comprised of internal skills driven training and general education to PNG, including 
Programs and Engans 
(i) Infrastructure comprise of Tax Credit Scheme (0.75 percent of CIT); Infrastructure development 
program (IDP); and community projects such as schools; social and health services; water supply and 
feeder roads within Porgera-Paiala 
(j) Business development comprised of direct contracts awarded to Programs, Engans, and rest of PNG 
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Table C-6: Non-tax benefit redistributions from Porgera mine (PNGK Millions) 
Year ROYALTY TO SSG TO EPGCompensation Donations Human Capital Equity Dividends Business Dev. Infras TOTAL
HOST COMM & EPG PDA (a ) Dev. (50% of total) (b)EPG & Porgeran LO (c)Enga & Porgera (d)
1990 1.15                       1 0 -         0.73                          -                            54.47                 0.70   58         
1991 5.60                       3 0 -         0.80                          -                            54.47                 3.08   67         
1992 6.44                       3 0 -         1.24                          -                            54.47                 3.14   68         
1993 5.12                       4 0 -         1.37                          -                            54.47                 3.54   68         
1994 5.03                       3 11.20 1.92       1.58                          -                            54.47                 3.25   81         
1995 5.39                       2 5.48 0.59       1.15                          -                            54.47                 1.58   70         
1996 7.43                       6 4.56 0.79       1.91                          -                            54.47                 5.92   81         
1997 6.64                       4 3.31 0.73       2.08                          18                              54.47                 20.16 109       
1998 9.70                       4 2.87 1.69       1.78                          -                            54.47                 21.06 95         
1999 11.55                     3 5.15 1.44       1.51                          -                            54.47                 20.70 98         
2000 14.70                     3 4.15 1.67       1.56                          5                                54.47                 20.92 105       
2001 14.55                     2 7.05 2.84       1.93                          12                              54.47                 17.75 113       
2002 15.72                     2 7.62 2.12       2.24                          2                                54.47                 19.89 106       
2003 21.95                     1 6.16 1.20       1.86                          4                                54.47                 23.85 114       
2004 25.95                     4 3.90 5.77       3.65                          10                              54.47                 26.85 134       
2005 23.48                     3 7.78 5.45       3.05                          12                              54.47                 25.99 135       
2006 18.31                     51 8.34 2.01       2.45                          9                                54.47                 81.49 227       
2007 20.95                     6 6.83 2.77       3.24                          -                            54.47                 38.59 133       
2008 29.95                     7 6.97 1.42       3.57                          -                            54.47                 38.57 141       
2009 30.35                     6 7.24 1.76       3.83                          -                            54.47                 35.14 138       
2010 35.16                     0 6.91 1.70       3.67                          -                            54.47                 27.19 129       
2011 38.21                     0 5.23 1.81       2.46                          -                            54.47                 23.37 126       
2012 27.46                     0 9.19 1.70       2.48                          -                            54.47                 24.19 119       
2013 30.91                     0 10.40 1.10       -                            -                            54.47                 20.91 118       
TOTAL 412                        114           130                40           50                              72                              1,307                  508     2,634    
Notes: 
(a) SSG funds are levied on the gross to host provinces. Enga Provincial Government shares the SSG 
fund with the Porgera Development Authority to deliver infrastructure and social services in Porgera 
(b) A 50 percent of the total expenditures on skills driven human capital development benefited the 
Porgera, and Enga Province 
(c) Enga Provincial Government and Porgera Landowners own 5 percent equity in the Porgera mine. 
They share the equity, each holding of 2.5 percent 
(d) An average value was calculated for the business development data was provided time series data 
format.  
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Table C-7: Financial data for the Ok Tedi mine (1982-2013) (Millions PNG K) 
 
Note: Royalties represent the amount paid to Porgera entities and communities only. 
 
 
 Year Royalty SSG TO PDADonation Compensation Human Capital Equity DividendsBusiness Dev InfrasDev. Total
Porgera (50% of total)(50% to Host) Dev. (25% of totalPorgera LO Porgera Porgera Region
1990 0.26          0.35            -             -                0.36                    -                   31.83           0.64              33      
1991 1.29          1.54            -             -                0.40                    -                   31.83           0.64              36      
1992 1.48          1.57            -             -                0.62                    -                   31.83           0.64              36      
1993 1.18          1.77            -             -                0.69                    -                   31.83           0.64              36      
1994 1.16          1.63            1.92            11.20            0.79                    -                   31.83           0.64              49      
1995 2.27          0.79            0.59            5.48              0.57                    -                   31.83           0.64              42      
1996 3.72          2.96            0.79            4.56              0.95                    -                   31.83           0.64              45      
1997 3.32          1.75            0.73            3.31              1.04                    9.00                  31.83           4.61              56      
1998 4.85          1.80            1.69            2.87              0.89                    -                   31.83           5.42              49      
1999 5.77          1.50            1.44            5.15              0.76                    -                   31.83           5.66              52      
2000 7.35          1.50            1.67            4.15              0.78                    2.40                  31.83           5.87              56      
2001 7.28          0.90            2.84            7.05              0.97                    6.06                  31.83           3.90              61      
2002 7.86          0.90            2.12            7.62              1.12                    0.87                  31.83           6.05              58      
2003 10.97        0.48            1.20            6.16              0.93                    2.00                  31.83           10.86            64      
2004 12.97        1.75            5.77            3.90              1.83                    5.14                  31.83           11.30            74      
2005 11.74        1.35            5.45            7.78              1.53                    6.00                  31.83           11.24            77      
2006 9.15          25.40          2.01            8.34              1.23                    4.45                  31.83           18.65            101    
2007 10.48        3.15            2.77            6.83              1.62                    -                   31.83           20.25            77      
2008 14.97        3.25            1.42            6.97              1.78                    -                   31.83           20.02            80      
2009 15.17        2.75            1.76            7.24              1.92                    -                   31.83           17.59            78      
2010 17.58        -              1.70            6.91              1.83                    -                   31.83           15.14            75      
2011 19.10        -              1.81            5.23              1.23                    -                   31.83           11.32            71      
2012 13.73        -              1.70            9.19              1.24                    -                   31.83           12.14            70      
2013 15.46        -              1.10            10.40            1.24                    -                   31.83           8.86              69      
TOTAL 199            57                40               130                26                        36                     764              193                1,446 
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Table C-8: Total tax and non-tax payments from Ok Tedi mine (Millions PNGK) 
 
 
  
Year 
Copper 
(t) 
Gold 
(Oz) 
silver 
(Oz) Gross Sales NATP 
     
0 
1982 
   
0 0 
1983 
   
0 0 
1984 
 
10985 5123 19.6 0 
1985 
 
538537 185683 171.9 -45 
1986 
 
598790 184638 208.9 42.5 
1987 38167 567180 220510 297 77 
1988 50910 579319 630951 231.5 20.7 
1989 131142 509544 965364 460.4 27.9 
1990 153162 414759 792855 538.5 89.6 
1991 198325 345716 821579 545.8 74.5 
1992 187004 325719 748597 513.4 51.3 
1993 202206 387866 865465 518.1 53.4 
1994 206639 447470 973684 684.2 126.6 
1995 229362 509621 998054 1074.1 166.8 
1996 188414 443326 875625 802.6 147.1 
1997 86741 187310 389184 391.4 -15.5 
1998 187249 501133 974970 1003.3 80.8 
1999 182588 388959 1031918 1043 92.5 
2000 187952 490555 1347918 1297.2 151.3 
2001 211975 480749 1236677 1491.6 69 
2002 181146 414808 928668 1532.3 139.9 
2003 228997 587139 1213977 2176.8 322.3 
2004 166328 491005 1132251 2088.4 493 
2005 204840 594402 1415692 3308.3 1047.3 
2006 177538 505248 1312842 4643.2 1881.2 
2007 186526 523446 1612968 5039.7 2040.5 
2008 162722 504123 1380840 3826.6 1226.7 
2009 150579 499300 1418617 4002.1 1562.2 
2010 158692 482068 1507096 5086.1 2029.3 
2011 146336 146336 1189029 4535.9 1239.3 
2012 121432 121432 889385 3359.6 913.3 
2013 100212 352050 929380 2670.2 181.9 
TOTAL 4427184 12948895 28179540 53561.7 14287.4 
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Table C-9: Redistributions of direct and non-tax benefits (Millions PNGK) 
 
Notes: 
(a) Royalty collection was centralised, but increasing community demand had shifted in policy where 100 
percent royalty paid to community entities and provincial governments as of 1990 
(b) State disposed of its Preference Certificate to shareholders and earned ordinary share dividends from 
owning 18.30 percent until the Ok Tedi mine was expropriated in 2014. These data exclude the dividend 
payments to PNG Sustainable Development Program (PNGSDP).  
(c) Business development comprised of goods and services procurements and direct contracts (assume 50 
percent of total)    
(d) Human capital assumed 50 percent of the total expenditure on in-house and external training 
(e) Direct taxes are taxes recognised on the project cash flow 
(f) Indirect taxes are taxes paid for employment of inputs production (e.g., salary and GST) 
(g) Non-tax benefits are business development, contracts, and donations. 
 Mining ProductioCIT DWT RoyaltyWithholdiCustomsSalaries/ Payee GST State Business Human TOTAL TOTAL Non-Tax TOTAL
Year Royalty(a Levy Levy WHT Tax Duties Wages Tax Dividends (bDev (c ) Capital (d)Direct Taxes (eIndirect (f )Benefits (g FISCAL 
1982 0.2 0.05 -                 0.2 0.1 0.25         
1983 0.2 1.5 0.05 -                 1.7 0.1 1.75         
1984 0.8 4.7 8.07 0.35 -                 5.5 8.4 13.92       
1985 2 16.1 28.2 42.2 8.07 0.65 18.1               70.4 8.7 97.22       
1986 2.6 0.1 5.1 5.5 8.07 0.35 2.7                 10.6 8.4 21.72       
1987 3.4 0.5 16.1 7.7 18.97 0.3 3.9                 23.8 19.3 46.97       
1988 3.6 0.3 5.1 8 61.62 0.4 3.9                 13.1 62.0 79.02       
1989 4.7 0.3 6.8 6.9 69.72 0.65 5.0                 13.7 70.4 89.07       
1990 5.5 0.8 5.6 7.5 84.52 0.85 6.3                 13.1 85.4 104.77     
1991 108.9 1 7.2 8 5.8 79.27 1 115.7             15.2 80.3 211.17     
1992 0.8 6.5 8.1 7.1 78.02 0.65 7.9                 14.6 78.7 101.17     
1993 0.6 5.9 6.5 7.8 80.52 0.6 8.4                 12.4 81.1 101.92     
1994 0.7 5.4 7.2 6.5 81.12 0.6 7.2                 12.6 81.7 101.52     
1995 4.9 0.5 8.7 10.2 0 86.92 1.3 5.4                 18.9 88.2 112.52     
1996 41 0.4 8.6 12.9 0 91.07 1.55 41.4               21.5 92.6 155.52     
1997 32.2 7.5 0.5 6.3 15.7 9.4 114.67 1.15 49.6               22 115.8 187.42     
1998 13.6 9.5 3.4 5.3 20.3 14.1 141.57 0.7 40.6               25.6 142.3 208.47     
1999 19.4 26.9 12.9 8.2 1.3 28 16.6 127.57 1.25 84.0               29.3 128.8 242.12     
2000 49.2 56.4 0.4 7.3 3.2 29.7 0 130.42 2.4 113.3             32.9 132.8 279.02     
2001 58.7 70 7 0.3 8.6 2.4 35.2 14.9 160.22 2.8 159.5             37.6 163.0 360.12     
2002 43.8 50 6.1 0.4 8.6 2.4 41.4 13.7 191.17 2.7 122.6             43.8 193.9 360.27     
2003 30.9 74.1 22.9 0.6 8.5 1.6 41.1 66.2 242.02 1 203.2             42.7 243.0 488.92     
2004 41 175.4 27.8 0.6 7.2 1.7 42.2 6.7 1.9 54.8 257.97 1 306.8             52.5 259.0 618.27     
2005 37.1 277.8 64.7 1.5 6.2 2.7 43.4 6.4 1.7 150.9 289.57 5.345 538.2             54.2 294.9 887.32     
2006 30.6 797.7 127 2.2 7.8 3.2 44.9 14.2 2 271.2 243.62 6.0275 1,236.1          64.3 249.6 1,550.05  
2007 31.5 1043 101 2.1 10.5 13.3 48.3 26.6 2.9 216 274.47 6.9265 1,403.4          91.1 281.4 1,775.90  
2008 2.5 11.4 646.2 65.5 1.7 15.9 9.2 53.1 17.3 3.8 139.1 230.87 7.5715 882.3             83.4 238.4 1,204.14  
2009 8.4 126.2 65.3 1.7 20.2 3.3 54.5 27.4 3.1 140 309.92 10.723 361.8             88.3 320.6 770.74     
2010 9.3 685.5 115 2.3 12.3 3.3 69.7 18.8 4 303.9 151.47 13.189 1,127.8          95.8 164.7 1,388.26  
2011 11.8 896.7 123 2.1 12.2 5.1 78.3 39 4.9 141.6 164.72 13.8025 1,187.8          127.3 178.5 1,493.62  
2012 10.5 228.6 45.8 1.6 8 33.2 74.5 37.9 4.5 132.3 155.07 13.523 426.8             150.1 168.6 745.49     
2013 7.7 105 0 1.3 9.2 22.2 82.9 38.4 4.9 0 3715.32 18.919 123.2             148.4 3734.2 4,005.84  
TOTAL 22           345    59         5,460   800  19      177       230     940       233    34    1,712        7,657     118        8,593             1,437       7,775       17,805     
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Table C-10: Benefit redistributions to Ok Tedi region and PNG (Millions PNGK) 
 
Notes: 
(a) Mining levy was introduced in 1996 was eventually abolished in 2008 
(b) MRA levy of 0.25 percent was introduced in 2008 to enforce policy implementation 
(c) Direct taxes comprise of CIT, DWT, equity dividend, royalty withholding tax 
(d) Indirect taxes comprise of employee salary tax, GST, duties and customs, etc. 
(e) Equity dividend comprises of GoPNG, Western Provincial Government and landholder communities 
(f) General compensation to mine-affected communities, which includes donations to disasters and sports 
(g) Funds managed for community projects under the Mine Continuation Agreement as of 2001 
(h) Contracts owned by community, and PNG owned firms excludes international service providers 
(i) Goods and services procure within PNG 
(j) Human capital comprise of skills driven in-house and external training to PNG and locals 
(k) TCS was the source of infrastructure development, which also includes a portion of royalty for on-
going maintenance of the Kiunga to Tabubil road  
 Year Royalty Mining MRA Direct Indirect Equity Compo(f )MCA (g) Service Goods Proc & Human (j) Infras Total
Levy(a ) Levy(b ) Taxes(c ) Taxes(d ) Dividends(e ) Contracts (h) Business Dev. (i) Capital TCS (k )
1982 0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.90          
1983 0.2 0 1.7 0.7 0.1 2.70          
1984 0.1 0 5.5 0.6 0.7 6.90          
1985 2 16.10     70.4 1.6 1.3 91.40        
1986 4.5 0.10       10.6 0 0.9 0.7 16.80        
1987 5.6 0.50       23.8 0 0.9 0.6 31.40        
1988 5.8 0.30       13.1 0 1 9.47 21.8 0.8 52.27        
1989 8.2 0.30       13.7 0 1 9.47 107.1 1.3 141.07      
1990 9.3 0.80       13.1 0 1.6 9.47 123.3 1.7 159.27      
1991 10.3 109.90   15.2 5.8 1.9 9.47 152.9 2 307.47      
1992 8.3 0.80       14.6 7.1 2.6 9.47 142.4 1.3 186.57      
1993 8.2 0.60       12.4 7.8 2 9.47 139.9 1.2 181.57      
1994 10.6 0.70       12.6 6.5 3.9 9.47 144.9 1.2 189.87      
1995 17 5.40       18.9 0 17.8 9.47 146.1 2.6 217.27      
1996 13.8 41.40     21.5 0 7.9 9.47 157.7 3.1 254.87      
1997 8.4 40.20     22 12.6 9 9.47 166 2.3 1.37 271.34      
1998 18.7 26.50     25.6 18.7 9.4 9.47 213.2 1.4 2.2 325.17      
1999 24 19.4 48.00     29.3 33.2 11.6 9.47 267 2.5 2.3 446.77      
2000 28.5 49.2 64.10     32.9 0 13.3 9.47 239 4.8 14.5 455.77      
2001 31.1 58.7 85.90     37.6 29.8 54.1 41.76 9.47 244.7 5.6 13.1 611.83      
2002 32.6 43.8 65.10     43.8 27.4 35.8 18.51 9.47 304.3 5.4 11.6 597.78      
2003 48.4 30.9 106.10   42.7 132.3 33.5 14.78 9.47 366.2 2 5.11 791.46      
2004 48.1 41 211.00   52.5 109.5 35.4 16.83 9.47 467.9 2 31.66 1,025.36   
2005 71.6 37.1 350.20   54.2 301.7 41.4 22.93 9.47 499.8 10.69 5.78 1,404.87   
2006 101.9 30.6 934.30   64.3 542.4 36.5 19.92 9.47 563 12.055 6.28 2,320.73   
2007 114.5 31.5 1,155.90      91.1 432 90.4 53.05 9.47 471.1 13.853 8.3 2,471.18   
2008 97.3 2.50 11.4 729.30   83.4 278.2 81.1 52.75 9.47 532.8 15.143 24.1 1,917.47   
2009 87.8 8.4 213.40   88.3 279.9 77.1 53.62 9.47 445.6 21.446 40.3 1,325.34   
2010 116.6 9.3 814.60   95.8 541.6 76.4 53.71 9.47 603.7 26.378 46.8 2,394.36   
2011 120.3 11.8 1,034.40      127.3 283.2 76.2 53.77 9.47 286.8 27.605 42.5 2,073.35   
2012 96.8 10.5 284.00   150.1 264.5 75.4 53.91 9.47 313.3 27.046 6.3 1,291.33   
2013 85 7.7 115.50   148.4 76.2 54.75 9.47 294 37.838 25.6 854.46      
TOTAL 1,235.70 344.70  59.10    6,455.40 1,436.60 3,314.20     877.60  510.29 246.29        7,414.50                236.75   287.80  22,418.93 
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Table C-11: Non-tax benefits redistributions to Western Province (Millions PNGK) 
 
Notes: 
(a) Total dividends comprise of equity ownerships: Mineral Resources Star Mountain (MRSM) 3.05 
percent; Mineral Resources Ok Tedi 3.05 percent; WPG 6.10 percent; and Non-CMCA 6.10 percent 
(b) Compensation comprised of payments in the form of cash to affected communities 
(c) Compensation paid into funds tied to community projects under the Mine Continuation Agreement 
(d) Business development comprised of goods and services, and direct contracts (50 percent of total)    
(e) Assume 50 percent of the total expenditure on in-house and external training flowed to the host region  
(f) The TCS has financed infrastructure around OK Tedi since its inception in 1997 
 Equity (b) Compo (cCompo Business Service Human Infrast. TOTAL
Year Royalty (a) Dividends General MCA (d) Dev (e) contracts (f)Capital (g) TCS (h) FISCAL 
1982 0.2 0.4 0.01 0.61      
1983 0.2 0.6 0.01 0.81      
1984 0.1 0.6 0.00 0.09 0.79      
1985 0 1.6 0.00 0.16 1.76      
1986 1.9 0.9 0.00 0.09 2.89      
1987 2.2 0.9 4.74 0.08 7.91      
1988 2.2 1 5.45 4.74 0.10 13.49    
1989 3.5 1 26.78 4.74 0.16 36.17    
1990 3.8 1.4 30.83 4.74 0.21 40.97    
1991 10.3 1.7 38.23 4.74 0.25 55.21    
1992 8.3 1.9 35.60 4.74 0.16 50.70    
1993 8.2 1.9 34.98 4.74 0.15 49.96    
1994 10.6 3.8 36.23 4.74 0.15 55.51    
1995 17 17.7 36.53 4.74 0.33 76.29    
1996 13.8 7.7 39.43 4.74 0.39 66.05    
1997 8.4 3.2 8.8 41.50 4.74 0.29 1.37 68.29    
1998 18.7 4.6 9.3 53.30 4.74 0.18 2.2 93.01    
1999 24 16.6 11.4 66.75 4.74 0.31 2.3 126.10  
2000 28.5 0 13 59.75 4.74 0.60 14.5 121.09  
2001 31.1 14.9 53.9 41.76 61.18 4.74 0.70 13.1 221.37  
2002 32.6 13.7 35.7 18.51 76.08 4.74 0.68 11.6 193.60  
2003 48.4 66.1 33.5 14.78 91.55 4.74 0.25 5.11 264.43  
2004 48.1 54.7 35.2 16.83 116.98 4.74 0.25 31.66 308.45  
2005 71.6 150.8 41 22.93 124.95 4.74 1.34 5.78 423.13  
2006 101.9 271.2 36.2 19.92 140.75 4.74 1.51 6.28 582.49  
2007 114.5 216 89.6 53.05 117.78 4.74 1.73 8.3 605.69  
2008 97.3 139.1 80.6 52.75 133.20 4.74 1.89 24.1 533.68  
2009 87.8 139.9 76.8 53.62 111.40 4.74 2.68 40.3 517.24  
2010 116.6 237.7 75.7 53.71 150.93 4.74 3.30 46.8 689.47  
2011 120.3 141.6 76.1 53.77 71.70 4.74 3.45 42.5 514.16  
2012 96.8 132.2 74.1 53.91 78.33 4.74 3.38 6.3 449.75  
2013 85 75 54.75 73.50 123.14 4.73 25.6 441.72  
TOTAL 1,214       1,602       869       510       1,854    30            288       6,613    
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Table C-12: Non-tax benefits redistributions to WPG (Millions PNGK) 
 
Notes: 
(a) Royalty payments to community entities exclude the Western Provincial and Fly River Local Level 
Governments 
(b) Dividend payments to community entities only and exclude the lower levels of governments 
(c) Compensation flows directly to the host communities and excludes donations 
 Equity (b Compo (cCompo Business Human Infrast. TOTAL
Year Royalty (a)DividendsGeneral MCA (d )Dev. (e ) Capital (f) TCS (g )
1982 0.2 0.4 0.01 0.61      
1983 0.2 0.7 0.01 0.91      
1984 0.1 0.6 2.84 0.09 3.62      
1985 0 1.6 2.84 0.16 4.60      
1986 0 0.9 2.84 0.09 3.82      
1987 0.1 0.9 2.84 0.08 3.91      
1988 0 1 2.84 0.10 3.94      
1989 0 1 2.84 0.16 4.00      
1990 0 1.6 2.84 0.21 4.65      
1991 1.5 1.9 2.84 0.25 6.49      
1992 1.4 2.6 2.84 0.16 7.00      
1993 1.3 2 2.84 0.15 6.29      
1994 1.9 3.9 2.84 0.15 8.79      
1995 2.5 17.8 2.84 0.33 23.46    
1996 3.3 7.9 2.84 0.39 14.42    
1997 1.7 3.2 9 2.84 0.29 0.34 17.37    
1998 4 4.6 9.4 2.84 0.18 0.55 21.56    
1999 4.6 16.6 11.6 2.84 0.31 0.58 36.52    
2000 7.8 0 13.3 2.84 0.60 3.63 28.16    
2001 6.5 14.9 54.1 41.76 2.84 0.70 3.28 124.07  
2002 7.1 13.7 35.8 18.51 2.84 0.68 2.90 81.52    
2003 10.6 66.1 33.5 14.78 2.84 0.25 1.28 129.34  
2004 10.8 54.7 35.4 16.83 2.84 0.25 7.92 128.73  
2005 28 150.8 41.4 22.93 2.84 1.34 1.45 248.75  
2006 43.2 271.2 36.5 19.92 2.84 1.51 1.57 376.73  
2007 42.7 216 90.4 53.05 2.84 1.73 2.08 408.79  
2008 35.1 139.1 81.1 52.75 2.84 1.89 6.03 318.80  
2009 31.8 139.9 77.1 53.62 2.84 2.68 10.08 318.01  
2010 44.5 237.7 76.4 53.71 2.84 3.30 11.70 430.14  
2011 40.7 141.6 76.2 53.77 2.84 3.45 10.63 329.18  
2012 31.1 132.2 75.4 53.91 2.84 3.38 1.58 300.40  
2013 23.9 76.2 54.75 2.84 4.73 6.40 168.82  
TOTAL 387         1,602    878       510       85         30            72         3,563    
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(d) The Supplementary Ok Tedi Act provides the mine to pay compensation to affected communities 
under the MCA 
(e) Business development benefit to the enclave Ok Tedi community comprises local owned contracts and 
50 percent of JV with other Papua New Guineans wholly    
(f) Assume 25 percent of the total expenditure on in-house and external training directly benefited the host 
community  
(g) Since TSC is spread wide within the region, about 25 percent of the TCS funds are spent within the 
host mining area 
 
 
